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Abstract
This is a study of two causally related issues, 
industrial and trade imbalances in the former East 
African Common Market (EACM) from mainly 1962 to the 
break up of that Common Market in 1977. Industrial 
imbalances among the three member countries of the EACM, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, was the principal cause of 
the trade imbalances. And the two forms of imbalances 
were a source of political sensitivity in Uganda and 
especially in Tanzania. This sensitivity, which 
reflected a belief that the operation of the EACM had 
been inequitable, was a threat to the existence of that 
economic integration scheme in the early 1960s. ^
This study analyses the nature, the causes and the 
dynamics of the industrial and trade imbalances for the 
sixteen year period mentioned above. Both quantitative 
and qualitative evaluations are made in order to 
establish the effectiveness of the mechanisms which were 
devised to correct the two forms of imbalances. The 
study focuses on one of the corrective mechanisms, the 
East African Development Bank (EADB), which still 
operates today. It was expected to reduce industrial 
disparities between Kenya and the other two countries.
Four perspectives concerning the operation of the 
EADB are adopted for the purposes of evaluating the 
effectiveness of this instrument. The first is fund
allocation. The EADB was supposed to allocate the 
funds at its disposal according to a prescribed formula. 
The second perspective is about countries1 capacity 
to absorb the funds allocated to them. The third concerns 
the relative importance of the EADB as a source of 
finance for projects, in comparison with the other 
sources of finance which the study calls the Non-Bank 
sources. Finally, the EADBfs effectiveness as a 
mechanism for correcting industrial disparities is 
evaluated from the standpoint of the performance of the 
projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
The EADB was also expected to make its three member 
countries increasingly complementary in industrial 
field. The measure of success it achieved in this 
direction is assessed.
It is found that the EADB was not an effective 
instrument for reducing industrial imbalances between 
Kenya and the other two countries. There are several 
explanations for this. First, the EADB did not have 
adequate funds. Second, finance absorption in Kenya 
was higher than in either Tanzania or Uganda and the 
EADB had hardly any power over that factor. Third, the 
EADBfs contribution of finance to the cost of projects 
was small. The Non-Bank sources were a more important 
source of finance. Fourth, Kenya*s capacity to 
generate investment greatly exceeded that of either 
Tanzania or Uganda. Therefore, given that the Bank
was a minor source of finance for the projects it co­
financed, its "balancing effect11 was greatly offset by 
the ,fdisparity effect" arising from Kenya’s greater 
capacity to generate investment. Finally, Kenya had 
more successful projects than either of the two 
countries. And the amount of investment in those 
projects (effective investment) was far in excess of 
the amount of effective investment in either of the two 
countries. An examination of the determinants of the 
success and failure of projects revealed that the EADB 
had scarcely any control of those determinants0
The study concludes that the reduction of industrial 
imbalances objective was unrealistic. This conclusion 
is partly arrived at by evaluating the performance of 
the EADB. It is also reached by taking into consider­
ation the findings that during the active lifetime of 
the East African Community (EAC), 1968-1977, there had 
been a general trend towards industrial disparity 
between Kenya and her two Partner States. Trade 
imbalances moved in the same direction. For Kenya and
Uganda, that trend goes back to 1962.
The EADB was also ineffective as an instrument for 
making its member countries increasingly complementary 
in industrial field. This was chiefly because there 
was no agreement between these countries on the harmoniz­
ation of industrial development in the EAC.
The principal lessons of this study are the
following. To begin with, it is unrealistic to try to 
bring about balanced economic development among members 
countries of an economic integration scheme if conditions 
for economic growth in those members differ. Secondly, 
as long as those members accept a high degree of inter­
country trade, imbalances in trade between those countries 
will exist. This should not, however, unduly raise 
political sensitivity of the member countries in trade 
deficit unless their share of trade in their economic 
block is falling and if they can not in the present or 
future induce investors operating in national boundaries 
to exploit the presence of a multinational market.
In connection with the EADB, it is argued that it 
could contribute more to the economic welfare of its 
member countries in two main ways. The first is that 
it should be able to mobilize more concessionary funds 
than it did in the past. The point is that the EADB 
should utilize increasingly soft loans such as those it 
obtained from the Scandinavian countries. The second 
way, is for the EADB to strive harder than it has done 
in the past to raise the number of successful projects 
in its member countries. Ways in which this goal may 
be achieved are found in the concluding chapter 8, of 
the thesis.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction -
Economic integration schemes in the less developed 
world are expected, inter alia, to accelerate the rate 
of economic growth of member countries. It is also 
expected that the benefits derived from the operation of 
such schemes will be equitably distributed among members. 
These expectations are shown in agreements below about 
economic co-operation in certain parts of the under­
developed world. The Treaty for East African Co-operat­
ion, which contains methods of regulating the operation 
of the former East African Common Market‘d (EACM) states 
that «,.... ’’there shall be accelerated, harmonious and 
balanced development..0. and sustained expansion of
economic activities, the benefit whereof shall be
2
equitably shared”. The Caribbean Treaty had a
3
similar objective. And two of the principal goals
of the Andean Group Treaty were the reduction of the
differences in development which existed among the
member countries and equitable distribution of the
potential benefits of that economic integration scheme
4among those members.
This study has two broad objectives. First, it 
investigates the nature, the causes and the dynamics of 
the twin problem of industrial and trade imbalances in
the former East African Common Market mainly between
1962 and 1977. Second, it carries out in-depth
evaluations of the effectiveness of mechanisms which
were designed to correct the two forms of imbalance*
on
The focus of the study is^the effectiveness of the
regional bank, the East African Development Bank, which
was supposed to reduce industrial imbalances between
Kenya and the other two countries.
The study was undertaken for two major reasons.
The first was to highlight the problem of uneven
distribution of industries among the member countries of 
5
a wholistic form of economic co-operation in the 
developing world. Industrial imbalances in the East 
African Common Market had been the principal cause of 
trade imbalances. Kenya, which had more industries 
than Tanzania and Uganda, had had a persistent trade 
surplus with her two partners. These two partners had 
shown a high degree of sensitivity to their trade 
deficit with Kenya. That sensitivity was, in the early 
and mid-1960s, a threat to the economic co-operation 
which had existed between the three countries since the 
1920s . Tanzania, which was less industrialised than 
Uganda in the 1960s, had also been persistently in trade 
deficit with Uganda up to 1970.
The second reason for undertaking the' study was to 
investigate the problems encountered in trying to correct 
industrial imbalances in the East African Common Market.
Here two forms of analysis are carried out. The first 
concerns an evaluation of the degree of effectiveness 
which could have been expected from the corrective 
mechanisms. The second is an actual evaluation of the 
effectiveness of one of the corrective mechanisms, the 
East African Development Bank (EADB). This exercise is 
expected to yield important insights into the effective­
ness, or lack of it, of the Bank. Eieldwork research 
was done on the operation of this regional development 
bank-cum-financial corporation. In evaluating the effect' 
iveness of "Bank1* and the other corrective mechanisms, the 
causes of industrial imbalances are taken into account.
At the time of starting this study, it was assumed 
that at some date in the future some form of economic 
co-operation between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda would be 
revived. It was also assumed that in the event such a 
decision was made, it would be helpful if. policy-makers 
in the three countries had the results of analyses of 
how the Common Market had operated. It was considered 
important to show whether or not a balanced distribution 
of industries among the three partner states was a 
realistic objective in the absence of a joint policy on 
industrial development on the Common Market basis.
The decision to revive economic co-operation, on 
piecemeal basis, was taken by the Heads of States of the 
three countries in November, 1983^. The three States 
also showed interest in East African economic
o
co-operation involving more than fourteen States .
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, as well as other Eastern
African States, could benefit from the East African
Community’s experience.
The East African Development Bank, which still
operates today, could play a useful part in assisting
the realisation of regional co-operation. Its
experience in successfully handling political issues
which would have wrecked it (the Bank), is invaluable.
Also its knowledge of the determinants of performance
of projects is very important. According to the new
Charter of the Bank, it is no longer expected to
reduce industrial imbalances between Kenya on the one
9hand and Tanzania and Uganda on the other .
lo2 Indicators of Magnitudes of Industrial and Trade 
Imbalances in the EACM
The object of this short section is to provide some 
indicators of magnitude of industrial and trade imbalances 
mentioned above. Details concerning the two forms of 
imbalances and how they changed over the sixteen year 
period under study are found in Chapters 2, 4 and 5.
In Kenya, the manufacturing sector contributed 
K. shso 460 million (the shilling was officially at par 
in East Africa until 1980) to the gross domestic product 
in 1962^e This was equal to 9o4 per cent of the GDP.
In Tanzania and Uganda, their manufacturing sectors
contributed T. shs 158 million and U* shs 196 million
respectively in the same year^. (These contributions
formed 3® 7 per cent of the Tanzanian GDP and 6„2 per cent
of the Ugandan GDP. A noteworthy point is that while
Kenya was more industrialised than the other two
countries, all the three countries were still at very
low stages of industrial development.
In 1977, the Kenyan manufacturing sector contributed
12K« shs 4107 million to the GDP . This amount was
equal to 12*7 per cent of the GDP. In Tanzania and
Uganda, the manufacturing sectors contributed To shs 2416
million and U« shs 1309 million to their respective 
1 3GDP . These contributions correspond to 9® 6 per cent 
of the Tanzanian GDP and to 4®7 per cent of the Ugandan 
GDP. Notice that while the industrial imbalance 
between Kenya and Tanzania was smaller by 1977 than it 
had been in 1962, the imbalance between Kenya and Uganda 
had increased between the two years. This is explained 
by the fact that while industrial production in Kenya 
expanded, in Uganda it collapsed particularly during 
the Amin administration, from 1971 onwards0
The magnitudes of trade imbalances are shown start­
ing from 1 9 5 6 o  The reason for starting from 1 9 5 6  and 
not from 1962 is that complaints by policy-makers in 
Tanzania and Uganda started being vocal in the late
1950s^. In 1956, Kenya had a trade surplus of
15Ko shs 93 million with Tanzania and Uganda ® The
surplus with Tanzania was shs, 39 million and that
with Uganda was shs. 54 million. By 1962, Kenya’s
trade surplus with the two countries had risen to
K. shs. 200 million, and Tanzania’s trade deficit was
T. shs 186 million^. In 1976 (the final full year of
the operation of the East African Common Market before
the closure of the Kenya-Tanzania border, this event
virtually brought to an end trade between the two
countries) Kenya’s trade surplus with Tanzania and
17Uganda was K» shs 1037 million . This time Tanzania’s
trade deficit was shs. 391 million and Uganda’s was
18shs. 646 million.
An important question which arises from these 
statistics is what they tell us about the relationship 
between industrial and trade imbalances. To begin 
with, it was seen above that Kenya was the most 
industrialised member of the East African Common Market. 
Secondly, it will be seen in Chapters 2 and 5 that 
manufactured products accounted for a disproportionately 
large part of Kenya’s exports to Tanzania and Uganda.
It follows, therefore, that manufactured goods accounted 
also for a disproportionately large part of Kenya’s 
trade surplus. Tanzania’s and Uganda’s trade deficit 
with Kenya was largely due to the fact that they were 
not able to produce goods such as manufactures for 
which there was a high demand within these countries and 
in Kenya. This point is elaborated in Chapters 2 and 5*
Uganda’s enormous trade deficit in 1976 was a result of 
the collapse of industrial production. This meant that 
the country was not only no longer able to satisfy some 
of her domestic demand, but she could not also no longer 
meet the demand for her traditional products in the 
other two countries.
In Tanzania, industrial production expanded steadily 
between 1962 and 1977. This led to an increase in the 
capacity to satisfy both the domestic demand and demand 
in the other two countries, especially in Kenya. 
Tanzania’s trade deficit of shs. 391 million in 1976 
(trade between Tanzania and Uganda was only shs. 7 
million of Tanzania’s exports to Uganda, nothing was 
imported from Uganda) was apparently not too alarming 
to revive the vocal complaints of the 1950s and 1960s.
It seems that the absence of complaints was due to the 
facts that instruments to correct industrial imbalances, 
(which was the cause of trade imbalances) were in 
operation and because Tanzanian exports to Kenya had 
risen. Uganda had herself to blame for the loss of 
her share of the EACM market.
1.3 Attempts to Render the Operation of the EACM 
Equitable
Three attempts were made in the 1960s, to render 
the operation of the East African Common Market 
equitable. The first was an arrangement called the 
Distributable Pool which was proposed by the
19Raisman Commission in I960 . This arrangement involved
the creation of a common fund to which Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda would contribute (see Chapter 4). Kenya, by 
virtue of being more industrialised and more economic­
ally developed, was expected to pay more money into the 
Distributable Pool than Tanzania and Uganda, Part of 
that money was expected to meet the costs of running 
services provided on an East African basis, and the 
other part was expected to be distributed to the three 
countries in equal shares. The scheme came into 
operation in 1961.
Policy-makers in Tanzania and Uganda did not find 
the Distributable Pool a satisfactory arrangement.
This was mainly because it did not tackle the causes 
of industrial and trade imbalances. In other words, 
the arrangement did not go to the root causes of the 
inequitable operation of the Common Market.
Policy-makers in Uganda and especially those in 
Tanzania, wanted to have mechanisms which would regulate 
the operation of the Common Market in such a way that 
both industrial and trade imbalances would be eliminated. 
A search for such mechanisms started in 1964 (soon after 
the independence of Kenya in December, 1963) and by 1965 
the necessary mechanisms had been found and accepted by 
the three countries. A document containing these 
mechanisms was called the Kampala Agreement^®.
This agreement contained two types of corrective
instruments. The first type was concerned with the 
regulation of inter-country trade so that some degree 
of inter-country trade balance would be achieved.
This entailed two methods of controlling inter-country 
trade. The first was to restrict, by a means of a 
quota system, the exports of a country which had had a 
trade surplus with another in the previous year. The 
second method was to encourage the country which had 
been in trade deficit with her partners in the previous 
year, to raise the volume of her exports to them. 
However, the methods of promoting exports were not 
specified.
The second type of corrective instruments concerned 
reducing industrial imbalances. There were two types 
of corrective mechanisms. The first involved the 
branching out of industries from Kenya to Tanzania and 
also from Kenya to Uganda. Firms which had tradition­
ally operated from Kenya to supply the Tanzanian and 
Ugandan markets were requested to set up branch product­
ion units in these two markets. Actually, for some of 
the firms in question, the decision to establish branch
units in Tanzania and Uganda had been taken long before
21the Kampala Agreement . The motive behind that
decision was to pre-empt other firms from gaining a
22foothold in the markets of Tanzania and Uganda . This 
would ensure that^ihe traditional suppliers from Kenya 
would retain their share of the Tanzanian and Ugandan
markets. The impetus for the preservation of a captive
market was provided by political pressure emanating from
23Uganda, and especially from Tanzania . There was a
threat that unless branch units were set up in the two
countries to substitute products formerly imported from
Kenya, other new firms willing to do so would capture
the market share of the existing firms.
The second mechanism for reducing industrial
imbalances was to allocate a number of "East African
Industries" to the three countries in such a way that a
country which was less industrialised would receive more
industries than a country which was more industrialised.
Tanzania, because of being the least industrialised
member, was allocated the largest number of industries,
three of them. Uganda was allocated two "East African
Industries", and Kenya was allocated only one such
industry. Bach of these East African industries was
expected to be the sole producer of a given product for
the EACM market.
Six industries were too few to have a significant
effect on reducing industrial imbalances. Moreover,
they were not as large-scale as the East African Oil 
24-Refinery . However, an agreement to have East African
25industries was an important step towards rationalising 
industrial production on a Common Market basis. This 
was something that had previously eluded policy-makers 
in the East African Common Market.
Unfortunately, the Kampala Agreement was never
ratified because of disagreement between policy-makers
in Kenya and Tanzania over retaining the shilling as a
26common currency in the EACM . However, some of the
branches of industries which were supposed to shift
from Kenya to Tanzania and Uganda did so.
The failure to ratify the Kampala Agreement was
followed by restrictions of imports from Kenya by the
other two countries. To a lesser extent Tanzania
restricted imports from Uganda. There was concern in
all the three countries that the interference with trade
could lead to a serious disruption of all forms of
economic co-operation between the three countries.
To avert this imminent disruption of co-operation,
the Philip Commission was set up in 1965, the same year
in which the Kampala Agreement should have been ratified
The terms of reference for the Commission were to find
ways in which economic co-operation between Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda could be strengthened. This
involved finding ways in which the cause of trade
imbalance, which was industrial imbalance, could be
corrected. The Commission proposed two mechanisms for
28correcting industrial imbalances . The two mechanisms 
came into operation in December, 1967.
A system of Transfer Taxes was one of the two 
corrective mechanisms. This was a system of import 
duties imposed on goods originating from Kenya and
Uganda. Tanzania was entitled to impose such duties 
on some industrial products from Kenya and Uganda 
because she was less industrialised than the two 
countries. Uganda was also entitled to tax some 
manufactures from Kenya because she was less industrial­
ised than Kenya. The products on which Tanzania and 
Uganda could legitimately impose the Transfer Taxes 
were those for which the capacity to produce them 
domestically was either present or was likely to be 
installed in a period of three months. Other conditions 
which had to be fulfilled before the Transfer Taxes 
could be introduced are found in Chapter 5. Because 
Kenya was more industrialised than either of the two 
countries, she was not entitled to impose import 
duties on her imports from Tanzania and Uganda®
The purpose of the Transfer Taxes was to protect 
’’infant” industries in Tanzania and Uganda so that in 
future there would be a balanced distribution of 
industries among the three countries. In other words, 
tariff protection provided by that system of taxes was 
supposed to enable a less industrialised member country 
to catch up with the more industrialised country.
It was expected that after fifteen years the 
Transfer Taxes would have achieved the objective of 
bringing about a balanced distribution of industries 
and would, therefore, be revoked. An a priori examin­
ation of the measure of success which could have been
expected from the Transfer Taxes is carried out in
Chapter 5- Because assessing the actual effectiveness
of the system requires a lot of data which are extremely
difficult to obtain, and whose reliability would be in
any case questionable, it was decided not to undertake
that exercise. As Hazelwood has observed, ,f....
admitted ignorance is preferable to a precisely
29calculated error” .
There was an implicit assumption that the presence
of the Transfer Taxes would lead to a reduction in
intra-EACM trade imbalances. Chapter 5 investigates
whether or not in the lifetime of that system of
protective tariffs, 1968 to 1 9 7 7 that goal was
achieved. The result of that investigation should
provide an idea about whether or not the Transfer Taxes
had been effective in reducing the cause of trade
imbalances in the EACH®
The other mechanism for correcting industrial
imbalances was the East African Development Bank. This
mechanism was expected to reduce industrial imbalance
between Kanya and the other two countries by lending
more money to Tanzania and Uganda. The prescribed
formula was that at the end of five years of lending,
Tanzania and Uganda should each have been allocated
38o75 per cent and Kenya 22 <>50 per cent of the total
amount lent. This formula, which was a product of
31political bargaining, did not bear any relation to
the degree of industrial imbalance that existed between 
Kenya and other two countries.
The measure of success the Bank met with as an 
instrument for correcting imbalances is evaluated in 
Chapter 6. In that chapter the extent to which the 
Bank was able to fulfil its other major goal, to make 
the economies of its three member countries complement­
ary in industrial field, is assessed. The Bank’s 
effectiveness in the first objective is further investi­
gated in Chapter 7 on the basis of performance of 
projects (whether or not they came into production and 
were profitable).
lo4 Political and Economic Framework of the Study
The Political Case
This section provides brief political and economic 
cases for correcting industrial and trade imbalances in 
the former East African Common Market. The main 
political case was to create political goodwill towards 
economic co-operation among the policy-makers in 
Tanzania and Uganda. It will be recalled that political 
sensitivity arising from industrial and trade imbalances 
threatened to disrupt the East African Common Market in 
the 1960s. In fact, policy-makers in Tanzania at one 
time issued a warning that they intended to pursue 
certain economic policies which were incompatible with
economic co-operation unless the Common Market was made
to operate in a more equitable manner than it had done 
32in the past . Tanzania's separatist stance was 
partly a result of disillusionment, because policy­
makers in Kenya and Uganda could not accept the federat-
33ion of the three countries which she had advocated .
In a federation, it is most likely that agreement
on joint economic policies to be carried out among the
member countries will be arrived at. One of such
policies in the Bast African Common Market would have
been a joint policy on industrial development on the
Common Market basis. Such a joint policy might have
made it possible to find ways in which a more even
distribution of industries among the three countries
could be brought about.
Federation had eluded Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
in spite of co-operation in many fields. The latter
two countries had, at different times, found it to be
against their economic and political interests to be
involved in a close political co-operation. For
instance, in the early colonial period, 1920s and 1930s,
policy-makers in Tanganyika had complained that the
protection of Kenyan industries which was enforced in
the three East African territories, had harmed the
consumers in Tanganyika. This complaint was found to
be a legitimate one by Armitage-Smith, an independent
34investigator from the Colonial Office in London.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Tanganyika did not have any 
industries which could benefit from the tariff protect­
ion enforced in the three East African territories.
These tariffs were, therefore, seen by the policy-makers 
in Tanganyika as serving the economic interest of Kenya 
at the expense of Tanganyika. If the latter had also 
had industries whose products were protected in the 
East African market, it is probable that her policy­
makers would have overlooked both the national income 
and import duty revenue which were being sacrificed. 
Import duty was sacrificed because the three territories 
did not levy import duty on the goods they imported from 
each other since the three territories were a customs 
union.
Economics and politics, as is often the case, were
intertwined. Policy-makers in Tanganyika and Uganda
had in the past feared that in a federation, the
European settlers in Kenya would dominate the indigenous
people who formed the vast majority. For Tanganyika,
that fear seemed to have disappeared around the time of
independence of the three territories in the early 1960s.
Nyerere pressed for the federation of the three territor- 
35ies . Policy-makers in Kenya seemed at first to be
36committed to the East African federation . As will 
be explained in Chapter 6, policy-makers in Uganda were 
still opposed to an East African federation in the early 
1960s. This was partly because of apprehension that the
economic welfare of the small scale farmer in Uganda
would deteriorate and, more importantly, because some
influential ethnic groups in the country suspected that
37they would lose their political power in a federation 
There were also other obstacles concerning power sharing 
(see Chapter 6). Policy-makers in Tanzania and Kenya 
had not gone far in seeking to reach an agreement on 
that matter. Instead, the two countries had started 
accusing each other of being the cause of the delay of
o p
the federation .
In this connection, Nyerere observed in the early
1960s that the longer the time it took to federate, the
more likely it was that a sense of patriotism (self-
39interest) would hinder federation in the future •
This observation turned out to be prophetic and it meant 
a loss of an opportunity to create an environment that 
would have facilitated the rationalisation of emergent 
industrial structure in the East African Common Market. 
This point is borne in mind when assessing the effective­
ness of the Bank as an instrument for making its member 
countries increasingly complementary in industrial field.
While it would now be unrealistic to expect that 
there would be a federation of Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda in the foreseeable future, it must be stressed 
that some form of political co-operation between these 
countries is essential for exploiting the potential 
benefits from economic co-operation. The same argument
applies also to other Eastern African and West African 
countries which have shown interest in regional economic 
co-operation.
The Economic Case
The economic case for correcting industrial
imbalances in the former East African Common Market is
examined from three angles. The first is that
industries established in Kenya before Tanzania and
Uganda began to promote their own industrial development
forestalled the establishment of similar industries in
those two countries. There is no evidence that this
happened. On the contrary, Tanzania and Uganda in their
drive to industrialise in the early and the mid-1960s,
set up many industries to substitute for goods formerly
40imported from Kenya . Kenya substituted some of
industrial goods from the two countries, on a significant
scale, later.
In any case, what policy-makers in Tanzania and
Uganda ought to have placed high on their list of
industrial development was to select those industries
which would reap the benefits of economies of scale by
producing for the East African market. Unfortunately,
the history of the East African Licensing Board shows
that an orderly development of industries which would
have avoided duplication or triplication of industries
41in the EACM was not achieved. Each country seemed
to want to set up an industry similar to one already in
existence in another country. The tendency for each
country to be self-sufficient, which had been identified 
42in the 1950s , was still present in the 1960s and
43
1970s . A more detailed discussion of rationalisation
of industrial production in the EACM is found in 
Chapters 4 and 6.
The second case for correcting industrial imbalances 
was to be found in anticipated benefits from the 
creation of employment for the resources of the less 
industrialised countries and in structural transformat­
ion of their economies. By setting up industries in 
Tanzania and Uganda, where relatively few existed, 
industrial growth poles would be created and future 
development of industries would depend on such growth 
poles^. This seems to have been a strong argument.
The creation of industrial growth poles is closely 
related to the theory of circular and cumulative causat­
ion in the sense that a region which has a concentration 
of economic activities is likely to be a more attractive
location for other new economic activities than a region
45where economic activities are sparse. The theory of 
circular and cumulative causation and its relevance to 
the East African Common Market are discussed in 
Chapter 3.
The third case for correcting industrial imbalances 
by setting up industries in Tanzania and Uganda rested
on the reduction in the price the consumer would pay 
for a good produced domestically. This applied to the 
types of industries whose products were bulky and 
expensive to transport from Kenya where they had 
traditionally been produced, to Tanzania and Uganda 
where they were consumed. Such industries included 
soft drinks, beer brewery and cement. It was advantage­
ous, in terms of reducing the transportation costs, that
those industries should be located near the main
4-6national markets . However, the consumer would 
benefit if other major components of cost for producing 
a good were at least equal to those in Kenya.
The case for correcting trade imbalances was to be 
found in solving the balance of payments ’’problem”.
But the case for ’’solving” the balance of payments 
’’problem” was a weak one because the solution proposed 
by the Kampala Agreement involved reducing the volume 
of intra-common market trade. In order for the member 
countries to attain rapid economic growth rates, fast 
expansion of the volume of trade was required. It must 
be realised that a balance of trade deficit does not 
necessarily inhibit economic growth, especially if these 
partner states are not each other’s major trading 
partners, as was the case with Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda^. This point is demonstrated by the fact that 
the Kenyan economy grew faster than Tanzania’s and 
Uganda’s between 1954 and I960, despite her persistent
48overall balance of trade deficit . That point is
further illustrated by the fact that despite America’s
massive trade deficit of #107 billion in 1984, her GNP
49grew at a very high rate of 6*8 per cent*
lo 5 Plan of Thesis and Contributions
This chapter tried to create a framework for the 
thesis by outlining the major issues related to the two 
themes of this study, industrial and trade imbalances in 
the former East African Common Market (EACM). The 
major issues are discussed in detail in the rest of the 
thesis.
Chapter 2 does three main things. Pirst, it 
examines some of the major economic indicators of the 
EACM economies and analyses the changes in those 
indicators which occurred between 1954 and 1961. The 
main areas of interest in this exercise are the changes 
which took place in industrial and trade imbalances in 
the EACM. Second, the historical origin of industrial 
disparities are examined* Third, a causal relationship 
between industrial imbalance and trade imbalance is 
examined. The findings in chapter 2 serve two purposes. 
To begin with, some are used in the assessment of the 
relevance of the customs union theory to the EACM in 
the next chapter. The other function is to provide 
inputs when measures designed to correct industrial 
imbalances are critically examined in chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 3 reviews several strands of economic 
theory in which the study is placed. The relevance of 
those theories to the situation that obtained in the 
EACM is examined*
Chapter 4 carries out four types of analyses 
designed to shed more light on industrial and trade 
imbalances. First, it examines critically the 
Distributable Pool as an instrument for making the EACM 
more equitable than it had been in the past. Second, 
other corrective mechanisms in the Kampala Agreement 
are subjected to a close and critical examination*
This examination utilizes some of the findings in 
chapters 2 and 3. The third type of analysis involves 
investigating the role market forces played in cross- 
border flow of investments into the manufacturing sectors 
of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The primary point of 
interest is what motivated such flow of investments* 
Finally, the changes in both industrial production and 
inter-country trade imbalances which took place during 
the period covered by this chapter, 1962-1967, are 
analysed* The aim is to show whether or not the two 
forms of imbalances widened*
Chapter 5 also carries out analyses intended to 
offer further insights into the twin problem of 
industrial disparities and trade imbalances in the EACM. 
The chapter covers the 1968-1977 period when the two 
instruments meant to reduce the two forms of imbalances 
were in operation. The first type of analysis
undertaken is the examination, on an a priori basis, of 
the degree of effectiveness which could realistically 
be expected from the Transfer Taxes. Secondly, the 
changes which occurred in industrial production in 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda during the ten year period 
are analysed. The object of this exercise is to 
establish whether or not the general trend was one of 
a reduction in industrial imbalances. A general 
hypothesis here is that there was too strong a trend 
towards the divergence of industrial imbalances which 
could not be substantially offset by the results of the 
Transfer Taxes.
The fourth type of analysis is an examination of 
the changes in the intra-EACM trade also between 1968 
and 1977. The aim of this exercise is to show the 
relationship between the industrial performance of the 
three countries and the pattern of their imports and 
exports. The expected relationship is that as 
industrial production of a country increased, so did 
her export capacity. It is also expected that due to 
the collapse of industrial production in Uganda, her 
exports to Kenya and Tanzania would decline but her 
imports from them would increase.
Chapter 6 evaluates the effectiveness of the East 
African Development Bank (EADB) in its two principal 
goals, the reduction of industrial imbalances and making 
the economies of its member countries industrially 
complementary. In evaluating how effective the EADB
was as an instrument for reducing industrial imbalances, 
its performance is viewed from three perspectives. The 
first is whether or not it allocated funds to the three 
member countries according to the formula prescribed by 
its Charter. The second is the ’’fund absorptive 
achievement” of each country. This term refers to that 
fraction of the total funds allocated to each country 
which had been disbursed at the end of a given period. 
The third perspective is a comparison of the Bank’s 
(EADB) ’’balancing effect” and the Non-Bank (sources of 
finance other than the Bank) ’disparity effect”. The 
results of this analysis should show how important or 
how marginal the EADB was in offsetting a common 
tendency for unequal capacity among members of an
50economic integration scheme to generate investments.
Chapter 7 further investigates the effectiveness of 
the EADB, but from two new angles. The Bank’s measure 
of success it achieved in reducing industrial imbalances 
is this time assessed on the basis of the performance of 
projects it cofinanced. Performance refers to whether 
or not a project came into operation as had been planned 
and also whether or not the project became profitable. 
All the projects are classified into three, large, medium 
and small scale. The main consideration in that 
classification is to study how the success or failure of 
projects in the three classes and in the three countries 
affected the Bank’s achievement of its primary task of
reducing industrial imbalances between Kenya and the 
other two countries. It is the amounts of investment 
in the successful projects in Kenya vis a vis the amount 
of investment in similar projects in either Tanzania or 
Uganda which are the focus of comparison.
Chapter 7 also examines the factors which determined 
the performance of projects. An important question which 
will be answered in the course of this examination is the 
extent to which the EADB controlled the determinants of 
success of projects. Its effectiveness is dependent on 
it having very significant influence over the success of 
projects.
Chapter 8 summarises the main findings of the 
study. Important lessons of experience from the operat­
ion of the East African economic integration scheme are 
highlighted. Existing or future economic blocks in the 
developing world could benefit from such lessons. The 
chapter also contains suggestions on how the EADB could 
in the future contribute more to the economic growth of 
its member countries than it has done in the past.
Contributi ons
A broad contribution of this study is to fill the 
existing gap in the knowledge about the nature, the 
causes and the dynamics of industrial and trade imbalances 
in the EACM from 1962 to 1977. The author is not aware 
of any other study that has dealt with these two
causally related issues in the EACM for a sixteen year 
period.
The following specific contributions have been made. 
First, the study shows how unrealistic it is to try to 
bring about balanced industrial development and to 
eliminate intra-EACM trade imbalances in an environment 
which is predominantly competitive.
Second, it is shown why the EADB was an ineffective 
instrument for reducing industrial imbalances and for 
bringing about industrial complementarity among its 
three member countries. To begin with, it is demon­
strated that the availability of finance, per se, does 
not lead to a reduction in effective investment 
differentials among members of an economic integration 
scheme. The term effective investment refers to the 
amount of finance involved in the successful projects.
The study also shows that the EADB’s ’’balancing 
effect” was overwhelmingly offset by the "disparity 
effect” of the Non-Bank (the two terms are defined in 
chapter 6).
The final set of contributions also arise from the 
evaluation of the performance of EADB as shown by the 
success or failure of projects. A careful examination 
of the determinants of success and failure of projects 
offers insights of how the EADB could contribute to the 
economic growth of its member countries.
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CHAPTER 2
T H E  B A C K G R O U N D
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the background information 
which should facilitate more understanding of the two 
themes of this study, the industrial and trade imbalances 
in the former East African Common Market (EACM). The 
main cause of the trade imbalances among the members of 
the EACM, as was explained in chapter 1, was the uneven 
distribution of manufacturing industries. This is 
because a disproportionately large share of the goods 
entering the intra-EACM trade were manufactures.
The background information supplied falls into 
three categories. First, major economic characteristics 
of the three economies of the EACM are discussed.
Second, the changes in industrial and trade imbalances 
which occurred between 1950 and 1961 are analysed.
Third, the origins of industrial imbalances in the EACM 
are examined with a view to identifying the factors 
which brought about the industrial disparities in the 
EACM. The circular and cumulative causation theory, 
which is explained in chapter 3, is borne in mind in the 
course of'that examination.
The period covered by this chapter is from 1945 to 
1961. But the focus is on the 1954-61 period during
which time complaints about the unsatisfactory operation 
of the EACM were often expressed. It was mentioned in 
chapter 1 that those complaints were vociferously 
expressed by policy-makers in Tanzania. Policy-makers 
in Uganda also wanted the EACM to be regulated in a 
manner which would bring more benefits to their country 
than had been the case in the past.
For Tanzania, the unsatisfactory operation of the 
EACM had been voiced on her behalf in the past by two 
prominent outsiders. Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, as was 
seen in chapter 1, after a fact-finding mission to
Tanganyika in the early 1930s, recommended that ....
"Tanganyika should cease to deplete her revenue and 
impoverish her citizens by protecting the products of 
her neighbours” .^ And Viner (1950) in his famous study 
of customs union arrangements observed that Tanganyika 
was primarily brought into the East African Customs 
Union ..... "to provide an expanded field for the tariff 
protection of industries of another territory" (Kenya).
By the mid 1950s, policy-makers in Tanzania were 
more actively involved in a scheme to ensure that in 
future industries to be set up in the EACM would be
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equitably distributed among the three member countries. 
Also around this time, plans designed to improve the 
economic welfare of Tanzanians were in place. As 
will be seen in section 2.3, similar plans had been 
implemented in both Kenya and Uganda earlier.
2.2 Some Economic Characteristics of the East African 
Common Market Economies
The economic characteristics to he analysed and 
discussed in this chapter are the gross domestic product, 
the role of the agricultural and the manufacturing 
sectors, the employment provided by the latter sector 
and the effect of intra-EACM trade as well as the 
external trade of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on their 
balance of payments position. Analyses carried out are 
comparative; results for Kenya are compared with those 
for Tanzania and Uganda. This approach is adopted 
because complaints about both industrial and trade 
imbalances arose mainly from the fact that Kenya had a 
more industrialised sector and was always in balance 
of trade surplus with the other two countries.
Gross Domestic Product
Table 2.1 below shows^inter alia, the gross domestic 
products of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda between 1954 and 
1961. Throughout this period, the Kenyan GDP was 
greater than that of either of the two countries, and 
Tanzania's GDP was greater than Uganda's. The disparity 
between Kenya's GDP and that of Tanzania almost doubled 
between 1954 and 1961. In the former year, the 
disparity in favour of Kenya was shs. 328 million and in 
the latter year it was shs. 624 million. The disparity 
between Kenya and Uganda increased even more substantially.
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In 1954, it stoad at shs* 586 million and by 1961 it 
had risen to shs* 1366 million.
These divergencies indicate, of coarse, the unequal 
expansion of the national economies in the East African 
Common Market. The expansion which took place in the 
three economies between 1954 and 1961 were shs* 1334,
1038 and shs* 554 million for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
respectively.
Agricultural Sector as the Foundation 
of EACM Economies
The importance of the agricultural sector as the 
foundation of the economies of Tanzania and Uganda can 
be seen from Table 2.1. Column 2 under each country 
shows that this sector contributed, in 1954, 62 and 
69 per cent to the gross domestic products of Tanzania 
and Uganda, respectively. By 1961, the importance of 
that sector had slightly declined in Tanzania; its 
contribution this time was 59 per cent* The decline 
in Uganda was more substantial from 69 per cent in 1954 
to 61 per cent in 1961. In spite of the fall in 
importance of the agricultural sector in percentage 
terms, this sector’s contribution in absolute terms 
increased between the two years. The increase in 
Tanzania was shs* 527 million and in Uganda it was 
shs. 132 million*
In Kenya, the agricultural sector was also the
backbone of the economy. It was the single most
important sector in the economy. The fact that its
contribution to the GDP in both 1954 and 1961, as
Table 2*1 indicates, was the least in the East African
Common Market was because the Kenyan economy was not
only more diversified than the other two countries1
economies, but also because it had other important
4sectors, such as commerce and trade.
Table 2.1 also indicates that the importance of 
the agricultural sector declined from 46*8 per cent in 
1954 to 38*5 per cent by 1961. However, its contribut­
ion, in absolute terms, to the Kenyan gross domestic 
product increased between the two years by shs. 251 
million, in current prices* This magnitude of increase 
was greater than had been achieved in Uganda, but it was 
also less than a half of what had been gained in 
Tanzania.
Despite the fact that the agricultural sector 
performed best in Tanzania, her policy-makers were not 
satisfied. They wanted to increase the contribution of 
the manufacturing sector to the economy. Section 2*3 
shows that the plan to achieve that objective had been 
implemented in 1956. Kenya and Uganda, as will also be 
seen in that section, had tried to develop their 
industrial sectors before Tanzania did.
The Manufacturing Sector
Table 2*1, column 3 under each country, shows the 
contribution of the manufacturing sector to the gross 
domestic product. It is noteworthy that the contribution 
of that sector was in all the three countries under 
10 per cent; a fact which underscores how underdeveloped 
that sector was in the EACM. The degree of its under­
development, as the table indicates, was uneven. In 
Kenya, the share of the manufacturing sector in the GDP 
in 1954 was 8.9 per cent in Tanzania and Uganda, the 
shares of that sector in their GDP were 2,6 and 5.3 
per cent, respectively. Kenya had, therefore, the most 
developed industrial sector, Tanzania was the least 
industrialised economy in the EAOM and Uganda occupied 
an intermediate position. Uganda was slightly nearer 
Tanzania than Kenya on the scale of industrial under­
development.
It may be seen from 2.1 that the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the GDP rose in all the three 
countries between 1954 and 1961. Kenya registered 0.7 
per cent rise, the increase in Tanzania was 1.5 per cent 
and in Uganda it was 1.1 per cent. However, in absolute 
terms, the greatest expansion was achieved in Kenya, 
shs. 150 million, compared to shs. 85 million in 
Tanzania, and shs. 64 million in Uganda.
Por Kenya and Tanzania, there had been a movement 
towards the reduction of industrial imbalances. The
disparity ratio in favour of Kenya had been in 1954
5
3o8 to 1. By 1961 the ratio had come down to 2.7 to 1. 
This reduction in industrial imbalances was largely due 
to two factors. The first is the active Tanzanian 
Government's involvement in the second half of the 1950s 
in the development of the manufacturing sector. The 
second is the decline of investment in the Kenyan 
manufacturing sector in the late 1950s. These two 
factors are discussed again in section 2*3.
For Kenya and Uganda, the industrial imbalance in 
favour of the former hardly changed between 1954 and 
1961. The ratio of disparity was 2 to 1 in 1961 and 
2«1 to 1 in 1961, marginal divergence in industrial 
imbalanceo
Employment Provided by Manufacturing 
Sectors of EAOM
Industrial imbalances seen above are also reflected 
in employment provided by the manufacturing sectors of 
the three countries. Table 2.2 below indicates that 
the Kenyan manufacturing sector employed more people 
than did the Tanzanian or the Uganda manufacturing 
sectors. In 1954, 41 thousand people were employed in 
the Kenyan manufacturing sector, while 20 thousand people 
were employed by the similar sector in Tanzania.
In Kenya, the employment in the manufacturing 
sector formed, as Table 2.1 indicates, 9*1 per cent of
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the total employment recorded for 1954. The correspond­
ing percentage in Tanzania was 5«1. These low percent­
ages once again underscore the extent of industrial under­
development* The percentages would have been even 
lower had every member of the labour force been recorded.
A large proportion of the labour force in the subsist­
ence, the non-monetary sector, was not included in the 
labour statistics.
The disparity in the manufacturing sector employ­
ment between Kenya and Uganda in 1954 was only 9 thousand 
people. It is noteworthy that employment provided by 
the Ugandan manufacturing sector formed 15.6 per cent 
of the total labour force recorded for 1954. The 
main explanation for this relatively high proportion 
(in comparison with Kenya and Tanzania) is that the 
labour force registered in Uganda was about 46 per cent 
of that in Kenya and about 53 per cent that of Tanzania.
In other words, there were far fewer people in gainful 
employment in Uganda than in the other two countries.
By 1961 employment in both the Kenyan and the 
Ugandan manufacturing sectors was below the 1954 level.
The fall in Kenya was 5 thousand and it was 7 thousand 
for Uganda. In both countries, as Table 2.2 shows, 
there had been an increase in employment between 1954 
and 1956. For Kenya, the same level of employment was 
maintained in 1958 and then there was a steady decline 
in the subsequent three years. For Uganda, employment
fell between 1956 and 1958, remained at that level in 
I960 and then sharply fell in 1961. This poor perform­
ance in Uganda was an integral part of the unsatisfactory 
performance of the entire economy.
Tanzania was the only country which experienced an 
increase in employment in the manufacturing sector 
between 1954 and 1961. The increase was 4 thousand 
people. However, it may be seen from Table 2.2, that 
the number of people employed in that sector had 
fluctuated between the two years.
The fact that Kenya had more people who had acquired 
experience in factories than the other two countries, 
would be expected to lead to the persistence of 
industrial disparities in the EACM. An industrialist 
intending to produce for the EACM would be interested to 
set up a plant in a country with a larger pool of 
experienced industrial workers. This would be 
particularly the case for investors who had no programmes 
for training their own staff. It will be seen in
chapter 7 that the availability of skilled workers was 
one of the determinants of the success or failure of 
projects.
Balance of Trade Position of EACM Countries
As a prelude to examining the intra-East African 
Common Market trade position of individual country, 
its trade position with the external world is discussed.
This helps to pat the intra-EACM trade in the overall 
context,
Kenya had, in 1954, a balance of trade deficit with
the external world (countries other than her two partners
in the EACM) of shs® 753 million® Tanzania and Uganda
on the other hand, had trade surplus of shs, 98 and
7
shs, 317 million, respectively. By I960, Kenya was 
still in trade deficit, but the magnitude of the deficit 
was substantially lower than it had been in 1954; it
g
was now shs® 600 million. This reduction was due
mainly to the fact exports had risen faster than imports,
Tanzania and Uganda had not only maintained their
trade surplus by I960, but the magnitudes of surplus
were also higher than they had been in 1954. The
increase for Tanzania was by shs, 253 million, and that
9for Uganda was shs, 21 million® The Tanzanian impress­
ive performance is attributable to the increase in 
volume of both the exports of agricultural produce and 
some other items such as diamonds. It was also due to 
the fact that exports grew faster than imports.
Although Tanzania’s balance of trade position with the 
external world improved spectacularly more than Uganda’s 
between 1954 and I960, there was little difference in 
their overall balance of trade surplus, Tanzania’s 
surplus in I960 was shs, 351 million while Uganda’s was 
shs, 338 million,
It is noteworthy that the two countries trade surplus 
with the external world was persistent between 1954 and
i960. One may, therefore, wonder why their policy­
makers were concerned about trade deficit in the intra- 
EACM trade. An examination of the effect of individual 
country’s intra-EACM trade position on. its balance of 
payments position will throw light on that question®
Kenya had a persistent trade surplus with both 
Tanzania and Uganda, an obverse position to that seen above 
concerning her trade position with the external world, 
Kenya’s trade surplus with her two partners was modest 
in 1954, shs, 31 million,1'1' This marginally offset 
her huge trade deficit of shs, 753 million with the 
external world seen above. By I960, her trade surplus
12with Tanzania and Uganda had risen to shs, 135 million.
This time, Kenya’s trade deficit with the external world
(shs, 600 million) was substantially offset,
Tanzania had a persistent trade deficit with
Kenya and Uganda. For example, in 1954 her trade
11deficit was shs, 71 million. This meant that the 
overall balance of trade was shs, 27 million. It will 
be recalled that her balance of trade position with the 
external world had been, in the same year, one of 
surplus, shs, 98 million. In other words, Tanzania’s 
trade with Kenya and Uganda caused a deterioration in 
her balance of payments. By I960, Tanzania’s trade 
deficit with her two partners had gone up to shs. 137 
million. The consequence of this deficit on Tanzania’s 
balance of payments was to reduce the surplus of
shs, 351 million she had with the external world to
shs, 214 million.
In order to understand why policy-makers in
Tanzania targeted complaints about trade imbalances on
Kenya, her (Tanzania’s) deficit in intra-EACM trade
must be split between Kenya and Uganda, In I960,
Tanzania’s deficit with Kenya was shs. 114,7 million
and Tanzania’s deficit with Uganda was only shs, 22,5
million. This meant that 84 per cent of that country’s
trade deficit was due to her trade position with Kenya.
Therefore, Tanzanian policy-makers were correct in
identifying the Kenya - Tanzania trade as the primary
problem to be tackled.
Uganda was, in 1954, the only country in the EACM
which enjoyed trade surplus with both the external
world and her partner states. Her surplus with Kenya
and Tanzania was shs, 91,6 million.1^ And her trade
surplus with the external world, as was noted above, was
shs. 317 million. With an overall trade surplus of
shs. 408.6 million, Uganda’s balance of payments position
was the strongest in the EACM. It is not surprising,
therefore, that Ugandan policy-makers were not vocal
with regard to the intra-EACM trade imbalances.
By I960, Uganda’s position in intra-EACM trade had
sharply deteriorated. Her trade surplus with Kenya
15and Tanzania had shrunk to a mere shs. 1.6 million.
There are two main explanations for this deterioration. 
The first is that Uganda’s exports to her partner states
shrunk, while those partners* exports to her, particularly 
Kenya’s, expanded. The second explanation which is 
closely bound up with the first, is that there was a 
transfer of a cigarette plant from Uganda to Kenya in 
1956. Cigarettes used to form a substantial part of 
Uganda’s exports to the other two countries. By I960, 
Uganda was instead importing such products from Kenya. 
Despite the deterioration in Uganda’s trade position 
in the intra-EACM trade, she was in I960 in trade 
surplus with Tanzania to the tune of shs, 22.5 million. 
Moreover, her balance of payments position in I960 was 
still that of surplus, shs. 339,6 million. This may 
explain why the Ugandan policy-makers did not complain 
much about the intra-EACM trade imbalances.
Prom the standpoint of balance of payments, the 
freedom of intra-EACM trade was most beneficial to 
Kenya, was harmful to Tanzania, and beneficial to a 
small extent to Uganda. This state of affairs had 
arisen because of the uneven distribution of industries 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It will be recalled 
that because most goods entering the intra-EACM were 
manufactures, a country with more export-oriented 
industries than others was always in trade surplus.
It will also be recalled that there was a high degree of 
inter-country trade, as is to be expected in a common 
market.
2.3 The Origins of Industrial Imbalances in EACM
This section explains how industrial imbalances 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda came about. Factors 
which helped or hindered industrial development in the 
three countries are discussed. An important point 
which the section tries to bring out is that the 
industrial development in the three member countries of 
the East African Common Market seems to fit in the 
pattern of early-late starter.
2.3.1 Industrial Development in Kenya, 1945-1963
Kenya was ahead of the other two countries in
16industrial development as early as the 1920s. She
had more industries processing domestic agricultural
produce for the East African market than the other two
countries did.
Those industries were started mainly by the
European settlers in Kenya and British firms. By the
end of the Second World War, Kenya had extended her
17industrial lead. This was partly because before
that War the colonial policy which generally discouraged
industrial development in the colonies, did not strictly
18apply to Kenya as it did to Tanzania and Uganda.
The other part of the explanation is that during the 
War, the Colonial Office was even more liberal than 
before towards Kenya’s attempt to substitute the
manufactured products which were difficult to obtain
19in East Africa because of the general risks to ships,
Tanzania and Uganda were not yet involved in such an
import substitution of manufactured goods.
After the Wax, the Colonial Office adopted a policy
of encouraging administrators in the colonies to promote
20economic growth in all fields of the economy. In the
East African Common Market, the Kenyan Government was
the first to take steps to comply with the new colonial
policy. The Government decided to promote industrial
development and it chose to rely on private enterprise
as the main agent for industrialisation. The choice
of private enterprise as the main agent of economic
growth was not a new strategy; it had started at the
21beginning of the century.
After the War, the Kenyan Government undertook to 
provide facilities and incentives designed to attract 
investors to the industrial sector. For instance, 
factory sites were offered at concessionary prices,
22roads to those sites were built, and water was supplied. 
Also, low company tax and high rates of depreciation
07
were promised to investors in industry, Furthermore,
the Government publicized Kenya abroad as a promising
24place for investment. In this connection,
Tinbergen (1958) has observed that the Government can 
play a very important role in facilitating economic 
development.^^
(Che measure of success the Kenyan Government’s
efforts to promote industrial development met with is
illustrated by the following quotations and statements.
”The attractiveness of the colony to capital investment
from overseas was well illustrated by ?the fact that
East African Power and lighting Company’s issue was
26subscribed twelve times”. This was in the late
1940s. Another report around that time states that:
”.... very considerable investment of capital had
27flowed into the country from overseas”. The sectors
to which that capital had flowed were not specified.
This lacuna is somewhat filled by the 1950 Report which
states that ”.... there continued to be a large scale
28capital investment flow into secondary industries”.
That report also mentioned that local manufactures
were starting to play an important role in the economic
stability of the Kenyan economy. This stabilising
effect was what policy-makers in Kenya were seeking
when they embarked on promoting the industrialisation
of the economy after the Second World War.
The 1953 report mentioned that there had been an
29increase in capital invested in industries. In
1955, it was reported that the industrial expansion
had continued with new industries being established and
some of the existing industries being expanded.^ The
1957 Report stated that ”.... industrial activities
continued to expand with most of the new capital coming 
31from overseas”.
Between 1958 and 1963 (the latter was the date of
Kenyan independence) investments in the country generally 
32declinedo This was largely due to the uncertainty
about the political stability of Kenya after becoming
independent. However, some investors did not hold a
pessimistic view about the political future of the
country. These included four petroleum companies
which undertook, in 1959, to build the first oil
33refinery in the East African Common Market. This 
industry was to play a large role in the East African 
Common Market inter-country trade imbalances. Also, 
because that industry made a substantial contribution 
to the Kenyan manufacturing output,^ its existence 
contributed substantially to the widening of industrial 
imbalances between Kenya, on the one hand, and Tanzania 
and Uganda on the other. Both the industrial and trade 
imbalances between Tanzania and Kenya were partially 
offset after an oil refinery was built in Dar-es-3alaam 
in 1966.35
The account given in the previous three paragraphs 
indicates that there was a good measure of positive 
response to the Kenyan Governments effort to industrial­
ise. In addition to Governments active involvement in 
industrial development, factors which contributed to 
that response included better prospects of gaining 
from the external economies0 by locating an industry 
in Kenya rather than in the other two countries;
Kenyafs purchasing power was higher than Tanzania1s and
Uganda’s; the facts that Kenya was the financial centre
for East Africa and the main centre for repairing and
37servicing machines. Furthermore, because the Kenyan 
Highlands, which was the region of industrial concen­
tration in the country, was in a strategic position to 
supply some of the areas of high purchasing power in 
the EACM was an additional reason why industrialists 
were likely to choose Kenya as an industrial site.
This region was actually well linked to some of the
regions of high purchasing power in the EACM by a good
3 8network of transportation systems. -
2 o 3 © 2  Industrial Development in Uganda, 1 9 3 2 - 1 9 6 2
By the late 1940s the Ugandan Government, like the 
Kenyan one, had shown intentions of promoting industrial 
development in the country0 For instance, by 1949, the 
Government had committed itself to building a hydro­
electric power station to provide power to potential 
39industries. The availability of electric power was
expected to encourage the establishment of industries in 
the country, and in particular in the area near the 
power station. The Ugandan Government was attempting 
to play a facilitating role for industrial development 
as the Kenyan Government had done by undertaking to 
provide industrial sites, roads and water.
However, unlike the Kenyan Government, the Ugandan
one was not as active in the late 1940s in promoting
industrial development. The Ugandan Government also
seemed to lack a clear cut strategy for industrial
development in the 1940s. For instance, while it
seemed that the Government intended to rely on private
enterprise as the main agent for industrialisation, no
special efforts were made to attract foreign investors.
Considering that the country had very limited savings
of her own to channel into the manufacturing sector, and
also considering that there was hardly a pool of
industrial entrepreneurs, special effort should have
been made to attract both foreign capital and foreign
40industrial entrepreneurs.
The Government’s failure to attract foreign invest­
ors is understandable because some influential ethnic
groups feared that foreign investors would be ’'Trojan
41horses” of political domination,. In the absence of 
a policy to attract foreign investors, it was to be 
expected that, at best, there would be a trickle of 
foreign investments into the Ugandan industrial sector.
A careful examination of Uganda’s annual reports between 
1946 and 1952 did not reveal any mention of foreign 
investment into the Ugandan industrial sector. This 
was in contrast to what occurred in Kenya. The 
Ugandan reports did not also mention any investment 
from domestic industrialists, either.
Given that Kenya was industrially ahead of Uganda
and given that in the late 1940s and early 1950s she 
(the former) attracted more investment in her industrial 
sector, it is reasonable to conclude that the existing 
industrial imbalances between the two countries widened 
between 1945 and 1952. Because of lack of data, the 
extent to which the industrial imbalance widened cannot 
be estimated.
The Ugandan Government, rather belatedly, adopted 
a clear strategy for industrial development in 1952.
It chose public enterprise as the main agent of indus­
trialisation. An institution known as the Uganda 
Development Corporation (UDC) was created as an
42instrument for bringing about industrial development.
This Corporation was wholly Government owned. Its 
objective was not only to promote the industrial 
development of Uganda but it was also expected to promote 
the development of several other sectors of the economy. 
Its capital was only £5 million (sterling).
In relation to its broad objective, the Corporation 
was undercapitalised. The extent of its undercapitalis­
ation is demonstrated by the fact that a cement plant, 
which the Corporation inherited in 1952, had cost 
£1.5 million (sterling) in 1949.^ This amount was 
33 per cent of the capital of the Corporation. If the 
Corporation had to be the sole financier of projects, 
it would have financed about three projects costing the 
same amount of money as the cement plant (ignoring the
erosion in value caused by inflation between 1949 and 
1952).
The Uganda Development Corporation was hailed as
a model for promoting industrial development in the
developing world. The World Bank mission to Uganda in
I960 described the performance of that Corporation as
having been impressive. ^  The author thinks that this
evaluation took into consideration the constraints of
industrial development such as the limited capital of
the Corporation, the shortage of workers with industrial
skills, the low purchasing power of the economy and
other bottlenecks which prevailed in the 1950s. Without
taking those factors into account, one would wonder why
the Corporation was praised. It financed only six
45industries between 1952 and 1961. This is not 
surprising given its undercapitalization mentioned above. 
It is conceivable that if foreign investment had been 
encouraged, the Corporation would have been in a better 
position to play a role of a catalyst. It could have 
used little amounts of its capital in many projects to 
attract larger amounts from private investors.
The following observation by Hanson (1959) explains 
why, contrary to what happened, the Ugandan Government 
needed to be more actively involved in promoting 
industrial development than the Kenyan Government:
”In Kenya, industry was so sufficiently 
advanced to be largely self-financing, 
whereas in Uganda, it was still necessary 
for the government to take part in supplying 
finance to promote the fijst steps in 
industrial development”.46
Because the amount of finance the Ugandan Government
supplied was limited, it is no surprise that the
f,initial steps” in industrial development which were
taken were few. This is in contrast with several
reports of success, seen above, which were achieved in
Kenya.
0-
The evidence seen in this sub-section and in the 
preceding one, suggests that the private enterprise 
strategy was more successful than the public enterprise. 
Bearing in mind that Kenya was an earlier starter in 
industrialisation than Uganda, and that when Uganda 
started she did not become as successful as Kenya, it 
seems right to conclude that the industrial imbalance 
between the two countries widened further between 1952 
and 1961. It was seen in section 2.2 that there was 
a slight divergence in industrial disparity between the 
two countries between 1954 and 1961.
2.3o3 Industrial Development in Tanzania, 1956-1961
The Tanzanian Government started to play an active 
role in the development of manufacturing industries in 
1956. It was seen that the Kenyan and Ugandan Govern­
ments were active in promoting industrial development
in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. The Tanzanian 
Governments late start may be explained in the following 
ways. First, as Hatch (1972) observed, the Tanzanian 
administration in colonial times ".... was usually 
desultory and weak.... with a tendency towards 
inefficient planning”.^ Second, the Tanzanian Govern­
ment , unlike those of Kenya and Uganda, was after the 
Second World War still seeking to develop the economy, 
mainly through agriculture. For instance, a gigantic
agricultural scheme to produce groundnuts was started
48in the late 1940s. As was seen above, it is around
this time that the Kenyan and Ugandan Governments were
trying to promote industrial development as a means of
structurally transforming the economies of the two
countries. The third explanation is that prior to
1956, the Government gave priority to developing the
communication and education sectors which it considered
to be of central importance to the economic development 
49of the country.
The Government appointed a Commissioner for Commerce
and Industry for the first time in 1956. One of his
principal duties was to promote the development of
50manufacturing industries. The strategy chosen to 
bring about this objective was very much similar to the 
Kenyan one. For example, private enterprise was 
selected as the main agent for industrialisation. Even 
the incentives which were offered to potential indus­
trialists were similar to those which the Kenyan
Government had introduced several years earlier. They
included low company tax, high rates of depreciation,
no restrictions on the repatriation of foreign investors1
capital and its earnings, protection of domestic
industries from imported products and making available
51industrial estates. In one of the annual reports for
Tanganyika, it was mentioned that effort was made to
attract foreign investors to industry and to other
52sectors of the economy. This was similar to the 
publicity campaign which the Kenyan Government had 
carried out earlier to attract overseas investors.
The Tanzanian Government1 s efforts to promote 
industrial development were met with some measure of 
positive response. Several large scale industries 
were established between 1956 and I960. These included 
cigarette manufacturing by the British American Tobacco 
Company, shoe production by Bata (a Canadian based shoe 
firm) and a flour milling plant (a British-Swiss
C O
venture). These industries represented inflow of 
foreign capital to Tanzania, but a careful examination 
of annual reports between 1956 and I960 does not reveal 
any mention of as large a scale of inflow of foreign 
investment to the Tanzanian industrial sector as that 
reported in Kenya.
There were several reasons for this. First, 
Tanganyika’s legal position as a protectorate rather 
than as a colony meant that there was always uncertainty
54about her political future. ^ Second, that uncertainty- 
increased after the mid 1950s when it became clear that 
in a matter of a few years the country would be independ­
ent. It is well-known that foreign investment shuns an 
area of political instability because the risks to 
investment are high in such a situation. The third 
factor is that because of limited experience in 
industrial development, Tanzania lacked a pool of 
managerial and skilled workers. The Tanzanian govern­
ment cites this as one of the obstacles to industrial
cc
development in the 1960s. The fourth factor was the 
country’s low level of per capita income. This meant 
a low level of purchasing power. Finally, because of 
the large geographic size of the country and the under­
development of the transport system, the market for an 
investor’s products was limited. A way out of this 
would have been for an investor to locate an industry 
in a strategic place where he could serve areas of high 
purchasing power in Tanzania and in the other two 
countries. This strategy had not yet been adopted in 
the 1950s.
In spite of the above obstacles to foreign invest­
ment inflows, Tanzania achieved expansion in industrial 
production between the time the Commissioner for Commerce 
and Industry was appointed, 1956, and I960. Yalue
added increased by shs. 40 million between 1957 and I960, 
which represented a respectable 5.6 per cent annual
56growth rate (these computations are based on Table 2*1). 
It will be recalled that in section 2.2 it was seen that 
industrial imbalances between Kenya and Tanzania were 
reduced between 1954 and 1961* A point which has to 
be stressed is that the correlation between the govern­
ment’s involvement in industrial development and the 
positive results achieved lends support to Tinbergen’s 
observation that governments can play an important role 
in the development of a nation.
2.4 The Relationship between Industrial and Trade 
Imbalances inEAOM, 1954-61
It was mentioned in chapter 1 that a causal 
relationship between industrial and trade imbalances 
existed in the East African Common Market (EACM).
That relationship is demonstrated in this section.
This is done by analysing intra-EACM trade flows between 
1959 and 1961. A hypothesis that industrial imbalance 
was the principal cause of trade imbalances in the EACM 
will be tested.
As a prelude to examining the trade flows, goods 
entering intra-EACM trade are classified into two, non­
manufactures and manufactures. The latter are defined 
as those products falling under sections 5 to 8 of the 
Standard International Trade Classification, and beer 
and cigarettes which belong to S.I.T.C.l. Beer and 
cigarettes are included in order to reduce the degree
of understatement of the capacity of some countries to
export manufactures.
Kenya, as was seen in section 2.2, was in persistent
trade surplus with Tanzania and Uganda in the late 1950s.
For the moment the focus will he on the Kenya-Tanzania
balance of trade position. Tanzania was in trade
deficit with Kenya in each year between 1959 and 1961.
Her total deficit in 1959 was shs. 93 million and she
57was in deficit in manufactures by shs. 78.2 million.
This means, therefore, that the deficit in manufactures 
was responsible for 84 per cent of Tanzania’s total 
deficit. She was also in trade deficit in non­
manufactures by shs. 14.8 million which accounted for 
the remaining 16 per cent of the deficit in both types 
of products.
Tanzania continued to be in trade deficit in both 
types of products in I960 and 1961. Her deficit in
cp
I960 was shs. 115 million. Manufactures this time 
accounted for 81 per cent of that deficit. In 1961,
59the deficit had increased further to shs. 141 million.
This time manufactures accounted for 77 per cent of that
trade deficit. The fall in the importance of the
manufactures was due to the increase in the value of
exports of non-manufactures rather than the expansion
60
of Tanzania’s exports of manufactures to Kenya.
The fact that Tanzania was less industrialised than 
Kenya, coupled with the above findings that manufactures
accounted for between 77 and 84 per cent of her trade 
deficit with Kenya, support the hypothesis that industrial 
imbalance was the principal cause of trade imbalances.
Uganda, like Tanzania, was in trade deficit with
Kenya between 1959 and 1961. In 1959, her deficit was
61
shs. 43 million. Also like Tanzania, Uganda was in 
that year in deficit in both manufactures and non­
manufactures. The former accoiunted for 81 per cent of
the deficit in both types of products. In I960,
6 2Uganda’s deficit was down to shs. 21 million. But the 
imbalance in trade in manufactures had risen from shs. 35 
million in the previous year to shs. 55 million (I960) in 
favour of Kenya. Uganda’s trade surplus of shs. 34 
million in non-manufactures helped to bring down the 
deficit to shs. 21 million. A similar situation 
occurred in 1961. Kenya was in trade surplus in 
manufactures, shs. 65 million, and Uganda had a shs. 27 
million surplus in non-manufactures. This means that 
Uganda’s deficit was shs. 38 million.
Considering that Uganda was less industrialised than 
Kenya, the above finding also supports the hypothesis 
that the principal cause of trade imbalances in the EACM 
was industrial imbalance. This is because when Uganda 
was in trade deficit with Kenya in both manufactures and 
non-manufactures in 1959, the former products accounted 
for 81 per cent of the trade deficit. In the subsequent 
two years, Uganda’s growing deficit in manufactures was 
partially offset by her surplus in non-manufactures.
Summary
This chapter discussed some of the major character­
istics of the EACM economies between 1954 and 1961.
It was seen that according to the contributions of the 
manufacturing sector to the gross domestic product, 
industrial imbalances between Kenya on the one hand and 
Tanzania and Uganda on the other, widened. Trade 
imbalances between Kenya and the other two countries 
moved in the same direction.
The chapter also traced the historical origin of 
the industrial imbalances in the EACM. It was found 
that Kenya’s industrial lead had been due to a number 
of factors such as government active participation in 
the development of industrial sector, positive response 
of foreign investors, level of income which was higher 
in Kenya than in other two countries, and the facts that 
Kenya was the headquarters of most financial institutions 
and technical services in the EACM. In this chapter, 
the causal relationship between industrial and trade 
imbalance in the EACM was demonstrated using inter­
country trade flows.
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CHAPTER 3
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
3«1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to provide several aspects of 
economic theory in which the study is placed. The 
approach is to review several aspects of the received 
theory, extend some of those aspects and later knit 
together the more salient pieces. In this exercise, 
an observation by Lipsey (I960) to the effect that the 
purpose of a theory is to facilitate the interpretation 
of the real world data is borne in mind.^ It is of 
interest also to point out that a theory which is closer 
to what obtains in the real world could be used to 
predict economic outcomes at certain periods in the 
future.
3o 2 A Review of Some Aspects of Customs Union Theory
It was mentioned in both Chapters 1 and 2 that 
there had existed free trade between Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda for a long time. It was also mentioned in 
Chapter 1 that the three countries had had a common 
external tariff. The presence of free trade and a
common external tariff meant that the form of economic 
co-operation between the three countries was a customs 
union one. Because of this fact, the first relevant 
field of economic theory which will be reviewed is that 
of customs union.
Viner (1950) laid the foundations for a systematic
development of the customs union theory by his study of
2the customs union issue. The study focused on how 
resources would be reallocated after some countries had 
decided to form a customs union. Krauss (1972) points 
out that Viner*s analysis intended to show whether or 
not resources would be efficiently used in a post
•5
customs union period. The foundation of his (Viner*s) 
analysis was the comparative advantage doctrine. 
According to this doctrine, a member country of the 
union whose production costs are lower than those of 
another member, in a given product, should be the sole 
producer of the product in question for the customs 
union market. This way, resources in a customs union 
would be efficiently utilised.
The efficient utilisation of resources had two 
interrelated beneficial effects in Viner*s study. The 
first was that since less resources would be required 
to produce the same quantity of a given good than before, 
more of other goods could be produced using the saved 
resources. The second was the possibility of a 
consumer surplus where more quantities of a given good
would be produced in the post customs union period than 
in the pre-customs union period. Viner originated a 
term "trade creation" to describe the two beneficial 
effects of efficient utilisation of resources. The 
term "trade creation" refers to the new volume of trade 
between member countries of a customs union which takes 
place as a result of the formation of the union.
He also originated the term "trade diversion" to 
describe the consequence of inefficient utilisation of 
resources. Resource allocation in this case is 
considered from a global standpoint. The costs of 
production of one member country are compared with those 
of other countries outside the customs union. Resources 
are inefficiently utilised if the production costs of 
a producer of a given good in the union are higher than 
the production costs of a producer of a similar good 
outside the union. According to the comparative 
advantage doctrine, it would have been better for the 
customs union producer to shift his resources to another 
line of production where his production costs would be 
lower than those of his competitor in the outside world. 
This would mean that the customs union would be supplied 
by more efficient producers in the outside world, and, 
from a global standpoint, that would ensure that a waste 
of resources would be avoided.
The theoretical advantages and disadvantages of a 
customs union need to be explored further in order to
shed light on the issue of equity. Insights gained 
from this exploration will provide a framework in which 
a critical examination of the measures taken to make the 
East African Common Market more equitable than it had 
been in the past will be conducted in the next two 
chapters.
Five major benefits may result from the creation of 
a customs union and they may not necessarily be equitably 
distributed among member countries. The first benefit 
arises from economies of scale which are made possible 
by market enlargement. The pooling together of national 
markets of member countries through the removal of 
hindrances to trade flows between members is expected to 
lead to the setting up of optimal plants to satisfy the 
demand for certain goods in more than one partner state. 
Such plants are expected to be faced with falling unit 
costs of production. In a customs union where producers 
compete with one another to sell their products, the 
fall in costs of production should lead to a reduction 
in the price a consumer pays. A higher price would have 
been paid in the absence of a customs union because sub- 
optimal plants would have been built.
The second benefit which one of the members or all 
of the members could get is an increase in investment 
as a result of market enlargement.^" This benefit is 
related to the first one. The prospects of a fall in 
unit costs of production may induce investors, both
domestic and foreign, to set up optimal plants which
will satisfy demand in more than one member countries'
market. For the potential investors, the fall in unit
costs may benefit them in two ways. First, their
5
profit margin may go up. Second, the fall in unit 
costs may result in an increase in demand for a product 
which now costs less than it did before the creation of 
a customs union.
The third advantage which may be bestowed on a 
member of customs union is efficient utilization of 
resources through rationalisation of production in the 
union. Where an agreement exists among member countries, 
the production of certain goods in the union may be 
rationalised. After establishing the magnitudes of 
demand for a given product in the current period and 
after predicting how that demand will change in the 
future, productive capacity commensurate with that 
demand may be allocated equitably among member countries. 
Attention would be given to avoiding too much excessive 
capacity. Such rationalisation would, of course, 
interfere with the distribution of productive capacities 
by market forces. This interference would, however, be 
better than a situation where competing investors set 
up plants and later some of them discover that there is 
not enough demand for their products. Such plants 
would close down and part or all the capital invested 
in the machinery would be wasted if an alternative use
for it cannot be found.
The fourth advantage from the existence of a 
customs union is the increase in employment of domestic 
resources which the presence of a large market may 
induce. This is likely to be particularly significant 
if the economies of the member countries have substantial 
quantities of unemployed or underemployed resources.
It is reasonable to expect that more employment will be 
created if large scale plants which use mainly domestic 
resources are built. Greater employment opportunities 
can be created if these large scale plants result in 
either backward or forward linkages, or in both.
Finally, market enlargement may broaden the export 
base of member countries, thus contributing to an 
improvement in their balance of payments position, A 
member country with a greater capacity than others to 
satisfy demand in their economic block and who is in 
trade surplus with her partners, will experience greater 
improvement than other members. Those members in 
trade deficit may be faced with a deterioration in 
balance of payments.
One of the major prices members of a customs union 
pay for belonging to such an economic organisation, is 
a fall in economic welfare arising from consuming 
expensive goods produced in the union. This is a 
result of trade diversion seen earlier. This price is 
paid by all members if a uniform price is charged for a
given good in all members of the union, and if all 
members consume equal quantities of that good. If, 
however, the quantities of the good purchased in the 
members differ - the price remaining uniform - then the 
deterioration in economic welfare will be greater where 
larger quantities of the good are bought. If a greater 
share of a plant's output is consumed in a member 
country where the plant is located, then the deteriorat­
ion in welfare will be higher in that country. However, 
this deterioration will be compensated by employment 
created and an improvement in the balance of payments 
arising from the export of some of the plant's output 
to other member countries.
Members of a customs union also suffer a loss 
af revenue. This is because goods traded
between members are supposed to have no import duty on 
them. The extent of the loss of revenue will depend 
on how large are the quantities of goods a member 
country imports from its partners. There is, however, 
some compensation for this loss of revenue. It comes 
from the presence of a common external tariff. If it 
is higher than individual countries' import duty was 
on a given good before the customs union was formed, 
then higher revenue will be collected on the quantities 
of that good which continues to be imported. This 
compensating element will be bigger, the higher the 
price elasticity of an imported good is, and the more
there is unsatisfied demand for a given good because 
of inadequate production capacity.
Another disadvantage of a customs union, for some 
members, is that it may encourage the concentration of 
industries in a member or members which are already more 
developed than other members. This is likely to be 
particularly so in a higher form of economic integration 
such as a common market where, in addition to a free 
movement of goods, the presence of a common external 
tariff, factors of production also move freely among 
member countries,
Viner* s theory is silent on the possibility of 
industries concentrating in one of the member countries 
of the customs union. The failure to consider this 
distributional aspect was due to the fact that Viner 
focused attention on the effects of efficient or 
inefficient resource allocation.
As an attempt to fill that lacuna, the contributions 
of several people in the context of the developing 
countries* economic integration schemes are discussed. 
Cooper and Massell ( 1 9 6 5 )  made a realistic assumption 
that member countries of a customs union in the develop­
ing world prefer manufacturing activities (industries)
6to any other form of economic activity. They also 
made another realistic assumption that an industry will 
survive in a customs union if it is offered tariff 
protection. This protection, viewed from a standpoint
of global utilisation of resources, means that resources
are not being efficiently utilised. That means that
there is "trade diversion". Actually, Philip (1972)
points out that customs unions in Africa were mechanisms
for promoting industrial development behind protective 
7
tariff walls. The question then becomes how the 
inefficient industries are to be distributed in a 
customs union.
Cooper and Massell show how industries could be 
distributed but within the framework of allocative 
efficiency. Their analysis does not differ from that 
of Viner; the more efficient member becomes the 
industrial site of industries which supply the customs 
union market. If a country is not able to attract 
custom union-oriented industries, Cooper and Massell 
propose that they should be compensated. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the authors had in mind income 
compensation. Bearing in mind the experience of the 
East African Common Market, income compensation did not 
satisfy policy-makers in Tanzania and Uganda because it 
did not tackle the root cause of industrial disparities 
in that Common Market. Market forces needed to be 
directed so that they could play a part in the even 
distribution of industries among the members of the East 
African Common Market. It seems that a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity is often inevitable in 
order for an economic integration scheme in the
developing world to hold together. This reduces the 
type of political sensitivity about inequality seen 
in Chapter 1.
Dosser et al. (1971) advanced a theory which reflects 
the need not to make allocative efficiency the exclusive
g
criterion for the location of industries. They suggest 
that even distribution of industries may be brought 
about using a criterion which is not comparative 
advantage. They do not, however, specify what that 
criterion should be. The East African Common Market 
experience suggests that the even distribution of 
industries may be brought about by arbitrary reallocat­
ion of the existing industries, the allocation of new 
industries and by allowing the less industrialised 
countries to protect their "infant" industries from 
mature industries with ones in the more industrialised 
countries.
Mead (1968) also recognised the need to have a 
mechanism for controlling the distribution of industries 
among the members of an economic integration scheme.
He observed: "Some form of interventionism is normally
required to control this distribution in such a way as
Q
to make it acceptable to all parties....f . Robson
(1971) spelt out the consequences of not intervening to
make an economic integration equitable. He remarks:
"But if equity is not assured the operation of existing
groupings may easily be rendered ineffective or in 
extreme cases they may collapse".^ While he appreciated
the importance,of equity, Robson (1980) also points out
that there is a need for rationalising production of
11
emergent structure of production,' This calls for an 
agreement among national policy-makers on mechanisms to 
bring about rationalisation. In order for the existing 
industrial imbalances to be corrected, it may be necessary 
for the mechanisms agreed on to discriminate in favour of 
the less industrialised member countries.
3,3 Some Aspects of Locational Theory
The theory of customs union on which the above 
discussions were based, does not mention factors other 
than comparative advantage which may cause uneven 
distribution of industries among the member countries.
The author considers filling that gap to be very 
important for this study. The gap is filled by review­
ing locational theories.
Hall (1900) argued that the location of industries
12
in specific places was accidental. He also argued 
that once industries had collected in a particular 
locality, economies of concentration developed there.
This tended to dissuade entrepreneurs from locating 
industries in other places since that would mean fore­
going the economic advantages from the economies of 
concentration. This theory is very closely related to 
the circular and cumulative causation hypothesis which
is discussed in the next but one section,
Weber (1909) sought to explain the determinant
of the location of industries in terms of costs of 
13production. He contended that the minimisation of 
costs was the overriding consideration of an investor 
when he was trying to choose an industrial site.
Weber recognised that there were other factors 
which determined the location of industries. These 
included the level of taxation, the availability of 
managerial skills and climatic factors. These factors, 
as was seen in Chapter 2, explain how Kenya came to be 
ahead of Tanzania and Uganda.
Fetter (1924) offered demand as a determinant of
14the location of industries. He advanced a theory of 
"market area" which attempts to provide a definite idea 
of the size and shape of the market tributary with 
respect to any given level of market prices and freight 
rates. The theory stresses the monopolistic nature of 
space by arguing that a producer exercises control over 
specific buyers in a particular space of the economy.
One of the major assumptions of this theory is that the 
market is monopolistically competitive because firms 
are geographically dispersed.
There are two ways in which the notion of a monopoly 
market is relevant to what obtained in the former East 
African Common Market. First, there was a period when 
Kenya and Uganda were the sole suppliers of certain
products to the Common Market because the two countries 
were early-starters in certain industries. Second, 
there was also a time when a producer in the East 
African Common Market, though he was not a sole supplier 
in that Common Market, he had a disproportionate share
15
of that market. Therefore, he had a near monopoly of 
the market.
Another contributor to the locational theory was 
16Losch (1954). He put forward a model of an economy 
which functions under monopolistic competition. The ' 
model was that of a broad, homogeneous plain (economy) 
with uniform transport features in all directions and 
with even scatter of raw materials in sufficient 
quantity for production to take place. In this model, 
there was also a uniform distribution of agricultural 
population with uniform tastes and preferences, uniform 
technical knowledge and production opportunities being 
disseminated through the plain.
A criticism which may be given about Losch*s model 
is that it implicitly suggests that there will be an 
even distribution of industries in the economy.
This interpretation is made because of the assumption 
that there is a uniform distribution of agricultural 
population, technical knowledge and production opportun­
ities. The latter two factors may not be evenly 
distributed in the regions of an economy (the East 
African Common Market is considered as one economy and
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are taken as three regions 
of that economy). The model does not mention the role 
domestic (regional) demand may play in influencing the 
location of industries. It is most likely that a 
region with higher purchasing power will attract more 
industries than a region with lower purchasing power. 
The gravitation of industries to the region with higher 
purchasing power is likely to he exacerbated where that 
region has infrastructural and geographical (centrality 
to the Common Market) advantages over other regions. 
This situation is likely to exist where a wholistic 
form of economic co-operation exists. That is where 
free trade, a common'external tariff and free movement 
of factors of production exist. In such a form of 
economic co-operation,high demand for industrial 
products of the more industrialised region by the less 
industrialised regions may lead to regional economic 
disparities.
3.4 Circular and Cumulative Causation and Regional 
Economic Disparities
Myrdal (1957) offered a theory of circular and
cumulative causation as an explanation of why regional
17economic disparities may persist. The theory
stipulates that a region which has acquired an economic 
lead over other regions is likely to maintain that lead.
This is because both economic and social forces tend to 
interact to promote further growth in the economically 
more advanced region. Market forces, as the quotation 
below indicates, is the cause of regional economic 
disparities:
That there is a tendency inherent in the free 
play of market forces to create regional 
inequalities, and that this tendency becomes 
the more dominant the poor a country is, are 
two of the most important laws of economic 
underdevelopment and development under 
laissez-faire.....
Notice that regional economic inequalities tend to 
be more dominant in a poor country. Myrdal originated 
a term "backwash" to describe the tendency for the 
persistence of regional inequalities. He also 
originated a term "spread effects" to describe a reduct­
ion in regional economic disparities. This was expected 
to occur where there was "pressure" of demand exerted 
by the more economically advanced region for the products 
of the less economically advanced region. "Spread 
effects" meant a transmission of prosperity from the 
richer region to the poor one. Myrdal considered the 
"spread" effects to be weaker than the "backwash" 
effects, hence the persistence of regional economic 
disparities.
Hirschman (1958) also tried to explain what causes
regional economic disparities and what happens over time
19to those disparities. He argued, in the same vein as
Myrdal, that a region which has acquired an economic 
lead over other regions may experience "polarisation" 
effects. By this, he meant that the more economically 
advanced region would become a nucleus for further 
growth and that this may forestall growth in the less 
developed region. But, he also argued that because of 
the demand for the products of the less developed region 
by the more developed one, growth was likely to be 
stimulated in the former region. He used the term 
"trickling-down" to describe such growth. Unlike 
Myrdal, Hirschman attached greater weight to the effect­
iveness of the "trickling down" effects*,
Myrdal*s and Hirschman*s theories of regional 
inequalities are largely relevant to what existed in the 
former East African Common Market. As was seen in 
Chapter 2, Kenya maintained her industrial lead over 
Tanzania and Uganda. This is consistent with backwash 
or polarisation notions,. The spread effects or trickling 
down effects are represented by the fact that Kenya was 
a bigger market for Tanzanian and Ugandan goods than the 
two countries were for each other’s goods. It is 
important, however, to point out and stress that because 
Tanzania and Uganda imported more from Kenya than she 
imported from them, the transmission of growth was, on 
balance, from the two countries to Kenya. This leads 
the author to conclude that Myrdal was right in suggest­
ing that the "spread" effects were likely to be weaker
than the ’’backwash1' effects*
It is'very important that in trying to predict the
extent of transmission of growth to consider the products
which will be traded* It is generally accepted that the
income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods is
20higher than that of the non-manufactured goods*
Therefore, a country which has a greater capacity to 
export manufactured goods is likely to grow faster than 
one which exports a higher proportion of non-manufactured 
goods. Perhaps, if Hirschman had considered the type 
of products entering into inter-regional trade, he 
would not have attributed as much potency to the 
’’trickling down” effects as he did*
Kaldor (1966) also tried to explain why regional 
economic disparities tend to persist* He used the 
theory of circular and cumulative causation to explain 
why economic disparities among some industrially advanced 
countries had persisted* He argued that it was the 
difference in productivity which had been responsible 
for the persistence of economic disparities*
Furthermore, he made the following observation:
. ..* relatively fast growing areas tend to acquire 
a cumulative advantage over a relatively slow 
growing area. 21
And he argued that left to market processes alone,
tendencies towards regional concentration of industrial
22activities will proceed further. This
being so because of the cumulative causation process,
Thirlwall (1974) clarifies this remark by Kaldor
by observing that in dynamic situation output is subject
23to increasing returns. Because of the so-called 
"Yerdoom effect”, a region which experiences an 
advantage in the production of goods with a high income 
elasticity of demand, will tend to have a higher rate of 
output and productivity than other regions,
Thirlwall (1978) also points out that the more economic­
ally advanced region by definition will be more competit­
ive in goods with high income elasticity of demand than 
the other regions, ^  This means that the relatively 
backward regions are likely to be adversely affected by 
the competitiveness of the more advanced region. In 
other words, development of certain economic activities 
in the less competitive regions may be forestalled.
This may happen because there is no protection of 
economic activities in the less competitive regions.
3.5 Capital Absorptive Capacities and Regional 
Economic Disparities
There is a link between circular and cumulative 
causation process and capital absorptive capacities.
The link is revealed by reviewing what several people 
consider to be the definition of capital absorptive 
capacity. An important point which emerges from their
definitions, shown below, is that capital absorptive
capacities of countries differ. In view of this, it
would be unrealistic to expect that there would be an
even distribution of industries among the members of
an economic integration scheme.
There is no single definition of capital absorptive
capacity which is generally accepted. One of the early
attempts to define capital absorptive capacity was made
by Horvat (1958). He defined it as the ability of
individuals and society to manipulate the stream of
25output increment. By this he meant the ability of 
individuals and society to undertake investments which 
would result in an increase in the flow of output to 
satisfy the demand. At this stage, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the ability to manipulate the increase 
in output was likely to differ between countries. 
Actually, the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 support this 
assumption.
Hirschman (1958) did not define capital absorptive
capacity as such, but he made several useful observations 
' 26on that issue.' First, he observed that capital 
absorptive capacity was determined by the capacity to 
invest. It seems reasonable to interpret this observat­
ion to mean that if an economy had a high capacity to 
invest, then its capital absorptive capacity would also 
be high. This interpretation is consistent with 
empirical findings in Chapter 6 about fund absorptive
capacities in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Second, 
Hirschman observed that the ability to invest grows with 
the act of practising to invest. This observation 
reflects an element of cumulative causation. For 
instance, a region which has practised to invest more 
than other regions is likely to have higher capital 
absorptive capacity than regions which have had less 
practice in investing. The third observation is that 
the size of the modem sector of an economy determines 
the amount of investment which will be undertaken.
This means that for economies like the East African 
Common Market ones, a country which has a bigger section 
of its economy in the monetary sector, may be expected 
to invest more than an economy whose monetary sector was 
smaller. This expectation is supported by the empirical 
findings in Chapter 6.
Higgins (1962) defined capital absorptive capacity
as the amount of investment which could be undertaken
in a five year period without reducing the marginal
21contribution of the last unit of capital. This 
definition reflects the notion of diminishing returns.
The extent to which this definition approximated to the 
real situation in the East African Common Market would 
require a careful empirical investigation. The data 
available to us do not permit such an investigation.
Mikesell (1962) defined capital absorptive capacity 
as the ability of a country to use financial capital in
such a way that there will be a net national product
whose discounted value equals the value of the financial
28capital that had been invested. This definition
reflects two interrelated issues, the cost and benefit 
notion and the efficient utilisation of resources.
The cost benefit criterion was used by the East African 
Development Bank in its evaluation of projects it 
financed.
A point which is often missed but which is so
important that it should not be missed, is that national
policy-makers may so intervene that the result of cost
benefit may be misleading. For example, national
policy-makers may decide to attach an artificially low
rate to discounting future benefits from industrial
activities that very many projects may be accepted
which would otherwise have been rejected. Findings
in Chapter 7 indicate that Kenya (the more industrially
advanced region) was more willing than the other two
countries not only to sacrifice some of the net national
product in return for industrial expansion, but she was
also willing to render more assistance to industrial
development than the other two countries.
Chenery . (1964) de fined c a p ita l  ab so rp tive  c a p a c ity
as the amount of increase in total investment which
could be carried out at an acceptable minimum level of
29productivity over a given period. The East African
Common Market experience indicates that the minimum
acceptable level of productivity may largely be 
determined by the weight which national policy-makers 
attach to investments in certain sectors. For 
instance, investment in the industrial sector was given 
a greater weight than investment in other sectors in the 
three member countries of the Common Market. The East 
African experience also suggests that the level of 
minimum productivity differs between countries. 
Furthermore, the extent to which national government 
will go towards rendering assistance that may facilitate 
industrial development differs. In the light of these 
factors, it seems unrealistic to expect that there could 
be a balanced distribution of industries between Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda.
Adler (1965) defined capital absorptive capacity as 
the amount of investment or rate of gross domestic 
investment expressed as a proportion of the gross 
national product that can be undertaken at an acceptable 
rate of return where the co-operant factors are 
present.^ It is conceivable that where policy-makers 
attach heavy weight to certain economic activities a 
low rate of return may be acceptable. The inclusion of 
the co-operant factors in the definition is an important 
contribution. These factors may include the availabil­
ity of competent managerial personnel and a skilled 
labour force in industrial production, the availability 
of foreign exchange and the necessary local inputs and a
healthy state of the national economy. The effect of
these factors on fund absorptive capacity is discussed
in depth in Chapter 6. A point which needs to be made
now is that the extent to which the co-operant factors
were present in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda differed.
In view of this, it may be expected that it would have
been very difficult to have a balanced distribution of
industries between the three countries.
Crulhati (1967) in contributing to factors likely to
affect capital absorptive capacity, stressed the non-
31financial factors. While this is true for the East
African Common Market where managerial know-how was a
major constraint to the commercial success of projects,
financial factors were also serious constraints.
Inadequate supply of local currency and in particular
of foreign currencies, caused the failure of a number of
projects financed by the East African Development Bank.
The definitions of capital absorptive capacity
discussed above looked exclusively at the supply side.
Stephens (1971) examined capital absorptive capacity
32from the demand side. He did not define the term.
He argued that constraints to capital absorptive capacity 
originated largely from the demand side because the 
demand for capital was a derived demand. He argued 
that the attempt to satisfy the existing or potential 
demand was the cause of the demand for capital. He 
concludes that any investment will prove unproductive
if there is no adequate demand. Stephens not only 
identified demand as a determinant of capital absorptive 
capacity, but he also contended that it is more important 
than the factors from the supply side.
The experience of the East African Common Market 
indicates that the main constraints to capital absorptive 
capacity arose from the supply side. Therefore, the 
argument by Stephens that the demand is a more important 
determinant of capital absorptive capacity than factors 
arising from the supply side, is not relevant to that 
Common Market.
In concluding the discussion on capital absorptive 
capacity, an attempt is made to highlight the salient 
points which have a bearing on industrial imbalances in 
East African Common Market. The ability to manipulate 
the stream of output is a very relevant point. As long 
as the abilities of the countries differ, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that there will be industrial 
imbalances between member countries of an economic 
integration scheme. The point that the capital absorpt­
ive capacity depended on the capacity to invest is also 
relevant. As long as the capacity to invest is 
different in member countries of an economic integration 
scheme, industrial imbalances are likely to exist.
It is also noteworthy that the size of the modern sector 
may determine the amount of investment which will be 
undertaken. It follows from this that if the size of
modem sectors differs in the member countries of an 
economic integration scheme, the amount of investment 
undertaken may also differ. In such circumstances, 
industrial imbalances would be expected. This is 
actually what happened in the Bast African Common Market, 
as will be seen in Chapter 5. Finally, it was mentioned 
that co-operant factors affect capital absorptive 
capacity. These factors were not uniform in the three 
countries of the East African Common Market. Because 
of that, the existence of industrial imbalances between 
the three countries would be expected to persist.
3.6 Synthesis
This section seeks to knit together or to synthesise 
the various salient strands of theory discussed in this 
chapter. Two questions are borne in mind. The first 
is what do the strands of theories to be synthesised 
tell us about the real world. The second is what is 
the predictive power of those theories. Two other 
considerations are also borne in mind. One is what 
insights the strands of theories seen in this chapter 
offer concerning the operation of a wholistic form of 
economic co-operation, like the East African Common 
Market. The other consideration is the insights which 
those theories offer for a non-wholistic form of 
economic co-operation. The latter form of co-operation
is likely soon to be in existence between Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda and other countries.
The orthodox customs union theory, as represented 
by Viner, postulates that if member countries reallocate 
resources in accordance with comparative advantage, then 
resources will be efficiently utilised. In other words, 
specialisation according to the comparative advantage 
doctrine leads to a better utilisation of resources.
This is likely to lead to more goods being produced than 
in the system where there is no specialisation.
There is, however, a probability that adherence to 
the comparative advantage doctrine could lead to the 
uneven distribution of industries among the member 
countries of the customs union. It was seen that 
through historical accidents, which may have had little 
connection with comparative advantage, some countries 
may acquire an industrial lead over other countries.
This lead is likely to be maintained or even expanded 
through the cumulative causation process. This process 
may, actually, lead to a lowering of costs in one 
country, while in another they remain high. The 
cumulative causation process may also lead to an ever 
increasing development of industrial growth poles in 
the country which is more industrialised than others. 
Furthermore, the country which is more industrialised 
than others may have greater capacity to invest in 
industries than other countries. As already noted,
great capacity to invest goes hand in hand with high 
capital absorptive capacity. Under these circumstances, 
industrial imbalances between member countries of a 
custom union are likely to persist.
It was seen that because co-operant factors, which 
influence capital absorptive capacity, are likely to be 
different in member countries of a customs union, the 
levels of industrial development are also likely to be 
different in those countries. In a non-wholistic form 
of economic co-operation, (which is what the former 
members of the East African Common Market are likely to 
have in the near future) balancing industrial contribut­
ion makes sense only in the context of rationalising 
industrial production on a regional basis. For this 
to happen, there is need to have an agreement on the
development of some industries on a regional basis.
33Such an agreement exists in the Andean Croup. For 
industries in which rationalisation is contemplated to 
success, it is essential to draw on past experience 
concerning what were the determinants of success and 
failure of industrial projects. The determinants of 
success (drawn from Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 7) included 
national government intervention, the availability of 
managers with relevant skills in running industrial 
projects, adequate demand, an economy which is growing 
and the availability of local funds and foreign 
exchange. Conversely, where these factors are lacking,
industrial performance is likely to be poor. It seems 
to me, that the knowledge of the factors which had 
caused the success and failure of industrial development 
in the former East African Common Market is a useful 
tool in predicting industrial performance not only in 
the former three member countries, but also in other 
countries of the developing world.
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CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL AND TRADE IMBALANCES IN EACMjl.96 2-1967
4.1 Introduction
It was noted in Chapter 1 that industrial and 
trade imbalances threatened to disrupt the forms of 
economic co-operation which had existed for a long time 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It was also 
mentioned that where market forces operate freely, as 
had been the case in the East African Common Market, 
regional economic disparities tend to develop. Policy­
makers in Uganda, and especially those in Tanzania, 
pressed for the regulation of market forces so that the 
operation of the Common Market would be rendered more 
equitable than it had been in the past.
The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it 
examines closely and critically the attempts which were 
made to render the former East African Common Market 
equitable. Second, the intra-EACM branching out of 
industries is discussed.
The third aim is to analyse the intra-EACM trade 
for the six year period covered by this chapter.
4.2 The Distributable Pool
The Distributable Pool was an arrangement that was 
designed to make the East African Common Market more 
equitable than it had been before. The primary purpose 
of that arrangement, as the quotation below shows, was 
to reduce tension in the political relations between the 
three members of that Common Market. This was expected 
to be achieved through a mechanism of unequal contribut­
ion of funds to a common pool, which will be explained 
below.
Our recommendation of a Distributable Pool of 
revenue is directed in the first instance at 
providing an easement of tensions in relation to 
the Common Market and to the establishment of some 
balance in the territorial advantages derived 
from it.3-
The principle behind the Distributable Pool was
that Kenya, which had benefitted from the operation of
2
the Common Market more than the other two countries,
should bear a greater burden, in terms of the costs of
running the common services, than her two partner states.
Those who designed the Pool scheme held a view that
under market forces a higher degree of efficiency was
likely to be achieved than under a system where market
3
forces were interfered with. Moreover, because there 
was interest to attract foreign investors to the Common 
Market, it was considered by those who designed the 
scheme that interfering with market forces would be
counterproductive. This consideration was responsible 
for the failure to tackle the root causes of industrial 
and trade imbalances.
How the Distributable Pool Operated
The Distributable Pool was an arrangement which 
required Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to contribute funds 
to a common pool from which each would receive back an 
equal share after the cost of running the services 
provided on the Common Market basis had been met. The 
money came from two sources in each country. The first 
was the income tax on the profit of manufacturing and 
finance companies.^ The second was the revenue of 
import duties collected by the East African Customs 
and Excise Department. Specific formulae applied were 
as follows. The formula applicable to the first source 
was that 40 per cent of the annual proceeds of profit 
would be paid into the Distributable Pool, and for the 
second source, it was expected that 6 per cent of each 
country*s share of revenue from customs and excise 
duties would also be paid into the Pool.
The Distributable Pool revenue was expected to be 
shared by four parties, the High Commission which ran 
the common services, and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
The formula for distributing the revenue among the four 
parties was 3:1:1:1 for the High Commission and the
three countries respectively.
Table 4*1 below shows the actual amount received
5
by the four parties between 1961 and 1966. Section A
of the table indicates that Kenya contributed a bigger
proportion of the revenue into the Pool than either 
Tanzania or Uganda did. Her contribution was between 
46 and 53 per cent of the total revenue for the five 
years and average annual contribution was 51 per cent. 
Tanzania’s contribution was between 24 and 26 per cent 
with the annual average contribution being 25 per cent. 
Por Uganda, her contribution ranged from 21 to 29 per 
cent and the annual average was 24 per cent.
A credit which ought to be given to the Distribut­
able Pool arrangement is that it made the contributions 
of the three countries to reflect the proportion of 
their gains from the common services. Kenya, for whom 
there was a general agreement that she had gained more 
than the other two countries, also paid more than either 
of them. Tanzania had also gained more than Uganda*^
There are three noteworthy points about the contents 
of Table 4do The first is that under the old system of 
contributing funds to run the common services, Tanganyika 
contributed more than Kenya and Uganda, and yet she had 
benefitted least from the operation of the Common Market. 
It seems that under that system the principle of equity
TABLE 4.1: Two Methods^inanclng EACM Common Services 
and In-built Compenaation
(in millions of East African shillings 
and percentages)
Pre-Distributable Pool Contributions
Kenya
Tanganyika
Uganda
Total
10. 50 
11.00 
8.20
29.70 Revenue for High Commission
Contributions Under Distributable Pool
1961-62 1962--63 1963-•64 1964--65 1965-•66
(1) Share Share Share Share Share
* * * * *
Kenya 34.62 53 41.84 53 51.02 52 49.98 46 58.70 51
Tanganyika 15.82 24 20.56 26 23.28 24 26.58 25 27.60 24
Uganda 15.18 23 16.62 21 23.18 24 31.80 29 28.90 25
Total 65.62 100 79.02 100 97.48 100 108.36 100 115.20 100
B. Distribution of Punds to:
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66
High Commission (i) 32.80 39.50 48.76 54.18 57.60
Kenya 10.94 13.16 16.24 18.06 19.20
Tanganyika 10.94 13.16 16.24 18.06 19.20
Uganda 10.94 13.16 16.24 18.06 19.20
Total 65.62 78.98 97.48 108.36 115.20
C. Net Receipts for:
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66
Kenya -23.68 -28.68 -34.78 -39.92 -39.50
Tanganyika - 4.88 - 7.40 - 7.04 - 8.52 - 8.40
Uganda - 4.24 - 3.46 - 6.94 -13.74 - 9.70
* The shilling was a common currency in the three East
African countries and it was at par,
Sources: Computed from: (1) P. Robson (1968), Economic
Integration in Africa, (London: George Allen 
and Unwin), p. 113- (2) A. Hazlewood (1975)t Economic 
Integration: The East African Experience, (London:
HeinemaniJ, p.42 .
was applied to the potential benefit likely to be derived 
by each country. The fact that Tanganyika was the 
largest of the three countries meant that she stood to 
gain more than the other two countries from the develop­
ment of a communication network.
The second point is that while all the three 
countries1 net receipts from the Distributable Pool were 
negative, Kenya’s net negative receipts were greater than 
Tanganyika’s or Uganda’s. This suggests that there was 
some compensation by Kenya for her trade surplus with 
the other two countries. That was a right step in the 
direction towards easing political sensitivity about 
trade imbalance which was shown by policy-makers in 
Tanganyika and Uganda. The third point is that 
Tanganyika paid slightly more than Uganda into the 
Distributable Pool in spite of the fact that she was 
less industrialised than Uganda, and had had a persistent 
trade deficit with her (see Chapter 2). This could 
perhaps have been justified by the fact that the former had 
benefitted more from communication services than the 
latter.
Two major criticisms may be levelled against the 
Distributable Pool. First, it did not attempt to solve 
the root cause of trade imbalances which was industrial 
imbalances. Even distribution of industries among the 
three member countries of the East African Common Market 
was necessary not only to solve the problem of trade
imbalances, but also to bring about even distribution 
of agents of economic growth.
The second criticism is that the amount which 
Tanganyika received back was too small, in relation to 
her balance of trade deficit in intra-EAGM trade, to 
satisfy the policy-makers in that country. For 
instance, while she received Shs. 13.16 million back 
from the Distributable Pool in 1962-63, her trade 
deficit in 1962 was Shs. 179 million.^ By 1966, the 
disparity between the ncompensation” she received and 
her trade deficit was even greater, the amounts in
0
question were Shs. 19.20 million and Shs. 225 million.
The situation in Uganda was different in the
1962-63 period. The income compensation received from
the Distributable Pool was Shs. 13.16 million. But
that country’s trade deficit with Kenya and Tanzania
q
was only Shs. 33 million. This means that about 
40 per cent of Uganda’s deficit was offset by that 
compensation. However, by 1966 the amount of compensat­
ion Uganda received, Shs. 19.2 million, was too small 
to substantially offset her trade deficit of Shs. 131 
million."^ Therefore, the greater were Uganda’s and 
Tanzania’s trade deficits with Kenya, the more unsatis­
factory the Distributable Pool appeared to be an 
inadequate compensation scheme.
4.3 The Kampala Agreement
Policy-makers in Uganda and especially those in 
Tanganyika were dissatisfied with the Distributable 
Pool, largely because it did not tackle both industrial 
and trade imbalances. This led to a search, in 1964, 
for ways in which the two forms of imbalances could be 
corrected. The search culminated, in 1965, into an 
acceptance by Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda to introduce 
a number of remedial measures. These were contained 
in a document called the Kampala Agreement."^
The remedial measures were of two types. The first 
involved the regulation of the intra-EACM trade. A 
country which had had a trade surplus with its partner 
state was to have her exports to that partner in trade 
deficit curtailed. The exports of the latter to the 
former were expected to be stepped up.
The second type of remedial measures dealt with 
the distribution of industries among the three countries. 
One of the two ways of achieving that objective was for 
some industries which had traditionally operated in 
Kenya and which had exported to Tanganyika, were
requested to set up branches in the latter. It was
expected that at a future date some Kenya-based 
industries would also branch out from there to Uganda.
The other method of distributing industries was to
allocate more lfEast African Industries” to Tanganyika 
than to the other two countries, thus contributing to
Tanganyika’s catcMng up in industrial development 
with her partner states. An East African industry 
was one which was accorded a monopoly status in the 
East African Common Market by the Kampala Agreement. 
Because Uganda was less industrialised than Kenya, she 
was also allocated more East African industries than 
Kenya.
4 . 3 o l  Balanced Distribution of Industries: A Critique
Since industrial imbalance was the cause of trade 
imbalance, it was considered appropriate that the former 
should be discussed first. The Kampala Agreement 
deserves credit for attempting to correct industrial 
imbalances. As has been explained above, the attempt 
was a right step towards promoting the economic growth 
of the less industrialised member as well as easing 
political sensitivity shown mainly by the Tanganyikan 
p oli cy-makers.
However, the extent to which industrial imbalances
could be reduced was limited. Eor instance, the
Kampala Agreement proposed only four industries which
would branch out from Kenya to Tanganyika. The latter
was expected to have two more East African industries
12than the former. Moreover, because Kenya was more 
industrialised than Tanganyika and had a more developed 
industrial infrastructure as well as being the centre of
many East African Common Market Services (which meant 
a high purchasing capacity in Kenya), it would not have 
been realistic to expect a significant reduction in 
industrial imbalances. It would have been more 
realistic to expect that the process of cumulative
causation would have worked towards industrial imbalances.
13Actually, Kenya kept ahead ^ of her two partner 
states in moving into substituting for some goods which 
she formerly imported from both them and from the rest 
of the world.
The attempt to bring about a balanced distribution 
of industries may be further criticised on the ground 
that no economic criteria were used. Eor instance, 
there is no evidence to show that comparative advantage 
was considered. Equity seems to have taken precedence 
over efficient utilization of the East African Common 
Market resources. This was, however, essential in order 
for that Common Market to hold together. It seems that 
in the economic integration schemes of the less developed 
countries, there is often a trade-off of efficiency for 
equity.^
Another criticism which may be given about the 
attempt to distribute industries evenly is that there 
was no joint agreement on industrial development on the 
East African Common Market basis. In the absence of 
such an agreement, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
the Kampala Agreement was an ad hoc arrangement whose
real purpose was to avert a political tension in the
15relations of the three East African partner states*
It is noteworthy that despite the three states*
co-operation in many areas, they never co-operated in
industrial field. The experience of the Andean economic
integration scheme suggests that even where an agreement
on the rationalisation of industrial production exists,
it is very difficult to rationalise; production because
16of conflicting national self-interests* This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, section 6„7»
4*3*2 An Attempt at Balancing Intra-EACM Trade:
A dritique
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, two 
methods for regulating the imbalances in the intra-EACM 
trade were proposed by the Kampala Agreement. The 
intention was to bring about some degree of balance in 
inter-country trade. The measure to restrict the 
volume of exports of the partner state which had had a 
trade surplus with another in the previous year, may be 
criticised on the ground that it threatened to curtail 
trade which would otherwise contribute to the economic 
growth of the three countries* What was overlooked is 
that the partner state whose volume of exports was 
restricted was likely to search for overt and covert 
ways of retaliating* Such a situation would have
defeated one of the main purposes of economic integration,
17to expand production and exports*
The measure to promote the exports of the country 
which had been in trade deficit with another partner 
state was a movement in the right direction* This is 
because seeking to expand exports would in turn have 
made it possible to expand production in the country in 
question. However, the Kampala Agreement did not 
specify how the expansion of exports could be achieved.
It ought to have stated, for instance, how export- 
oriented industries in the countries in trade deficit 
would be assisted in expanding their exports to the 
countries in trade surplus.
There was a possibility that without assisting the 
former countries, they could not, on their own, have 
been able to substantially increase the volume of their 
exports*
The Kampala Agreement was not ratified by any of 
the three partner states. This was due to the disagree­
ment between policy-makers in Kenya and Tanzania over
maintaining a common currency which had traditionally
18been issued by the East African Currency Board*
It would have been meaningless for Uganda which was: 
outside that controversy to ratify the agreement since 
it had been arrived at with the EACH in mind*
4.3.3 Industrial and Trade Imbalances in EACM:
A Result of Monetary Policies?
A question which this section seeks to answer is 
whether the monetary policies which had been pursued in 
the East African Common Market (EACM) were responsible 
for the industrial and trade imbalances. If the answer 
is an affirmative one, then Tanzania’s demand that new 
monetary policies should be adopted would be understand­
able. But, if the answer is negative, then her demand 
would be construed to have been based on other consider­
ations. This answer would mean that the Kampala 
Agreement did not make a serious omission by not suggest­
ing the type of monetary policies which would contribute 
towards balanced industrial development and inter-country 
trade.
In order to be able to answer the above question,
how the East African Currency Board (EACB) had operated,
must be explained. The EACB came into existence in
1919 and it controlled money supply in the EACM and in
19other two territories. Between that date and 1955, 
the EACB only issued local currency, the shilling, 
against the amount of foreign exchange (largely the 
pound sterling) held by each territory. This restrict­
ive system was criticised on the ground that it retarded 
the economic growth of the territories in which it was 
practiced.20
With this criticism in mind, an attempt will now
be made to examine the first part of the question posed
above. That part is whether or not the restrictive
monetary policy pursued in the EACM was responsible for
the industrial backwardness of Tanzania and Uganda in
relation to Kenya. There is no evidence to suggest
that the lag of Tanzania and Uganda in industrial
development was due to the rigid control of the money
supply. In other words, the shortage of finance did
not stunt industrial development in the two countries.
On the contrary, both Newlyn (1952) and Hazlewood (1954)
pointed out that for most times the East African banking
system had excess supply of the pound sterling.which,
as explained above, was the basis for the quantity of
21money that could be supplied.
Moreover, it was seen in chapter 2 that the under­
development of industries in Tanzania and Uganda was 
partly a result of a colonial policy which discouraged 
the industrialisation of the colonial territories. It 
was also explained in that chapter that important factors 
which usually facilitate industrialisation were either 
absent or available in insufficient quantities in 
Tanzania and Uganda. In the light of these findings 
and the explanation by Newlyn and Hazlewood, it can be 
concluded that the restrictive monetary practice 
exercised by the EACB did not retard industrialisation 
in these two countries. In any case, Kenya was equally 
affected by that restrictive monetary practice.
An attempt will now be made to answer the second
part of the question, namely the extent to which the
restrictive monetary control affected trade imbalances
in the EACM. The restriction of the quantity of money
supplied should reduce imports. This is because the
aggregate demand is suppressed under restrictive
22monetary practice. The converse is, of course, true
if expansionary monetary policy is adopted. In the
view of this knowledge, it can be concluded that the
monetary policy pursued before 1955 was not responsible
for the trade imbalances in the intra-EACM trade.
Instead, it may have helped in keeping imbalances lower
than they would otherwise have been by depressing the
aggregate demand.
Between 1955 and 1964 the East African Currency
Board exercised modest expansionary money supply based
on fiduciary issue of the currency. For instance, in
1964, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were each allowed a
23fiduciary issue of Shs. 197.2 million. This expans­
ionary monetary policy adopted should have led to an 
increase in investment in the industrial sectors of the 
three countries. Since these countries had received 
equal amounts, the industrial imbalances which would 
have followed, if any, could not be blamed on the EACB.
This conclusion does not apply to trade imbalances. 
As was explained above, the pursuit of expansionary 
monetary policy tends to raise the aggregate demand,
and that in turn will tend to raise the demand for 
imports. This is likely to be more so the case where 
there are few impediments to inter-country trade. It 
will be seen later in this chapter (section 4.6,
Table 4.3) that the intra-EACM trade imbalances increased 
between 1962 and 1967, the period which this chapter 
covers. This is consistent with the expectation that 
expansionary monetary practices should be accompanied 
by a rise in aggregate demand and an increase in imports. 
The magnitude of trade imbalances would probably have 
been greater by the end of 1967 if obstacles introduced 
in 1964 had not been still present.
There was another force working in favour of the 
intra-EACM trade imbalances. This was the expansion 
of the national governments1 expenditure. Such a 
practice also raises the aggregate demand and increases 
the demand for imports. The trade imbalances under 
such circumstances would reflect the three countries’ 
ability in self-sufficiency in a number of products, 
particularly in industrial ones.
Tanzania and Uganda who, as Table 4.3 indicates, 
were in persistent trade deficit in the intra-EACM trade, 
were in a dilemma with regard to the expansionpry monetary 
liberal fiscal" policies. The pursuit of these policies was 
essential in order to encourage economic growth. But 
such policies w e r e  bound to increase their trade deficit 
with Kenya since she was producing goods with a high
income elasticity of demand and yet Tanzania and Uganda 
were not producing goods which would also be in high 
demand in Kenya.
Trade imbalances resulting from expansionary 
monetary policies were to be expected from 1966 onwards. 
This is because the three national central banks which 
replaced the East African Currency Board increased money 
supply substantially. The justification for this, as 
was explained above, was to facilitate economic growth. 
This subject of the effect of monetary policies pursued 
in the EACM on industrial and trade imbalances is 
examined again in chapter 5, for the period 1968-1977.
It was stated at the beginning of this section 
that judgement would be made as to whether or not the 
Kampala Agreement made a serious omission by not 
indicating which type of monetary policy would promote 
inter-country trade balance. Restrictive monetary 
practice, as was seen above, would have assisted to 
achieve that goal. It was also seen that that could 
have been achieved at the expense of retarding economic 
growth. Given that trade deficit, as was noted in 
chapter 1, does not retard economic growth, the Kampala 
Agreement’s silence on which monetary policies to be 
pursued to curtail Tanzania’s and Uganda’s trade deficit 
was not a grave omission. Its silence on the type of 
monetary policy which would promote industrial develop­
ment in those two countries may be explained by the
fact that the question of monetary policy to be pursued 
had been dealt with by some other experts.^
4o4 Cross Border Plow of Investment in Industry in EACM
This section discusses the flow of some investments 
across the borders of the three partner states of the 
East African Common Market. The discussion is meant to 
illustrate the role market forces played in the distribut­
ion of industries among the three partner states. It 
will be recalled from the account given in chapter 1, 
that market forces played a part in the distribution of 
industries either because of a desire by investors to 
acquire a share of the new national market, or to retain 
the existing share.
4o4ol Flow of Investments from Kenya and Uganda 
to Tanzania
The flow of investments from Kenya and Uganda into 
the Tanzanian industrial sector was carried out by two 
main agents. These were the industrialists of the Asian 
origin and some multinational companies. The former 
agent will be dealt with first.
The Chandalia family had a factory in Kenya which
25produced aluminium products. In I960, a similar 
factory was set up in Tanzania. At the time of the
Kampala Agreement that industry was allocated to
Tanzania on the understanding that she would be the
sole producer of the aluminium products in the East
African Common Market. An examination of the intra-
EACM trade shows that Kenya exported aluminium products
before and after the Agreement. That means that
Tanzania never became the sole producer of the aluminium
products in the Common Market. This is no surprise
since the Kampala Agreement was never ratified.
The Madhvani Group of companies was another agent
of the flow of investment from Kenya to Tanzania. In
the 1960s, the Group set up plants to produce biscuits,
26beer, glass bottles and also was involved in a project
27to expand the output of sugar in Tanzania. Sikh Saw
Mills company was yet another enterprise owned by
investors of Asian origin which was involved in the
cross-border investments. This company which had
traditionally been based in Uganda established plywood
28factories in Tanzania also in the 1960s.
Four firms illustrate the role some multinationals
played as agents of industrial distribution. The
British American Tobacco Company had a history of being
a ’’footloose” industry. Prior to 1956, the main plant
of this company was in Uganda and it exported mainly
29cigarettes to both Kenya and Tanganyika. After that 
date the main plant shifted to Kenya and its products 
were exported to Tanganyika and Uganda. In 1961, the 
company set up a plant in Tanganyika to meet the
domestic demand. The fear of losing that country's 
market after her independence was one of the probable 
reasons why the company decided to branch out from 
Kenya*^ There was, however, a valid economic reason 
for locating a plant in Tanganyika. There were savings
to be made in transportation costs. Instead of trans­
porting bulky tobacco from the country to Kenya to be 
manufactured into cigarettes which would then be exported 
to Tanganyika, as did actually happen, cigarettes were 
manufactured where the raw material was produced*
The East African Breweries Company which had
operated in Kenya since the 1920s, expanded its plant
31in Tanganyika in 1961. A brewery is the type of 
industry which is often located near the market* This 
is because water which forms a disproportionately large 
weight of beer is also bulky, and it is economically 
disadvantageous to transport the product over long 
distances* Supplying the Tanganyikan market from Kenya 
before 1961 may, however, have been a rational economic 
decision taken by the owners of the East African 
Breweries* This is because the demand for beer in 
Tanganyika was low. The decision to establish a 
brewery in the country may have been based, among other 
considerations, on the anticipation that in the post­
independence period there would be high demand for beer.
32This actually did happen*J
Portland Cement Company, which had operated from 
Kenya for a long time, also decided to set up a plant in
Tanganyika. Although this industry was one of the four
industries which were requested by the Kampala Agreement
to shift from Kenya to Tanganyika, the decision to do so
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had been taken before the Agreement* One of the 
factors which may have led to the decision to set up a 
plant in Tanganyika is the saving in transportation 
costs. Cement, like the brewery and cigarette indus­
tries, uses bulky inputs which are expensive to carry 
over long distances* Moreover, the main inputs were 
available near Dar-es-Salaam which was one of the main 
markets for cement in the country. The decision to 
locate a cement plant close to Dar-es-Salaam was, 
therefore, consistent with the reasoning that where an 
item to be produced is expensive to transport, a plant 
should be located near the market* Another factor 
which may have influenced the decision to locate a 
cement plant in Tanganyika was the anticipation that 
the demand for cement would increase sharply in the 
post-independence period. This is indeed what happened
in the 1960s because of the Government*s ambitious
34programme of construction*
Bata, a Canadian-based shoe company, which had
operated from Kenya since 1940, had established a small
35plant in Tanganyika in 1958. In the 1960s policy­
makers in the latter country brought pressure to bear
on the company for it to expand production in the 
36country* The company was reluctant to duplicate 
plants In the Bast African Common Market because it was
more economical for it to expand production at the plant 
in Kenya to meet the Tanganyikan and Ugandan demand. 
Actually, in the early 1960s Kenya was the only country 
which had a tannery and that was probably one of the 
principal reasons why it was economical for the product­
ion of shoes to be expanded there. The company 
eventually increased the output of shoes in Tanganyika
but only of the type which were not already being
37produced in Kenya. In other words, duplication of 
plants was avoided through producing certain types of 
shoes in one country and not in another, a form of 
specialisation*
4.4o2 glow of Investments to Uganda from Kenya and 
Vice Versa
This subsection seeks to provide a fuller picture 
of the flow of investments across the borders of the 
East African Common Market by discussing some industries 
which were involved in the shift from Kenya to Uganda 
and vice versa. What is of interest here, like in the 
previous subsection, is what was behind the investors' 
decision to shift their investments from one country 
to another. Later on it will be argued that given 
certain factors, the shift of industries among members 
of an economic integration scheme could be predicted.
Some Plow of Investments from Kenya to Uganda
Pour industries which branched out from Kenya to 
Uganda described below represented a step towards 
reducing industrial imbalances between the two countries. 
One of the earliest of those industries was a tea 
processing plant. A factory owned by a company which 
grew and processed tea in Kenya branched out from there 
to Uganda in 1948. It has been suggested that the 
motive behind that shift was to establish a foothold in 
Uganda so that in case the Common Market broke up, the 
company would not lose the Ugandan market to a new 
arrival competitor.
The Bata company was another industry which branched
out from Kenya to Uganda. This took place in 1963 and
the decision to branch out was also due to political
pressure from policy-makers in Uganda which was brought
39to bear on the company. The company was faced with 
a threat that if it failed to set up a branch in Uganda 
(as well as in Tanganyika) it could lose its market in 
that country.
The third industry which branched out from Kenya 
to Uganda was involved in paint manufacturing. This 
took place in the early 1960s. High demand for paint 
in the Ugandan market^, coupled with the fact that the 
products of paints industry are bulky, may have been 
some of the main considerations for the decision to 
branch out.
Glass manufacturing industry is the fourth industry
which branched out from Kenya to Uganda. In the early
1960s, there were two glass manufacturing plants in the
East African Common Market and both of them were in Kenya.
The two plants were owned by the Madhvani Group of
companies whose headquarters of its main commercial
activities was in Uganda. This group of companies set
up a plant in Uganda in the late 1960s. The main
advantages of setting up a plant in Uganda seem to have
been two. The first was the economic benefit which
would be derived from central management and financial
arrangement on a large scale by the head office of the
41Madhvani Group in Uganda. The second reason is the 
savings in transportation costs which could be made as 
a result of locating a glass plant in Uganda. The 
main input required by the industry, a certain type of 
sand, was available in abundance in the country.
The four industries discussed above were multi­
nationals and were owned either by one company or a 
group of companies. It seems to be a safe generalisat­
ion to say that if the prospects of making a reasonable 
return on capital are good because of the presence of 
the appropriate economic and political climate, multi­
nationals are likely to respond positively to a policy­
maker's request for even distribution of industries among 
members of an economic integration scheme.
glow of Investment from Uganda to Kenya
A flow of investment from Uganda to Kenya represented 
a step towards increasing the existing industrial 
imbalance between the two countries. Due to the 
difficulties of obtaining data, one industry is 
discussed here. The industry in question is the Iron 
and Steel. The first plant of that industry in the 
East African Common Market was established in Uganda in 
1961 by the Madhvani Group of companies (major share­
holder) and by two Italian companies.^ Economic 
efficiency consideration suggests that the plant should 
have been located in Kenya. Pirst, a large proportion 
of the scrap used was found in Kenya and was bulky and 
therefore expensive to transport. Second, Kenya
43consumed more iron and steel products than Uganda.
It has benn suggested that the decision to locate the
plant in Uganda was based on the expectation of
advantages from the centrality of management mentioned 
44above.
4.5 Comparative Industrial Growth in the Partner 
States of EACM. 1962-1967
The discussion of cross border investments in the 
East African Common Market (EACM) does not provide a 
full picture of the industrial performance of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, yet that picture is needed in order
to indicate whether or not the industrial imbalances 
between the three countries were reduced. This section 
compares the industrial performance of the three 
countries from 1962 to 1967. During this period, 
instruments designed to correct industrial imbalances 
were not in operation and there was no cooperation in 
developing industry on the Common Market basis. In 
other words, the EACM was of a laissez faire type.
Table 4o2 shows both the contributions which the 
manufacturing sectors of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
made to their respective gross domestic products. It 
may be seen that the size of the manufacturing sector 
in Kenya, in 1962, which was K Shs. 460 million, was 
approximately 2.4 times the size of the Ugandan manu­
facturing sector and approximately 3 times that of 
Tanzania.
TABLE 4.2: Contributions of Manufacturing Sectors in
Kenya. Tanzania and Uganda. 1962-1967""
(in millions of East African Shillings and 
in percentages)
Year
Ken'v 
Value added 
in Mfg.(1)
(1~) as $ 
of GDP
Uganda 
Value (1) as $ 
added in of GDP 
Mfg.(1)
Tanzania 
Value (l) as f 
added in of GDP 
Mfg.(l)
1962 460 7.6 195 6.2 154 3.7
1963 580 9.5 248 7.0 156 3.4
1964 676 10.3 273 7.0 194 4.0
1965 754 11.3 319 7.1 234 4.8
1966 842 11.1 352 7.5 282 5.8
1967 884 11.1 387 7.8 314 5.5
* East African shilling was still officially at par. 
Source; Computed from United Nations Yearbook of National 
Accounts Statistics, 1968.
By 1967, value added in the Kenyan manufacturing 
sector had risen to K Shs. 884 million, in current 
prices. This represented an increase of K Shs. 424 
million. Increases in Uganda and Tanzania on the other 
hand were T. Shs. 192 million and U. Shs. 160 million, 
respectively. Because the increase in Kenya was more 
than twice the size of increases in either of the other 
two countries, the industrial imbalances had increased.
The movement towards the reduction of industrial 
imbalances shown above by the cross-border flow of invest­
ments was, therefore, counter-balanced by this general 
movement towards industrial disparity.
An important point which this study wishes to stress 
is that the difference in the results of national efforts 
to expand industrial production led to the widening of 
industrial imbalances. Given that there was no co-ordin­
ation of industrial development on the East African 
Common Market basis, it was to be expected that there 
would be differences in industrial output in the three 
partner states. It follows from this that it would have 
been unrealistic to expect that industrial imbalances 
between the three partner states could be corrected in 
the absence of relevant policy instruments.
The pattern of industrial imbalances discussed above 
is shown in Figure 4.1. It may be seen that the general 
movement was that one of the widening of industrial gap 
between Kenya and the other two countries. Since, as 
was seen in Chapter 2, there existed a causal relationship

between industrial imbalance and trade imbalance in the 
East African Common Market, the next section investigates 
whether or not that relationship also existed during the 
1962-1967 period*
4*6 Intra-EACM Trade. 1962-1967
The magnitudes of inter-country trade in the former 
East African Common Market between 1962 and 1967 are 
shown in Table 4«3 below* Kenya exported more than
Tanzania* As was seen earlier, Kenya was more
industrially developed than the other two countries, and 
Uganda was also more industrialised than Tanzania* 
Therefore, a prima facie evidence of a partner state’s 
level of industrial development and her capacity to 
export is provided by the table. It may also be seen 
that Kenya had a balance of trade surplus with Tanzania
and Uganda for the six years* Notice that the size of
Tanzania1s trade deficit was greater than Uganda’s for 
each of those six years. Bearing in mind the different 
levels of industrial development mentioned above, and 
the balance of trade just stated, a correlation between 
industrial imbalances and trade imbalances existed*
An attempt will now be made to show whether or not 
the relationship between industrial imbalances and trade 
imbalances was a causal one. This exercise will involve 
examining the extent to which manufactured products were 
responsible for trade imbalances*
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As a prelude to examining the role manufactured 
products played in inter-country trade imbalances, 
manufactured products will be defined in a manner 
reflecting their international trade element. Beers 
and cigarettes under Section 1 of Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) and all goods falling under 
Sections 3 and Sections 5 to 8 are defined as manufact­
ured traded products. This broader than usual definit­
ion is chosen in order to: capture most of industrial 
goods traded in the East African Common Market, Because 
the definition has certain shortcomings, the results 
obtained by using it will have to be qualified. Two 
main shortcomings are that some of the manufactured 
products which are classified under Section 0 are left 
out and Section 3 in the case of Uganda include an 
item such as electric power which in strict terms ought 
not to be considered as a manufactured good. Despite 
the latter shortcoming, the magnitude of Kenya’s exports 
is understated because a substantial size of her exports 
falling under Section 0 is left out.
Table 4«4 shows the magnitude of manufactured goods 
traded between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda between 1962 
and 1967o Bor Kenya, manufactured goods accounted for 
between 65 and 76 per cent of her total annual exports 
to the other two countries during the six year period. 
This meant that a disproportionately large part of her 
trade surplus with those two countries was attributable 
to the export of manufactures. This point deserves to
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be dealt with in some depth,,
To demonstrate how industrial imbalance (which 
manifested itself in the unequal capacity of the member 
countries of the EACM to export manufactures) was the 
principal cause of the intra-EACM trade imbalances, the 
trade flows from 1962 to 1967 are used, Kenya and 
Tanzania are dealt with first. It was noted that the 
latter was in trade deficit with the former for the six 
years which this chapter covers (see Table 4*3). It 
may also be seen from Table 4*4 that Tanzania was 
persistently in trade deficit with Kenya, in manufactures, 
for all the six years shown in that table. Those 
products actually contributed a disproportionately 
large part to Tanzania’s trade deficit. Their annual 
average contribution between 1962 and 1964 was 81.3 per 
cent^ (calculated using statistics in Tables 4.3 and 
4.4). In 1965 manufactures accounted for 93*7 per 
cent of Tanzania’s deficit with Kenya and in the 
subsequent two years the annual average was 80 per cent. 
Bearing in mind that Tanzania was less industrialised 
than Kenya, these results support the hypothesis that 
the unequal levels of industrial development between the 
two countries was the principal cause of trade imbalance.
Uganda, as may be seen from Table 4*3, was also 
persistently in trade deficit with Kenya for each of the 
six years in the table. In examining the role the 
manufactures played in Uganda’s trade deficit, a different
approach from that one used in the case of Kenya and 
Tanzania is adopted. This approach is dictated by
the nature of trade between Kenya and Uganda which is 
different from that of Kenya and Tanzania*
Uganda* s trade deficit in manufactures with Kenya 
was Shs. 50, Shs. 79 and Shs. 125 million for 1962,
1963 and 1964 respectively (calculated from Table 4.4). 
But her trade position in all types of products, though 
still in deficit, was better than what has been shown.
The figures were Shs. 14 million for 1962, Shs* 33 
million for 1963 and Shs* 76 million for 1964. These 
reductions in deficit were due to the fact that Uganda 
was in trade surplus in non-manufactures for the three 
years.
Uganda’s trade deficit in manufactures with Kenya 
reached the peak in 1965 when it stood at Shs. 163 
million. In that year, she was also in trade deficit 
in the non-manufactured goods by Shs. 1 million. The 
overwhelming contribution of the manufactures should be 
noted. For the next two years, Uganda*s deficit in 
manufactures fell to Shs. 145 million in 1966 and fell 
further to Shs. 120 million in 1967. In 1966 Kenya 
had increased her surplus with Uganda in non-manufactures 
to Shs. 21 million, but her surplus in manufactures was 
Shs. 18 million less than it had been in 1965. This 
fall was due to trade restrictions which both Uganda 
and Tanzania had imposed on Kenya*s manufactures. In
1967, Kenya’s exports of manufactures fell again due 
to the trade restrictions. During that year, Uganda 
was hack in trade surplus with Kenya in non-manufactures. 
For four years, Uganda’s trade surplus with Kenya in 
those products had helped to a small extent to offset 
her trade deficit in all products.
The findings above concerning the overwhelming 
contribution of manufactures to Tanzania’s and Uganda’s 
trade deficit show that industrial imbalance was the 
principal cause of trade imbalance for the period 
covered by this chapter. It must be reiterated that 
the uneven distribution of industries among the three 
members of the EACM manifested itself in unequal capacity 
of those members to export manufactures to each other.
Summary
Three main issues were discussed in this chapter.
The first was the Distributable Pool. It was seen that 
while this scheme was intended tor- bring about a balanced 
distribution of ’’advantages” derivable from the Common 
Market, it did not attempt to correct the cause of the 
uneven distribution of ’’advantages”. This was because 
those who devised the scheme feared to interfere with 
market forces lest the flow of investment to the Common 
Market from the external world be discouraged. The 
failure to tackle the twin problem of industrial and
trade imbalances made the Distributable Pool arrangement 
unacceptable to policy-makers in Tanzania and Uganda.
The second issue concerned the corrective mechanisms 
of industrial and trade imbalances which were proposed 
in the Kampala Agreement. It was seen that though that 
Agreement was never ratified, there was movement towards 
correcting industrial imbalances* Thi3 movement was 
represented by the branching out of industries from Kenya 
and Uganda to Tanzania, as well as the branching out 
from Kenya to Uganda. It was also seen that there was 
a movement of industry from Uganda to Kenya which 
represented a step towards increasing the existing 
industrial disparity between the two countries* 
Furthermore, it was seen that the motive behind the 
relocation of industries was a commercial gain for 
private investors. The desire by national policy­
makers in Tanzania and Uganda to expand industrial 
production provided the incentive for investors to move 
into the two countries. It seems that where there is 
a coincidence of interest between investors and a certain 
national policy, a flow of investment across the borders 
of members of an economic integration scheme may take 
place. However, it was also seen that industrial 
disparity between Kenya on the one hand, and Tanzania 
and Uganda, on the other, (viewed from the whole of 
national manufacturing sector) widened.
The third issue which was discussed concerned inter­
country trade imbalances. It was found that a causal
relationship between industrial and trade imbalances 
existed. Since industrial imbalance was the cause of 
trade imbalances, measures which sought to bring about 
a balanced distribution of industries among the three 
members of the EACM should have tried to correct 
industrial imbalance during the 1962-1967 period. It 
will be seen in the next chapter that a search for ways 
to correct industrial disparities got under way during 
the period covered by this chapter. The implementation 
of the corrective mechanisms was actually in December,
Notes
Colonial Office, Bast Africa, Report of the Economic 
and ffiscal Commission, Cmndo 1279, (London: HMSO, 
I961), paragraph 65o
Ibid., appendix.
Pol* Nixson (1973), Economic Integration and 
Industrial Location, (London: Longman), p» 34°
Colonial Office, East Africa, ojd. cit.
A search for the statistics for the year 1967 
in several university libraries in Britain bore no 
fruits. This data may most probably be obtained 
in East Africa in the archives of the former East 
African Common Services. The absence of one 
year's data was not considered a serious drawback 
since the data for the other five years covered 
by the chapter were available«,
World Bank (IBRD) (1962), The Economic Development 
of Uganda, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins), p, 860
Tanganyika's deficit is calculated from statistics 
in East African Statistical Department, Economic 
and Statistical Review, 1963. (The statistics 
for a given year usually appear in the report of 
the following year).
EASD, Economic and Statistical Review, 1967.
EASD, _________   , 1963°
, 1967.
The Document, The Kampala Agreement, April, 1965*
12, Ibid. Kenya was supposed to manufacture electric 
bulbs for the East African Common Market.
Tanzania was expected to produce motor vehicle 
tyres and tubes, to assemble radios, and to 
manufacture aluminium products also for the EACM. 
Uganda was expected to produce for that market 
bicycle parts and nitrogenous fertilizers.
13. See R.C. Porter, "Kenya's Future as an Exporter 
of Manufactures", Eastern Africa Economic Review, 
Volume 6, Number 1, June, 1974, pp. 44-69°
14. See P. Robson (1980), The Economics of International 
Integration, (London: George Allen and Unwin), p.149.
15. Policy-makers in Tanzania claimed that they had
accepted a less than optimal solution (the Kampala 
Agreement) in order to maintain the East African 
economic integration scheme. See J.S. Nye (1966), 
Pan-Africanism and Bast African Integration,
Tlondon: Harvard Universi ty Press), p. 177.
16. See D.E. Hojman (1981), "The Andean Pact:
Failure of a Model of Economic Integration?", 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 20, 
p. 158.
!7. See R.F. Mikesell (1963), "The Theory of Common 
Markets and Developing Countries", in P. Robson 
(1972), International Integration, "(London: 
Penguin), p. 166.
18. For the operation of the East African Currency 
Board, see W. T. New 13m  and D.C. Rowan (1954), 
Money and Banking in British Colonial Africa,
(Oxford f Clarendon Press J.
19. Ibid.
20. See "Analyst", (1954), "Colonial Monetary Theory", 
Social and Economic Studies, Volume 3, p. 105.
See also A. Hazlewood (1954) "Colonial Monetary 
Arrangements", Social and Economic Studies,
Volume 3, p. 301. He simply reports the allegation 
that a deflationary monetary policy retards economic 
development.
21. W. T. Newlyn (1952), ’’The Colonial Empire11, in
R.S. Sayers1 Banking in the British Commonwealth, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press;.
22o This is well explained by Galbraith. See
J.K. Galbraith and N. Salinger (1979), Almost 
Everyone^ Guide to Economics, (London:
Andre Be u t s ch), Chap ter VT.
23. See H.H. Binhammer (1975), The Development of
Financial Infrastructure in Tanzania^ (Dar-es-Salaam: 
East African Literature Bureau), p. 7.
24o Ibid, pp. 1-2. The experts in question were 
E. Blumenthal and W. T. Newlyn.
25® See East African Development Bank, Aluminium 
Africa, file PS/16B/17/I.
26. P. Zajadacz (ed. ) (1970), Studies in Production 
and Trade in East Africa, (New York: Humanities 
Press), PPo 127o
27o The Madhvani Group bought Mtibwa Sugar Estate in 
1966. See East African Development Bank, 
Mtibwa Sugar Estate, Basic Data, file PS/16B/25.
28o Republic of Tanganyika, Annual Report of the
Commerce and Industry Division, 1963» (Dar-es-Salaam: 
Government Printer), p. 8.
29o The plant in Eastern Uganda, at Jinja, was set up 
with a view to satisfying most of the cigarette 
demand in the East African Common Market. In 
1956, that plant was relocated to Kenya.
30. It was a common practice for policy-makers in
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to issue threats that 
unless industries were to set up their branches 
in national boundaries, they would lose their 
share of the market to new competitors. See 
Nye, op. cit., Chapter 5*
31o See A. Hazlewood (ed, ) (1967), African Integration 
and Disintegration, (London: Oxford University 
Press), p. 96o
32. For instance, between 1971 and 1977, the consumption 
of beer (bottled "European beer") increased from 
53,916 to 88,307 litres per annum. This 
represented an annual growth rate of 7*3 per cent.. 
See United Republic of Tanzania, Economic Survey, 
1977-78, (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer), 1979*
3 3 o  See A .  Hazlewood (ed. ) ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  op. cit., p. 9 6 .
34. See United Republic of Tanzania, Tanzania Second 
Five Year Plan, Volume 1, (Dar-es-Salaam: 
Government Printer), p. 71.
35o Tanzania continued to import substantial quantities 
of shoes from Kenya which means that the domestic 
plant did not satisfy the domestic demand. This 
is not surprising given that the company in 
Tanzania produced only a given type of shoes.
36° See Nixson, o£. cit., p. 86.
37o The plant in Tanzania specialized in plastic 
footwear. See Hazlewood, o jd .  cit., p. 97.
38. See Nixson, o j d .  cit., p. 76.
39o Ibid., p. 86.
40. The demand for paint in Uganda grew fast in the 
early 1960s. On the other hand, in Kenya there 
was a decline in demand between 1961 and 1964, 
and this was one of the motives for the paint 
industry to branch out from there to Uganda.
See Zajadacz, . o jd .  cit., p. 167.
41. See Nixson, op. cit., p. 98.
42. Ibid.
43. For the quantities of iron and steel products 
consumed by the two countries as well as Kenya.
See East African Development Bank, Iron and Steel 
Industry in East Africa, p. 41.
44. Nixson, oj). cit., p. 98.
45. Calculated from EASD, Economic and Statistical 
Reviews, 1963 and 1965.
CHAPTER 5
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTER-COUNTRY TRADE T 1968-1977
5*1 Introduction
The object of this chapter is four-fold. First, 
it examines closely and critically on an a'priori 
basis how realistic it was to attempt to bring about a 
balanced distribution of industries between Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda. Balanced industrial development 
between the three countries was the stated objective of 
the Treaty for East African Co-operation (TEAC), as will 
be seen below. Second, the measure of success which 
could be expected from one of the two mechanisms that 
were supposed to contribute to the reduction in indus­
trial imbalances between the three countries is evaluated. 
The mechanism, to be discussed in this chapter, is a 
system of import duties on some manufactured products 
imported from Kenya and Uganda, which was called the 
Transfer Tax. Third, the changes in industrial 
production in the three countries between 1968 and 1977 
are analysed with a view to showing whether or not 
industrial imbalances were reduced at the end of this 
period. Finally, the pattern of inter-country trade is 
examined with the aim of showing whether or not trade
imbalances between the three countries were corrected 
during the 1968-1977 period.
This chapter attempts to highlight the causes and 
the dynamics of industrial and trade imbalances during 
the ten year period when the Transfer Taxes were in 
operation. It is argued that there was a strong move­
ment towards industrial imbalances in the East African 
Common Market which could not be significantly offset 
by the proposed corrective mechanism.
5.2 The Balanced Economic Development Objective:
A Critique
The balanced industrial development objective was 
an integral part of a broader goal, the balanced economic 
development^" between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It 
seems logical that the broader goal should be discussed 
before critically examining the expected effectiveness 
of its component. As was seen in chapters 2 and 4,
Kenya had persistently been ahead of Tanzania and Uganda 
in economic development in the 1950s and the 1960s.
It was also seen in chapter 3 that there is a tendency 
for a region which has acquired an economic development 
lead over other regions to maintain that lead.
The question is whether it was realistic to suppose 
that that tendency of cumulative causation would be 
checked. As a prelude to answering this question, it 
is important to recall how the cumulative causation
process tends to operate in favour of persistence of 
regional disparities. Economic advantages which a more 
economically advanced region has over the less developed 
regions tend to encourage more economic activities to be 
undertaken in the former than in the latter. This is 
likely to be more so where market forces operate freely. 
In order to check the perpetuation of regional economic 
disparities, strong measures which curtail the freedom 
of market farces and which give more encouragement to 
the expansion of economic activities in the less 
developed regions than in the advanced regions need to 
be in place.
There were no broad measures designed to equalize 
economic development in the East African Common Market 
(EACM). All the three member countries of the EACM 
intended to accelerate the pace of their economic 
development, and their strategies were very similar.
They all intended to play an active role in facilitating 
the realisation of fast economic growth rates.
In the absence of instruments to suppress the 
tendency towards the persistence of regional economic 
disparities, it should have been more realistic to expect 
that balanced economic development in the EAC would not 
be achieved. It will be remembered that for a number 
of reasons (see Chapter 2) Kenya was a more attractive 
site of economic activities in the EACM than Tanzania 
and Uganda. It could have been foreseen that because 
of the circular and cumulative causation phenomenon
unless drastic adverse conditions were to develop in 
Kenya, she would grow faster than the other two 
countries. This would, therefore, have meant that the 
level of economic development in the EAC would continue 
to be unequal.
5.2.1 The Balanced Industrial Development Objective;
A Critique
The balanced industrial development between the
three members of the East African Community may be
criticised on several grounds. The first is that no
consideration seems to have been given to the possibility
of cumulative and circular causation working in favour
of the persistence of industrial disparities between
Kenya and the other two countries. As was seen in
Chapter 2, Hanson observed that because industry in
Kenya was more developed than in Tanzania and Uganda,
less encouragement was required for further industrial
development in Kenya than in the other two countries.
But there is evidence that after the three countries had
become independent, the Kenyan government was as active,
2
and in some cases more active , in promoting industrial 
development than the governments of Tanzania and Uganda. 
This was before the Treaty for East African Co-operation 
(TEAC) (signed in 1967) which contains the balanced 
industrial development goal was signed.
The second ground which suggests that the balanced
industrial development objective was unrealistic, is 
the absence of extensive incentives to encourage more 
industries to be set up in the less industrially 
developed countries. The TEAC mentioned that efforts 
should be made by policy makers in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda to reach an agreement on such a scheme of 
incentives. The fact that incentives which would have 
made Tanzania and Uganda more attractive as industrial 
sites than Kenya were not included in the Treaty suggests 
there were problems in agreeing to have such an arrange­
ment. As will be seen in Chapter 6, policy makers in 
Kenya found it unacceptable to retard the economic 
development of their country in order to enable Tanzania 
and Uganda to catch up with her.
Finally, the balanced industrial development may 
be criticised on the ground that there was no system of 
equalizing investments in the three countries1 industrial 
sectors. In the late 1950s, as was seen in Chapter 2, 
a large investment had been undertaken in Kenya when the 
first oil refinery in the EACM was set. It contributed 
to the divergence in industrial disparities between Kenya 
and the other two countries. This ought to have been a 
lesson to those who wanted to bring about an even 
distribution of industries that that objective could be 
achieved if projects of greater investment magnitude were 
set up in Tanzania and Uganda.
If strict equal level of industrialisation was to be
achieved, there needed to be one East African investment 
allocation authority. It had to discriminate in favour 
of the less industrialised countries, Tanzania and Uganda. 
The East African Development Bank (EADB) was such an 
authority. Its effectiveness is evaluated in Chapters 6 
and 7. It will be seen that the EADB was an ineffective 
instrument because it had limited funds to offset the 
disparity tendency arising from the fact that Kenya’s 
capacity to generate investment was greater than either 
Tanzania’s or Uganda’s. Furthermore, it will be seen 
that conditions conducive to the success of investments 
undertaken were relatively more abundant in Kenya than 
in the other two countries. It is noteworthy that 
there were two forces working in favour of the persist­
ence of industrial disparities in the EACM. One was 
Kenya’s greater capacity to generate investment than 
the other two countries, and the other was that conditions 
conducive to the success of projects were better there 
than in either Tanzania or Uganda.
5.2.2 An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Transfer 
Taxes; A Critique
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
that a critical examination, on an a priori basis, of 
the measure of success which could be expected from the 
Transfer Taxes will be carried out. This is the aim in 
this subsection. To begin with, the necessary
information which can make that examination possible is 
provided.
It was explained in Chapter 1 that the Transfer 
Taxes were a system of protective tariffs in the East 
African economic integration scheme. The primary aim 
of those tariffs was to protect and promote manufacturing 
industries in the less industrialised member so that 
after a given period she would be as industrially 
developed as her partner state or states who had been 
ahead of her in the past.
Industries in the less industrialised member of the 
East African Common Market were actually protected 
against competition from the more advanced member 
country’s industries, as well as against rival industries 
from the external world. Protection from the latter 
was provided by the presence of a common external 
tariff on imports from the industries outside the EACM.
Several conditions had, however, to be fulfilled 
before the Transfer Taxes could be legitimately imposed. 
First, a country had either to be already producing 
goods similar to those it intended to protect or it had 
to have the industrial capacity to do so in about three 
months after the Transfer Taxes had been introduced.
The rationale for this restrictive condition seems to 
have been to avoid unnecessary curtailment of intra-EACM 
trade. Given that one of the raison d’etre of a common 
market is to encourage trade between member countries,
that rationale was a reasonable one.
One of the important assumptions underlying the 
Transfer Taxes is that the presence of tariff protection 
would induce investors to set up new industries or 
expand output from the existing capacity. This pre­
supposed the capacity of those investors to generate or 
mobilize the financial and human resources required to 
carry out new investments or to expand output from the 
existing plants. That capacity may be limited in a 
less economically developed country. This limitation 
may be particularly so in a country which adopts a 
policy of nationalising the "major means of production", 
as was the case in Tanzania in 1967 and Uganda in 1970.
It seems reasonable to expect that for a country which 
is still economically backward, it can hardly stand on 
its own and make fast economic development advances. 
Either that country will take a long time on its own 
to develop or it will have to accept foreign capital 
and technical expertise as well as foreign managerial 
know-how in order to make fast economic advances. If 
the more economically advanced member country is more 
willing to accept foreign investors to contribute to 
the development of her industrial sector than the 
industrially backward countries are, then the expectation 
should be that the former is very likely to remain 
industrially ahead of the latter.
The second condition, which had to be met before 
the Transfer Taxes could be validly imposed, is that
the firm seeking to be protected by those tariffs had 
either to be able to satisfy at least 15 per cent of 
the total national demand for the product to be protected 
or the value of the product in question had to be over 
Shs. 2 million. This restrictive condition seems to 
have been based on the assumption that there were 
industries which would become commercially profitable 
in the national market. The above two values were 
perhaps the minimum requirement for the commercial 
success of such firms. It would have been more 
important to require a firm to indicate how the Transfer 
tariff protection would enable it to increase employment 
and output, thus contributing to the reduction of 
industrial imbalances.
The third condition was that the rate of the Transfer 
Tax would not exceed 50 per cent of an external common 
tariff imposed on a product similar to that which was 
to be protected by the Transfer Tax. This meant that 
though a substantial tariff protection was given to 
some industries in the less industrialised partner state, 
exports of competing products from the more industrialised 
partner could still reach the market of the former.
The extent to which those exports would be consumed 
would depend on their price elasticity.
If the quality of rival products from the more 
industrialised member was higher than that of the goods 
protected by the Transfer Taxes, then it would be
expected that the degree of protection would be small. 
That, in turn, would mean that the extent to which those 
Taxes would encourage industrial development would be 
small.
There is reason to suppose that the tariff wall
provided by the Transfer Taxes was too low to induce
new investors. The average tariff which Tanzania
imposed on 35 items of manufactures from Kenya was 17 
4
per cent. And the average tariff Uganda imposed on
514 items of manufactures from Kenya was 15 per cent. 
These rates were much lower than many tariff protection 
rates given to other industrial products.
It seems that those who devised the Transfer Taxes 
were in a dilemma. On the one hand, they intended to 
encourage industrial production in Tanzania and Uganda 
to enable the two countries to catch up in industrial 
development with Kenya. Ideally, this required, among 
other measures, a total ban of imports of competing 
products. On the other hand, they did not intend to 
discourage totally Kenya’s exports to her two partner 
states by introducing prohibitive tariff rates.
However, it may be argued that the introduction of 
the Transfer Taxes would have reduced Kenya’s exports to 
her two partner states due to a switch in demand for her 
products to those from the external world. This is 
because the imposition of a duty on a Kenyan product 
would have diminished its price attractiveness vis a vis
a similar product from the external world. Although 
its price would still have been lower than that of its 
competitor from outside the East African Community, it 
would nevertheless have been higher than it had been 
before the imposition of a Transfer Tax.
The fourth restrictive condition which had to be 
abided by was that if a firm was able to export more 
than 30 per cent of its output to one or both of its 
partners, it had no right to be protected by a Transfer 
Tax. This suggests that if a firm was able to export 
about a third of its products to her partner states, she 
was competitive enough not to need tariff protection. 
This seems to have been a reasonable condition consider­
ing that care had to be taken to avoid unnecessary 
curtailing of intra-EACM trade.
Because of the above restrictive conditions, the 
Transfer Taxes’ effectiveness as an instrument for 
reducing industrial imbalances in the East African 
Community was limited. At any rate, it may be argued 
that tariff protection on its own may not be a potent 
instrument for encouraging industrial development in 
economies where co-operant factors for economic growth 
are limited. Protection may need to be complemented 
by the availability of skilled workers, experienced 
managers and various forms of government assistance.
As was seen in Chapter 2, it was Kenya, the most indus­
trialised member of the EACM, who seemed to fulfil those
conditions more than Tanzania and Uganda. This suggests 
that any advances which the latter two countries would 
make towards catching up industrially with Kenya would he 
more than offset by her further advancement in industrial­
isation. (Phis would be assisted by the relative abund­
ance of conditions conducive to success in industrialis­
ation in Kenya. This dynamic explanation may be 
presented in a nutshell this way. It was more realistic 
to expect Kenya to forge ahead in industrialisation at a 
faster rate than the other two countries, in spite of 
the Transfer Taxes.
The maximum lifetime of the Transfer Taxes was 
fifteen years. This implies that after that period 
those protective tariffs were supposed to have contributed 
to a balanced distribution of industries between Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, all other things remaining the same. 
As was argued earlier, the cumulative causation process 
was likely to work in favour of Kenya retaining her 
industrial lead. And what seems to have been ignored 
by those who designed the Transfer Taxes is that some 
investors in industry in Kenya would respond to the 
presence of those tariffs by moving into the substitution 
of new products which were not yet subjected to the 
Transfer Taxes. In such a case, their exports to 
Tanzania and Uganda would not at all be adversely 
affected. As a result, this response would have enabled 
Kenya to retain her industrial lead over her two partner 
states in the EAC. Actually, Porter (1975) points out
that Kenya kept a step ahead of Tanzania and Uganda
7
in introducing new industrial activities in the EACM.
The effectiveness of the Transfer Taxes could also
have been doubted from the outset because they were not
designed to promote large scale - East African - oriented
industries. If, for instance, those protective tariffs
had been used to protect a vertically integrated iron
8
and steel project in Uganda , there would probably have
been a substantial reduction in industrial imbalance
between that country and Kenya. Those tariffs could
also have been used to encourage the development in
Tanzania of a vertically integrated project to produce
coconut oil for human consumption and as an input for
9
the soap industry in East Africa. Since such a 
project would have been a large scale one, it would have 
contributed substantially to the reduction in industrial 
imbalance between Tanzania and Kenya. The above two 
examples would have served two purposes. One was to 
reduce industrial imbalances and the other was for each 
country to specialise in those products in which its 
natural endowment was the best in the Community.
5.2.3 Industrial and Trade Imbalances in EACM from 
19^7 to 1977: A Result of Monetary Policies 
Adopted?
This subsection seeks to examine whether it made 
sense to aspire to bring about a balanced distribution
of industries in the East African Community and to have 
intra-EAC trade balance in the absence of a strategy on 
common monetary policies to be pursued in the EAC. The 
period to be discussed is from 1967 to 1977. During 
this period, the East African Currency Board (EACB) had 
been replaced by three national central banks as regulat­
ors of money supply in each country.
Before examining the role monetary policies adopted 
may have played in industrial and trade imbalances 
between 1967 and 1977, a brief explanation concerning 
how the regulation of money supply affects economic 
activities needs to be provided. If a government 
intends to expand economic activities, it can direct the 
central bank to effect measures such as lowering the 
reserve requirement and interest rates. Selling govern­
ment securities will serve the same purpose. This 
should create the basis for money creation by commercial 
banks. And aggregate demand is expected to expand.^ 
Aggregate demand can also be expanded through fiscal 
measures such as increasing government expenditure or 
cutting taxes. In response to the expansion of demand, 
investments and output are expected to increase. The 
converse is supposed to happen if, say, in the interest 
of fighting inflation, the government adopts monetary 
and fiscal policies which reduce the aggregate demand.
Expansionary monetary policies were pursued by the 
three East African countries after the creation of 
national central banks in 1966. Erom 1967 to 1977 the
money supply expansion in Kenya was 6*3 fold^, while in
12Tanzania it increased by a factor of 5.8. In Uganda
13the increase was 8*8 fold.
The question of interest is how these expansions 
were likely to affect industrial and trade imbalances in 
the East African Community. According to the theory 
seen above that expansionary monetary policies are likely 
to result in increases in investments and output, it 
would be expected that the greatest industrial expansion 
would have occurred in Uganda. As will be seen later 
in this chapter, industrial production in that country 
contracted between 1968 and 1977. The fact that the 
expansion of money supply was not accompanied by an 
increase in industrial output, illustrates an important 
point that the availability of finance does not necess­
arily result in an increase in investment*
This did not, however, apply to Kenya. The expans­
ion of money supply there was accompanied by an increase 
in industrial output, as will be seen later in this 
chapter. And, as Table 5»1 below indicates, there was 
a big credit expansion in the manufacturing sector in 
Kenya. Between 1967 and 1977, the amount of credit rose 
from Shs. 244 million to Shs. 1286 million, an increase 
by the factor of 5o3. It is noteworthy that the credit 
to the manufacturing sector exceeded credit extended to 
the agricultural sector which was the backbone of the 
economy. This is not surprising given the high priority 
which was attached to the development of the manufacturing 
sector.
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In Tanzania, credit expansion in the manufacturing 
sector was even greater than the increase which occurred 
in Kenya, Credit rose from Shs. 115 million in 1967 to 
Shs. 1418 million in 1977, a 12,3 fold increase. But, 
as will he seen later in this chapter, industrial expans­
ion in Tanzania was less than that which took place in 
Kenya in that eleven year period. This may be explained 
in two ways. First, Tanzania was starting from a lower 
industrial base than Kenya. Second, it is possible that 
credit availability may not have been translated into 
successful investments because of the inadequate presence 
of conditions conducive to successful investments. It 
will be seen in Chapter 7 that those conditions were 
relatively more abundant in Kenya than in the other two 
countries.
The fact that money supply in Uganda exceeded that 
in Kenya and yet industrial production in the latter was 
greater than that in the former, suggests that the manip­
ulation of money supply would not have reduced industrial 
imbalances between the two countries« This argument is 
also valid in the case of Kenya vis a vis Tanzania.
The foregoing argument implies that monetary 
" integration of the East African Community would not have 
been a solution to industrial imbalances in that 
Community. On the contrary, it is probable that 
monetary integration would have exacerbated industrial 
disparities by making it easier for capital to gravitate 
to Kenya where the prospects of the return to capital
were more, promising than in the other two countries.
5.2.4 Trade Imbalances in Intra-EAC Trade: A Result 
of Expansionary Monetary Policies?
It was explained earlier that expansionary monetary 
policies raise aggregate demand. As a result, the 
consumption of domestic goods is expected to go up.
In an economic integration scheme where there are not 
many obstacles to inter-country trade, the rise in 
aggregate demand should lead to an increase in the 
consumption of imports from the partner states.
If some partner states are unable to provide the 
goods which other partners want and if they are not 
able to satisfy the domestic demand for many products 
and instead they depend on the partner states to satisfy 
that demand, then trade imbalances may be expected.
The expansionary monetary policies in such an economic 
integration scheme will benefit most the member country 
capable of producing most goods which consumers in the 
integration scheme want. And such a country will tend 
to be in trade surplus with her partner states who have 
less capacity to satisfy the demand for a number of 
products in that economic scheme.
It will be seen later that Uganda1s industrial 
production declined between 1968 and 1977* At the same 
time, her imports from Kenya, who was her more important 
trading partner than Tanzania, increased enormously
between the two years. Due to the decline in industrial 
production in Uganda, her capacity to maintain her share 
of Kenya’s market fell. These two factors resulted in 
an enormous trade deficit between her and Kenya 
(Table 5.4). It seems reasonable to assume that the 
great expansion of money supply seen above also contrib­
uted to that trade deficit.
The same may be said for Tanzania’s increase in 
trade deficit with Kenya. However, because industrial 
production in Tanzania did not fall during the ten year 
period, her trade deficit with Kenya may be partly 
attributed to the pressure of demand for Kenyan products 
in Tanzania, partly to her lower capacity to export, and 
partly to the increase in aggregate demand following the 
expansion in money supply.
Trade imbalances could also be expected if as a 
result of monetary expansionary policies inflation in 
one partner state was greater than in another or others. 
This is particularly likely to be the case if one of the 
partner states has lost the capacity to satisfy both 
domestic and the partner states* demand in many products 
due to the collapse of domestic industries. That 
scenario actually obtained between Kenya and Uganda for 
the period covered by this chapter. Production in 
Uganda, as was explained earlier, had collapsed and
14inflation in that country was higher than in Kenya.
Due to the high inflation in Uganda, the demand for her 
products in Kenya was likely to be low. On the other
hand, the demand for Kenyan goods in Uganda was likely
to he high because low inflation in Kenya would mean
that the cost of production of goods would also be low.
This would, of course, lead to trade deficit for Uganda.
That, as was seen above, is what actually happened.
Since monetary expansion in Kenya was greater than
that in Tanzania, that should have led to an upsurge in
demand for Tanzania’s products. Table 5«4 shows that
between 1968 and 1976 Tanzania’s exports to Kenya
increased by a factor of 3.4. Greater expansion could
probably have occurred if inflation between the two
15years had not almost doubled.  ^ And such an increase
in exports would have contributed to a reduction in
Tanzania’s trade deficit with Kenya.
Despite the fact that the expansion in money supply
in Kenya was greater than that in Tanzania, inflation
16
was on the whole lower in the former. This means 
that consumers in Tanzania would have been more inclined 
to buy Kenyan low cost products. Conversely, the 
Kenyan consumers would have been less inclined to purchase 
high-cost Tanzanian goods. As a result of this, one 
would expect that Tanzania would have been in trade 
deficit with Kenya. It will be seen later in this 
chapter that Tanzania was persistently in trade deficit 
with Kenya between 1968 and 1976.
5.2.5 Industrial and Trade Imbalances in EACH:
A Result of Unharmonised Fiscal "Policies?
Active fiscal policies were adopted in the three 
partner states of the East African Common Market soon 
after their independence in the early 1960s. The term 
active fiscal policy refers to the introduction of 
expansionary public spending programmes. The object of 
that policy was to stimulate the economic growth of those 
partner states. The expansion in spending was expected 
to raise aggregate demand, thus providing a stimulus for 
economic growth. In order to achieve this goal, the 
level of taxes must either be reduced or held constant.
In the light of the above explanations, an examinat­
ion of what wo>uld be expected to happen in an economic 
integration scheme where fiscal policies are not 
harmonised, will be carried out. If the most economic­
ally advanced member’s public expenditure is greater than 
that of a less developed partner, and if the level of 
taxation in the former is lower than that in the latter, 
then economic disparities between the two countries are 
very likely to be aggravated. This is because the 
expansion in aggregate demand will be greater in the 
more economically advanced partner state. Part of that 
expansion will stimulate industrial development by 
inducing entrepreneurs to increase investment in the 
industrial sector. If in addition to a greater rise 
in aggregate demand in the more economically advanced
country, conditions conducive to industrialisation are
more favourable there than in the less economically
developed partner, then the existing disparities in
industrial development would also become wider.
The expansion in expenditure in Kenya for the
period 1968-1977 exceeded that in Tanzania for all but
one year during this period. The cumulative amount of
17Kenya’s excess expenditure was Shs. 5152 million.
And Kenya’s expansion in public expenditure for the
1968-1973 period exceeded that of Uganda by Shs. 5059 
18million. In theory, therefore, it would be expected 
that aggregate demand, investment and output, would be 
greater in Kenya. As will be 3een later in this 
chapter, the expansion in industrial production was 
greater in Kenya than in either Tanzania or Uganda 
between 1968 and 1977. This establishes a correlation 
between uneven . public expenditure and different 
levels of industrial development among members of an 
economic integration scheme.
A question of interest in this subsection is whether 
harmonised fiscal policy in the EACH would have reduced 
the unequal industrial development among the members of 
that economic integration scheme. A harmonised fiscal 
policy on its own would not have made a contribution 
towards the correction of industrial imbalances. To 
illustrate this point, let it be assumed that an agree­
ment had been reached between the three member countries 
of the EACM that expenditure in each country would bear
a relation to each country’s level of economic develop­
ment. This would have meant that expenditure in Kenya 
would have been greater than in either Tanzania or 
Uganda. Under such an arrangement, fiscal policy in 
the EACM would have been in harmony. Yet that would 
have been a recipe for the perpetuation of economic 
disparities between Kenya and the other two countries.
In order to reduce economic disparities in the EACM, 
there needed to be fiscal measures discriminating in 
favour of the less economically developed members.
Such measures could have included greater expansion of 
public expenditure in those members than in the more 
economically advanced members. Also taxation should 
have been lower in the former than in the latter. 
Furthermore, a scheme of incentives discriminating in 
favour of the less economically advanced countries would 
have been necessary. As will be seen in Chapter 6,
Kenya was not willing to accept arrangements which would 
retard her economic growth. This was understandable 
given that even though she was more economically and 
industrially developed than either Tanzania or Uganda, 
she was still by international standards backward 
economically and industrially.
Expansionary fiscal policies adopted in the East 
African Common Market could be expected to lead to 
intra-EACM trade imbalances. This is because those 
policies would result in an increase in aggregate demand. 
And as was explained earlier, part of that increase
would lead to a rise in the consumption of imports.
The country with greater capacity to export to its 
partner states was likely to be in trade surplus, while 
those members with a relatively limited capacity to 
export could be expected to be in trade deficit. This 
would particularly be the case in an economic integration 
scheme where goods entering inter-country trade are 
predominantly manufactures, and where member countries’ 
ability to export those products differ according to 
their level of industrial development.
5. 3 Industrial Performance of Kenya. Tanzania and 
Uganda. 1968-1977
The aim in this section is to compare the changes 
in the industrial sectors of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
between 1968 and 1977 so as to establish whether or not 
industrial imbalances between the three countries were 
reduced. It will be recalled that it is during this 
period that economic disparities between the three 
countries were expected to be corrected. A hypothesis 
to be tested is that there was a general trend towards 
the divergence of economic disparities between Kenya and 
the other two countries.
Table 5.2 shows that Kenya’s gross domestic product 
was greater than that of either Tanzania or Uganda for the 
ten year period covered by this chapter. It also shows 
that the increase in the GDP of Kenya between 1968 and
1977 was greater than that achieved by either Tanzania 
or Uganda. As a result, there were divergencies in 
economic disparities. For Kenya and Tanzania, the 
divergence had been rather small. The ratio of the 
two countries’ GDP was 1.2 to 1 in 1968 and by 1977 the 
ratio was 1.3 to 1, both times in favour of Kenya.
In the case of Kenya versus Uganda, the ratio was 1.3:1 
in 1968 and 1.8:1 in 1977, also in favour of Kenya.
These findings support the hypothesis that the general 
trend was one of the divergence of economic disparities 
between Kenya and the other two countries.
Table 5.2 also indicates that the manufacturing 
sector in Kenya made a greater contribution to the GDP 
than those of Tanzania or Uganda did in each of the ten 
years in the table. At the end of that period the 
cumulative contribution of the Kenyan manufacturing 
sector was Shs. 754 million compared to Shs. 402 million 
in Tanzania. In Uganda the contribution of that sector 
in 1977 was Shs. 18 million less than it had been in 
1968. This means that there had been a strong movement 
towards the divergence of industrial disparities between 
Kenya and Uganda. The ratio of value added of the two 
countries’ manufacturing sector moved from 2.2 to 1 in 
1968 to 4.1 to 1 in 1977 in both cases in favour of 
Kenya.
There had also been a divergence in industrial 
imbalance between Kenya and Tanzania during the ten year 
period. It had, however, been smaller than that just
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seen above. The disparity ratio in 1968 had been 1*5 
to 1 and by 1977 it had risen to 1.7 to 1 in favour of 
Kenya in both cases.
Table 5*2 furthermore shows that the importance of 
the manufacturing sector had risen by two percentage 
points in Kenya between 1968 and 1977. The increase in 
Tanzania between those two years was one percentage and 
in Uganda the importance of the manufacturing sector had 
declined by one percentage point. A noteworthy point is 
that that sector was still underdeveloped in the three 
countries. Its’ share in the gross domestic product was 
by 1977 13, 10 and 6 per cent for Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, respectively. Given the high priority attached 
by the three countries to industrial development, these 
percentages show that there was still a long way to go 
before those sectors could make major contributions to 
the national economies.
5*3.1 Employment Provided by Manufacturing Sectors of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 19&8-1977“
Employment provided by the manufacturing sectors of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda between 1968 and 1977 is used 
in this subsection to assess the direction of industrial 
imbalances once again. Table 5*3 below indicates that 
the Kenyan manufacturing sector provided more employment 
than the Tanzanian or the Ugandan counterpart sectors did. 
In 1968, the Kenyan manufacturing sector employed
8.6 thousand more people than the Tanzanian sector did 
and 12 thousand more than was employed in the Ugandan 
manufacturing sector. In the subsequent years, as the 
table indicates, the disparity in employment in the case 
of Kenya and Tanzania, reached the climax in 1972 when 
it stood at 39*3 thousand people in favour of Kenya.
From then onwards the general trend in employment 
disparity was downwards. By 1977, employment in Kenya 
was 26.7 thousand more than in Tanzania. And the total 
increase in disparity between the two countries since 
1968 was 18.1 thousand people. This lends support to 
the hypothesis seen earlier that the general trend was 
one of industrial development divergence between Kenya 
and her partner states in the East African Community.
A comparison of employment provided by the Kenyan 
and the Ugandan manufacturing sectors provides even 
more convincing evidence to support the hypothesis.
Table 5*3 indicates that the employment disparity 
between the two countries increased from 12 thousand in 
1968 to 66.4 thousand in 1977. The increase in employ­
ment in Kenya was 59*8 thousand while in Uganda it was 
only 5*4 thousand. This meant that on average the 
additional annual employment creation was 6 thousand in 
Kenya and only 0.54 in Uganda. In Tanzania, it was 
about 4*2 thousand. Assuming that these rates of job 
creation had not changed, say in the next five years 
from 1977, the disparity between Kenya and the other two 
countries would have been greater at the end of that
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19period than it had been at the beginning (1977).
The last three columns of Table 5.3 show employment 
in the manufacturing sector of each country as a proport­
ion of total employment in the Bast African Community 
manufacturing sectors. The Kenyan manufacturing sector*s 
share was, as may be expected, greater than that of 
either of the two countries. This is true for each of 
the ten years shown in the table. Although the Kenyan 
share fluctuated, the general trend was in the upward 
direction. The same is true for Tanzania, although 
between 1969 and 1973 the trend was downwards; after 
the latter year, the movement was generally in the 
upward direction.
Table 5.3 shows that Uganda’s share declined 
throughout the ten year period. Her share fell by 
10.9 percentage points between 1968 and 1977. Kenya’s 
share, on the other hand, increased by 7.7 percentage 
points. The increase in Tanzania was only 3.1 percent­
age points. If there had been an agreement on how to 
promote balanced employment creation in the EAC, it 
would have been reasonable to consider a strategy of 
promoting more investments in labour intensive industries 
in Tanzania and especially in Uganda.
5.4 Intra-Bast African Community Trade, 1968-1977
This section seeks to analyse the changes in trade 
between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from 1968 to 1977.
As had already been mentioned, the relationship which 
existed between industrial imbalance and trade imbalance 
was of a causal nature. It is expected, therefore, to 
find that trade imbalances widened between the two years 
because industrial imbalances also widened.
It may be seen from Table 5.4 that trade imbalances 
widened between 1968 and 1976. The reason why the 
focus of attention should be on this period and not the
1968-1977 one, is that in 1977 the border between Kenya 
and Tanzania was closed, and that drastically reduced 
the volume of trade with each other.
During the 1968-1976 period, Kenya not only had a 
persistent balance of trade surplus, but the size of 
that surplus increased 3.7 fold. On the other hand, 
both Tanzania and Uganda had persistent trade deficit. 
Bor Uganda, her trade deficit increased 13.6 times 
between 1968 and 1977. Bor Tanzania, the deficit 
increased 1.9 fold between 1968 and 1976.
The fact that trade imbalances increased at the 
time when industrial imbalances were also increasing, 
is consistent with the expectation that the two forms 
of imbalances should move in the same direction, but 
that does not establish a causal relationship. This 
is because some of the goods entering inter-country
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trade were not manufactured products. In order to 
give an idea of the correlation between industrial 
imbalance and trade imbalance, manufactured goods are 
defined. That is a prelude to showing the causal 
relationship between the two variables.
Manufactured products are defined as some items 
falling under Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) Section 1, beverages and tobacco, and all items 
falling under Sections 3, 5 to 8. This definition is 
broader than the one usually used which includes only 
items in SITC 5 to 8. The choice of a broad definition 
is based on a consideration that at an early stage of 
industrial development, most industrial activities tend 
to concentrate in basic manufacturing activities such 
as food processing and beverages which fall below 
SITC 5.
Table 5.5 shows the size of manufactured and non­
manufactured products traded between 1968 and 1975.
The other two years, 1976 and 1977, are left out because 
disaggregated data on them are not available. Notice 
that manufactured products accounted for between 70 and 
85 per cent of Kenya’s total exports to Tanzania and 
Uganda.
On the other hand, in Tanzania manufactures accounted 
for between 41 and 59 per cent of her exports to Kenya 
and Uganda. In Uganda, although the exports declined 
sharply between 1968 and 1975, manufactures still
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accounted for between 51 and 73 per cent of the total 
exports.
The Ugandan situation where, due to industrial 
decline, the value of exports of manufactures which 
used to form over 50 per cent of her exports to Kenya 
and Tanzania also declined sharply, provides further 
proof that industrial imbalance and trade imbalance were 
causally related. It is also relevant to note that 
as industrial production in Tanzania expanded and 
manufactured products increased their share in her total 
exportsto Kenya and Uganda (see Tables 5.3 and 5.5), 
her trade deficit generally declined between 1969 and 
1974o
Summary
The main findings and arguments of this chapter are 
the following. The balanced economic development of the 
three member countries of the East African Community was 
found to be an unrealistic objective. This was because 
there were no plans to bring about that objective. 
Instead, there seemed to be competition to accelerate 
the pace of development of national economies. It was 
argued that under such competition the circular and 
cumulative causation was likely to work in favour of 
Kenya. That would lead to the persistence of economic 
disparities. It was also argued that the expansionary
monetary and fiscal policies pursued in the EAC were 
not the type which would correct industrial and trade 
imbalances.
It was further argued that the Transfer Taxes 
could not realistically be expected to make a significant 
contribution towards even distribution of industries in 
the EAC. This argument was based on two principal 
considerations. The first was that conditions conducive 
to industrial development were more favourable in Kenya 
than in the other two countries. Secondly, Kenya1 s 
capacity to generate investment, as will be seen in 
Chapter 6, was greater than either Tanzania’s or 
Uganda* s.
Empirical investigations concerning the changes in 
industrial production in the three countries showed that 
industrial imbalances diverged between 1968 and 1977.
The divergence between Kenya and Uganda had been greater 
than that between Kenya and Tanzania. It was also found 
that intra-EAC trade imbalances had widened. This was 
to be expected since industrial imbalances, the main 
cause of trade imbalances, had widened.
The divergence in industrial disparities between 
Kenya and the other two countries is borne in mind in 
the next chapter. In that chapter, the measure of 
effectiveness of the East African Development Bank met 
with as an instrument for correcting industrial 
imbalances between Kenya and the other two countries is
evaluated. The question to be answered there will be 
whether or not the EADB contributed towards the reversal 
of the industrial disparities seen in this chapter.
Notes
See Document: Treaty for East African Co-operation, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 7,
Article 2.
The Kenyan Government was more active than those 
of Tanzania and Uganda in so far as the encourage' 
ment and support of private investors were 
concerned. See A. Siedman (1972), Comparative 
Development Strategies, (Nairobi: East African 
Publishing House), Chapter VI.
The author knows from his experience of Bast Africa 
that a number of consumer goods produced in Kenya 
were considered by the consumers to be of higher 
quality than those manufactured in either Tanzania 
or Uganda. In many cases this judgement was right. 
But one should not completely rule out an irrational 
preference of imported products over the locally 
produced goods.
Calculated from Republic of Kenya, Economic Survey. 
1965, p. 46o
Ibid.
For instance, in Uganda tariff protection for 22 
industrial products used in a certain study was 
between 125 and 12 per cent. The average was 
41 per cent. Calculated from V. Jamal (1976), 
"Effective Protection in Uganda”, Eastern Africa 
Economic Review, volume 8, p. 64o
See R.Co Porter ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  "Kenya’s Future as an 
Exporter of Manufactures", Eastern Africa Economic 
Review, volume 6, pp. 4 4 - 6 9 o
Uganda has deposits of iron ore close to its 
Eastern border with Kenya. From that region, it 
is also easy to reach northern Tanzania through 
Lake Victoria. Therefore, if an iron and steel 
plant had been set up there, it would have been able 
to serve both Kenya and Tanzania as well as Uganda.
9. Tanzania has the largest area suitable for growing 
coconut trees in East Africa# See East African 
Development Bank, Mafia Coconut, file PS/16B/8/I*
10o See J.K. Galbraith (1969), The Affluent Society, 
TUondon: Hamish Hamilton), Chapter XV.
11o Changes in Bank deposits are used to calculate the 
increase in money supply. See for Kenya,
Central Bank of Kenya, Economic and Financial 
Review, Volume XII, July-September, 1979, p.~28.
12. For Tanzania, see Bank of Tanzania, Economic 
Bulletin, Volume XII, March, 1980, p. 42.
13. For Uganda, see Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development, Statistical Department Reports.
14© The annual rate of inflation in the 1970s was 
about 29 per cent in Uganda and 11 per cent in 
Kenya. See World Bank (1981), Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan AfricaT (Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank;, p. 143o
15. See World Bank, World Tables (1980), pp. 118-9 
for Kenya, and pp. 192-3 for Tanzania.
16. The annual rate of inflation in Tanzania was
approximately 13 per cent, while in Kenya, as was 
noted above, it was 11 per cent. See World 
Bank (1981), Accelerated Development in Sub- 
Saharan Africa, op. cit., p. 143.
17. Calculated from United Nations, Statistical 
Yearbook, 1970, 1974 and 1978.
18. Ibid.
l9o At the end of a five year period beginning in 1977 - 
in other words by 1982 - the disparity in employment 
would have been 95 thousand between Kenya and Uganda. 
It was seen that by 1977 the disparity between the 
two countries stood at 66.4 thousand. There would 
also have been a divergence in employment disparity 
in the manufacturing sectors of Kenya and Tanzania. 
The disparity in 1982 would have been 36 thousand. 
But^as was noted earlier, the disparity between the 
two countries in 1977 had been about 27 thousand.
CHAPTER 6
E F F E C T I V E N E S S  O P  E A S T  A F R I C A N  D E T E I i O P M E N T  B A N E  
T t f  I T S  T W O  P R I N C I P A L  O B J E C T I V E S
6.1 Introduction
A  balanced distribution of industries among the 
three member countries of the former East African 
Community (EAC) was one of the major objectives of the 
Treaty for East African Co-operation, and the East 
African Development Bank (EADB), as was mentioned in 
Chapters 1 and 5, was one of the two mechanisms which 
were created to bring about that objective. The Bank 
(as EADB will be called from now onwards) was actually 
designed primarily to reduce industrial imbalances 
between Kenya on the one hand, and Tanzania and Uganda, 
on the other. Another objective of the Bank was to 
promote and finance industrial projects which would make 
the economies of its three member countries, Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, complementary. The Bank came into 
existence in December, 1967, but started lending in 1969. 
It survived the break-up of the East African Community 
in 1977 mainly because of the World Bank’s intervention.^ 
The Bank still operates today.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate how effective 
the Bank was as an instrument for reducing industrial 
gaps and for bringing about industrial complementarity
in the East African Community. The period to be covered
is from 1969 to 1977. After 1977, the activities of
the Bank ground virtually to a halt following the end of
the Community. This is the reason why investigations
of this chapter end at 1977*
The evaluation of how effective the Bank was as an
instrument for reducing industrial imbalances takes a
very large part of this chapter. This is not because
the author attaches more importance to that objective
2
than to the industrial complementarity one. It is 
rather because the activities of the Bank were such 
that more work was done on lending in order to achieve 
a balanced distribution of industries than in promoting 
industrial complementarity. This does not mean that 
the Bank neglected work on industrial complementarity.
On the contrary, the Bank took important initiatives to 
fulfil that objective, but nothing came out of these 
initiatives.
6.2 Data Collection and Methods of Analysis
Data used in this chapter came from three sources.
The first is the published annual reports of the Bank 
from 1969 to 1977. The second is the files of projects 
which are kept by the offices of the Bank in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda. These confidential files were 
studied by the author during his fieldwork. The 
third source is the interviews which were conducted 
with some officials of the Bank in the three countries. 
The author also had a discussion with the former 
Director-General of the Bank, who led it from 1967 to 
1977.
Three types of analyses are carried out. First, 
the degree of success the Bank achieved in allocating 
the funds at its disposal to the three partner states, 
according to the prescribed lending formula, is 
established. The formula was that at the end of a 
five year period of lending, funds should have been 
distributed in such a way that Kenya would have been 
allocated 22.50 per cent of the total amount lent, 
and Tanzania and Uganda were supposed to have been each 
allocated 38.75 per cent of the total amount lent over 
five years. It is this unequal distribution of funds 
that was expected to reduce industrial imbalances.
The second type of analysis is to use fund 
disbursement as a criterion on which the effectiveness 
of the Bank as an instrument for reducing industrial 
imbalances is evaluated. The author is aware that the 
Charter of the Bank did not expect fund disbursement to 
be used as a criterion for evaluating the effectiveness 
of the Bank. It should, however, be realised that 
because funds may be allocated but may not be drawn in
a reasonable time, fund allocation criterion can give 
results which are different from those given by the 
fund disbursement criterion. Bearing in mind the steps 
taken towards implementing a project, the latter 
criterion is a step ahead of the former. Therefore, 
fund disbursement is a better indicator of the effect­
iveness of the Bank, or lack of it, than the fund 
allocation criterion.
The third type of analysis is a comparison of the 
importance of the Bank as a source of finance with other 
sources. For the purpose of simplifying analysis, the 
sources of finance for the projects in whose financing 
the Bank participated, are divided Into two, namely, the 
Bank and the Non-Bank. The aim of this exercise is to 
indicate the extent to which the Non-Bank source in 
Kenya contributed to the widening of industrial 
imbalances between her and the other two countries.
The exercise involves comparing the amounts of finance 
contributed to the total cost of projects by the Non- 
Bank source in Kenya on the one hand, and the Non-Bank 
sources in either Tanzania or Uganda on the other. In 
order to give a fuller picture, an attempt is made to 
compare what this study calls "balancing effect" of the 
Bank with the "disparity effect" arising from Kenya1s 
greater capacity to invest. The two terms are defined 
below.
6*3 Main Arguments
The main arguments of this chapter are the follow­
ing. The first is that the Bank was not an effective 
instrument for reducing industrial Imbalances, partly 
because it had limited funds. The second is that 
because fund absorption was higher in Kenya than in the 
other two countries, the expected reduction in industrial 
imbalances could not be achieved. In other words, 
making available funds to Tanzania and Uganda per se 
was no guarantee that industrial imbalances between the 
two countries with Kenya would be reduced. What was 
required was not only the unequal distribution of funds 
seen above, but also that fund absorption in Tanzania 
and Uganda should be at least equal to fund absorption 
in Kenya. The latter was something completely beyond 
the control of the Bank, as will be explained later.
The third argument is that the expectation concern­
ing the effectiveness of the Bank was exaggerated.
This argument derives mainly, but not exclusively, from 
the benefit of hindsight after comparing the finance
contributed by the Non-Bank sources in Kenya and in the
other two countries. It is, however, borne in mind 
that if there had been no uncertainty about the future 
of the East African Community, probably the Bank would 
have achieved more than it did. The fourth argument 
is that because no agreement existed on the rationalis­
ation of industrial production in the Community, the
industrial complementarity objective was an unrealistic 
goal. Finally, it is argued that the political will 
to co-operate which was first eroded by the economic 
hardships faced by the three member countries of the 
Bank in the early 1970s, and exacerbated by the Amin 
regime in Uganda which was constantly at loggerheads 
with the Tanzanian government, created an environment 
in which it was very difficult for the Bank’s initiatives 
at rationalising production to succeed. Rationalising 
production on the Community basis as suggested by the 
Bank (to be seen later) would have had adverse effect 
on some producers. Yet, no arrangement was proposed 
on how to compensate those who would be adversely 
affected.
6.4 Sources of Funds for the Bank and Methods 
of Operation
The Charter of the Bank proposed two sources of
A
finance for projects. The first was the paid-in
capital, reserves of the Bank, its undistributed surplus
and the Special Funds. The second was funds raised
from capital markets within or without the East African
Community. The authorised capital stock of the Bank
5
was Shs. 400 million.
The Bank, like most other regional banks, was only 
concerned with whether or not a project submitted to it 
for a loan was economically viable and technically
feasible. The Bank was not involved in the decisions
concerning political considerations of the location of
£
projects in its member countries* This meant that 
it was seen to be impartial in distributing the funds 
at its disposal. This is perhaps the main reason 
why despite some misunderstandings which existed between 
its member countries, the Bank was never accused of 
partiality. That in turn seems to be one of the major 
reasons for its survival when other Community institut­
ions collapsed in 1977o
6*5 Allocations. Disbursements and Sources of Finance 
for EAPB-Pinanced Projects. 196>9-1973
It was explained earlier that the Bank was expected 
to reduce industrial imbalances by allocating more funds 
to Tanzania and Uganda than to Kenya. It will also be 
recalled that the Bank was expected to comply with the 
lending formula at the end of a five year period of 
lending*
6o5ol Allocations to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda,
1969-1973
The allocations to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
between 1969 and 1973 are shown in Table 6*1* It may 
be seen that- by 1973 Kenya had been allocated a
TABLE 6*1: Allocation of Funds to Kenya, Tanzania
and Uganda, 1969-1973'
(in million East African shillings and 
in percentages)
Tear Kenya Tanzania Uganda Total
1969 lie 20 13o65 12c 00 36.85
1970 19.43 18.60 1.50 39.53
1971 4.80 8o60 3 3 c 4 7 46.87
1972 10o46 44o60 38o25 93.31
1973 22o 60 12.76 10.00 45.36
Total 68.49 98 * 21 95.22 261.92
Actual
Percentage 26d0 37o50 36.40
Expected
Percentage 220 50 38.75 38.75
Deviations 
in Amount
___
+ 9c 56 - 3c 28 - 6.27
Source; Computed from East African Development Bank 
and Industrial Development of East Africa. 
Ten Tear Report (1967-1977), pp. 34-35.
cumulative sum of Shs. 68.49 million, while Tanzania 
and Uganda had been allocated Shs. 98.21 million and 
Shs. 95.22 million respectively. These amounts 
correspond, as row 8 indicates, to 26.1, 37.5 and 36.4 
per cent of the total amount that the Bank had lent to 
the three countries. It may be seen by comparing rows 
8 and 9 that the deviations from the expected were 
small. For Kenya, the Bank deviated from the expected 
by 3.60 per cent in an upward direction. This meant 
that Kenya was allocated Shs. 9.56 million more than 
was expected (see last row). On the other hand, the 
deviation from the expected in Tanzania was 1.25 per 
cent below the 38.75 mark as rows 8 and 9 indicate.
This meant that she was allocated Shs. 3.28 million 
less than was required by the lending formula. For 
Uganda, the deviation from the expected was 2.35 per 
cent and that meant that she was allocated Shs. 6.27 
million less than was required by the lending formula 
(see the bottom row).
While in principle the fact that the Bank did not 
fully comply with the prescribed lending formula meant 
that industrial imbalances could not be reduced accord­
ing to expectation, the deviations were almost insignifi­
cant. The Bank did, therefore, achieve a very high 
measure of success. This judgement considers the fact 
that the deviations seen above were for a five year 
period.
The fluctuations in year to year allocations shown 
in Table 6.1 deserve comment. The amount the Bank 
allocated to each country was not the same in each year. 
For instance, in 1971 Kenya was allocated Shs. 4*80 
million, while in 1973 she received Shs. 22.60 million. 
There were similar fluctuations in both Tanzania and 
Uganda as the table shows. The explanation for those 
fluctuations is that the number of projects the Bank 
financed varied from year to year. In some years the 
Bank had more projects which passed its criteria of 
economic viability and technical feasibility than in 
other years. The Bank, like other lending institutions, 
appraised projects and committed its funds to those with 
very high prospects of becoming commercially profitable. 
However, in some cases it financed projects with no 
outstanding chances of succeeding provided those 
projects* potential for contributing to economic growth 
were high. Such projects were often guaranteed by 
national governments. This meant that in the event of 
the commercial failure of those projects, the government 
would repay the Bank’s loan to such projects.
6.5«2 Disbursements to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
This subsection investigates whether or not the 
Bank also achieved much success from the standpoint of 
disbursements. It may be recalled that it was argued
that disbursement is a better indicator of whether or 
not the Bank was an effective instrument. As a prelude 
to analysing the distribution of disbursements, a term 
which will be used in the discussion must be defined.
The term is fund absorptive achievement. It is 
defined as the amount of funds disbursed to each country 
divided by the amount allocated. In other words, fund 
absorptive achievement is that fraction of the amount 
allocated which was disbursed. This term will be 
applied to what had happened at the end of a five year 
period, 1969-1973, since it is after this period that 
the Bank was expected to have reduced industrial 
imbalance. It should be pointed out that the Bank had 
a policy of disbursing the amounts allocated only if 
satisfactory progress in project implementation was 
taking place.
It may be seen from Table 6.2 that by 1973 more 
funds had been disbursed to Tanzania than Kenya.
This was consistent with the principle that the former 
should receive more funds than the latter. Notice, 
however, that Kenya’s fund absorptive achievement was 
slightly greater than Tanzania’s. This meant that 
industrial imbalance between the two countries could 
not be reduced exactly as the lending formula required. 
In order for imbalance to be reduced according to the 
ratios given by the lending formula, fund absorptive 
achievements in Kenya and Tanzania needed to be at 
least equal. But the Bank, as will be explained in the
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next two paragraphs, had hardly any control over fund 
absorptive achievement*
Uganda had the lowest fund absorptive achievement 
in the Community* It may be seen from Table 6*2 that 
Uganda’s absorptive achievement was 21 per cent, less 
than one third of Kenya’s* This low absorptive achieve­
ment was largely due to the mismanagement of the Ugandan 
economy by the Amin Government which came into office in 
1971* The term mismanagement of the economy refers to 
the failure on the part of the Government to provide 
a coherent policy on what was expected to be achieved 
and the failure to create the environment conducive to 
economic growth. As will be seen ahead in this 
chapter, the necessary co-operant factors which would 
have facilitated high fund absorption were lacking in 
Uganda mainly because of the poor performance of the 
economy. This reminds us of the important role of the 
co-operant factors in capital absorptive capacity seen 
in Chapter 3o
A question which must now be answered is what the 
different fund absorptive achievements seen above tell 
us about the effectiveness of the Bank as an instrument 
for reducing industrial imbalances. In the case of 
Kenya and Tanzania, because absorptive achievements of 
the two countries were almost the same (67 and 66 per 
cent, respectively) industrial imbalance between the 
two countries was also reduced almost as the lending
formula required. It must be stressed, however, that 
since the Bank had hardly any influence over absorptive 
achievements in the two countries, the compliance with 
what the Bank was expected to achieve was coincidental.
For Kenya and Uganda, the industrial imbalance 
between the two countries widened because of a very low 
fund absorptive achievement in Uganda. By 1973, Kenya 
had absorbed Shs. 25*96 million more than Uganda. It 
is of interest to note that while the fund allocation 
criterion in the subsection 6.5.1 showed that industrial 
imbalance between the two countries was reduced, the fund 
absorptive^achievement criterion shows the opposite.
In other words, while the former criterion showed that 
the Bank had been effective, the latter shows that it 
had been ineffective. Because it was argued that 
disbursement (which is closely related to fund absorpt­
ive achievement) is a better indicator of the effect­
iveness of the Bank, or lack of it, than the fund 
allocation criterion, it is concluded that the Bank did 
not reduce industrial imbalance between Kenya and Uganda. 
The Bank may hardly be blamed for that failure since
its influence over the determinants of fund absorption 
7was minimal.
It seems that those who designed the Bank assumed 
that funds made available to the member states of the 
Bank would be utilized (disbursed) in a reasonable time. 
They could not envisage that conditions in Uganda could
change in such a way that fund absorption there would be va
very low. While it may be unfair to expect that the 
designers of the Bank could predict conditions in Uganda, 
a lesson arising from the Ugandan situation is that in 
future consideration should be given to the likelihood 
of the rates of disbursement varying between member 
countries of an economic integration scheme. The 
variation could mean that the reduction of regional 
economic disparities might not be achieved.
Before moving on to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the Bank from a broader criterion than the two used 
above, the results of analyses carried out in this sub­
section and in the last one are, summarised in Figure 6.1. 
Fart A shows what should have been allocated to Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda at the end of five years. The 
amounts in Part A are arrived at by applying the 
prescribed lending formula (22.50 : 38.75 : 38.75) to 
the total amount that was lent between 1969 and 1973*
Part B shows the actual allocations and Part C shows 
the amount which had been disbursed to the three 
countries after the five year period. Deviations 
from expectation in so far as allocations were concerned 
are referred to either as over- or under-allocations.
Terms "balancing effect" and "disparity effect" which 
are explained in subsection 6.5.2 are shown in the 
figure. Notice that while fund allocation criterion(,<ft^ x>) 
showed that there had been "balancing effects" K^T^ for
-- ^ »mm* ■
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Kenya and Tanzania, and K^ for Kenya and Uganda, 
the disbursement criterion showed that the "balancing 
effect" for Kenya and Tanzania was only Kg 12 ^or
Kenya and Uganda there was "disparity effect" in favour 
of Kenya, represented by Ug Kg,
6o5o3 Sources of Finance and the Balanced Industrial 
Development Objective, 196)9-1973 "
An attempt will now be made to evaluate how effect­
ive the Bank was using a broader criterion than the 
fund allocation and fund disbursement criteria. The 
broader criterion is what the study classifies as the 
two types of sources of finance for the projects in 
whose financing the Bank participated. One source was 
the Bank itself and the other is what the study calls 
the Non-Bank which comprises all other parties that 
provided finance to a given project. Although this 
classification may appear arbitrary, it serves a useful 
purpose of distinguishing the Bank from other sources 
of finance. That makes it possible to examine its 
effectiveness as an instrument for reducing industrial 
imbalances.
Table 6.3 shows the two sources of finance mentioned 
above. It may be seen that, on the whole, the Bank's 
contribution to the total cost of projects was least in 
Kenya. For instance, by 1973 the Bank's contribution
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to the cumulative cost of projects in that country was 
10 per cent* In Tanzania and Uganda, the Bank's 
contributions, also at the end of 1973, were 20 and 22 
per cent respectively*
A question which should be answered is that given 
that the Bank was not as important a source of finance 
for projects as the Non-Bank, could it make a significant 
impact in reducing industrial imbalances? As a prelude 
to answering that question, two terms which will be used 
are defined. The first is what the study calls the 
Bank's "balancing effect". This is defined as that 
amount by which the Bank's allocations to either Tanzania 
or Uganda at the end of five years of lending exceeded 
the amount allocated to Kenya. The other term is the 
"disparity effect". This is defined as that amount by 
which investment finance provided by the Non-Bank in 
Kenya exceeded the amount supplied by the Non-Bank 
sources in either Tanzania or Uganda. Once again, the 
focus of interest is on what had happened by 1973.
The "balancing effect" (of the Bank) in the case 
of Kenya and Tanzania was Shs* 29*72 million by 1973*
The "disparity effect" was Shs. 245*74 million. The 
net effect was, therefore, that of disparity, equal to 
Shs. 216*02 million* For Kenya and Uganda, the 
"balancing effect" was Shs* 26*73 million and the 
"disparity effect" was Shs. 295*42 million* Therefore, 
the net effect was that of disparity, represented by
shs. 268.69 million. Clearly, the "balancing effect" 
of the Bank was greatly offset by the "disparity effect". 
This was more so in the case of Kenya and Uganda. In 
view of these findings, it follows that the Bank was not 
an effective instrument for reducing industrial 
imbalances.
(The reason why the Bank was ineffective is that it 
had limited funds in relation to the task of counter­
balancing the difference in capacity to invest between 
Kenya and the other two countries. However, even if 
the Bank had had more money to lend than it did, that 
may not have necessarily made it a more effective 
instrument for reducing industrial imbalances. This is 
because, as was noted in subsection 6.4.2, Kenya's fund 
absorptive achievement was greater than either Tanzania's 
or Uganda's. If the Bank had had more funds and 
increased the amounts allocated to the three countries, 
it is probable that Kenya would have absorbed more 
funds than either Tanzania or Uganda. That would have 
led to an increase in industrial imbalance, which was 
the opposite of what was wanted.
The "disparity effects" would have slightly narrowed 
if the Bank had fully complied with the prescribed lend­
ing formula. Table 6.3, column 3 under each country, 
shows the expected allocations, while column 2 shows 
the amounts which were actually allocated. There was 
a small over-allocation for Kenya. And there were even 
smaller under-allocations for both Tanzania and Uganda.
If the lending formula had been strictly adhered to, 
the "balancing effect" in the case of Kenya and Tanzania 
would have been Shs. 42.58 million instead of being 
Shs. 29.72 million as seen above. The net "disparity 
effect" would, therefore, have been reduced from 
shs. 216.02 million to Shs. 203.16 million.
The "balancing effect" in the case of Kenya and 
Uganda would also have risen by the same amount as in 
the case of Kenya and Tanzania. This is because 
Tanzania and Uganda were supposed to be allocated equal 
amounts. The net "disparity effect" between Kenya and 
Uganda would have fallen from Shs. 268.69 million to 
Shs. 255.83 million. These reductions in investment 
disparities which would have resulted from strict 
adherence to the lending formula, are very small in 
relation to the "disparity effect" of the Non-Bank. 
Therefore, complete compliance with the lending formula, 
per se, would not have made the Bank an effective 
instrument for correcting industrial imbalances.
The "balancing'' and "disparity effects" discussed 
above are shown in Figure 6.2 below. The distance KT 
represents the net disparity effect between Kenya and 
Tanzania. The balancing effect is Bq,. In the 
absence of the balancing effect, the investment 
differential between the two countries would have been 
longer than KT. For Kenya and Uganda, the net disparity 
effect is shown by KU and the "balancing effect" is
(J
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The net disparity effect in the hypothetical case 
where the Bank had complied with the lending formula 
is Kg T for Kenya and Tanzania. This distance is 
shorter than the actual one seen earlier, KT. The 
reduction in investment differentials due to complete 
compliance with the lending formula is K Kg in both the 
cases of Kenya - Tanzania and Kenya - Uganda. The net 
disparity effect for the latter is Kg U.
Now that the importance of the two sources of 
finance for projects in the three countries has been 
shown, it may be instructive to give an idea of capital 
formation that took place in the industrial sectors of 
Kenya and Tanzania between 1969 and 1973. Uganda is 
excluded because of lack of data. In Kenya, capital
Q
formation was K Shs. 1986 million. The Bank's
allocations to that country over the five year period
(see Table 6.1) were equal to 3.4 per cent of that
capital formation. In Tanzania, capital formation was
q
T Shs. 1524 million, and the Bank's allocations to that 
country for five years (see again Table 6.1) was equal 
to 6.4 per cent of cumulative capital formation.
These figures show two things which are relevant to the 
industrial imbalance issue. The first is that Kenya's 
capital formation was greater than Tanzania's. This 
may be an explanation of why, as was seen in Chapter 5, 
industrial imbalance between the two countries widened
between 1968 and 1977. The second thing is that while 
the Bank was more important in Tanzania than in Kenya, 
its contribution to capital formation in the former was 
too small to make a substantial impact in reducing the 
gap in capital formation between the two countries.
The amount considered here are those represented by the 
"balancing" effect and the difference in capital format­
ion between the two countries.
It is important to point out that in Tanzania, an 
institution called the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) 
which was expected to finance and promote industrial 
development, was set up in 1970.^ Its effectiveness 
will be briefly examined later. The relevance of this 
exercise is that it is expected to shed light on that 
institution's contribution to a balanced industrial 
development between Kenya and Tanzania. Kenya also 
set up an institution, called the Industrial Development 
Bank (IDB), in 1973, and its objective was similar to 
that of the TIB.^ More will be said later about 
the IDB.
6.6 Allocations, Disbursements and Sources of
Finance for EADB-Fmanced Projects. 1974-1977
This section carries out analyses similar to those 
carried out in the previous section. It may be recalled 
that the Bank was expected to comply with the lending 
formula at the end of a five year period. Therefore, 
in principle, every five year period stands on its own 
for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the 
Bank as a mechanism for reducing industrial imbalances. 
However, because when the Community broke up in 1977 
the activities of the Bank virtually came to a standstill, 
four years instead of five are covered. Caution will, 
therefore, be exercised in drawing conclusions on whether 
or not the Bank was effective, since its evaluation will 
be based on a period of less than five years.
6.6.1 Allocation of Funds to Keuva. Tanzania and 
Uganda. 1974-1977
The distribution of funds by the Bank to Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda between 1974 and 1977 is shown in 
Table 6.4. The focus of interest is on the cumulative 
amount which had been allocated at the end of the 1974- 
1977 period. At the end of this period, the Bank had 
allocated shs. 99.87 million to Kenya, shs. 104.50 
million to Tanzania and shs. 82.45 million to Uganda.
TABLE 6.4:
Allocation of Funds to Kenya. Tanzania and 
Uganda. 1974-1977
(in millions of East African shillings and 
in percentages)
Year Kenya Tanzania Uganda Total
1974 15.22 27.00 17.45 59.67
1975 41.50 8.00 23.00 72.5C
1976 8.45 43.50 20.00 71.95
1977 35.70 26.00 22.00 82.7C
Total 99.87 104.50 82.45 286.82
Actual
Ratios % 34.82 36.43 28.75
Prescribed
Ratios % 22.50 38.75 38.75
Deviations
in Amountp +35.34 -6.64 -28.69
Sources: Computed from East African Development Bank,
Annual Reports, 1974-1977.
Considering that the Bank was expected to allocate 
more funds to Tanzania and Uganda than Kenya, the first 
striking thing is that Kenya was allocated more funds 
than Uganda. Notice also that Tanzania was allocated 
slightly more funds than Kenya, only shs. 4.63 million. 
Although there was one more year to go before the end 
of a second five year period of the Bank's lending, it 
seems that the Bank was off the course to complying with 
the prescribed lending formula. The actual ratios in
row 7 and the prescribed ratios in row 8 indicate that 
there were big deviations from expectations for Kenya 
and Uganda. For Kenya, the deviation was 12.32 per cent 
above expectation. On the other hand, the deviation 
for Uganda was 10.0 per cent below expectation. This 
meant that industrial imbalance between the two countries 
increased. The amount representing that increase is 
shs. 17.42 million, this being the difference between 
Kenya's and Uganda's cumulative allocations between 
1974 and 1977. The amount by which Tanzania's allocation 
exceeded Kenya's, as seen above, was so small that the 
Bank seemed to be incapable of complying with the lending 
formula even if the East African Community's break-up 
had not disrupted the activities of the Bank.
The amounts representing deviations from expectations 
are shown in the last row of Table 6.4. It may be seen 
that while Kenya had been allocated shs. 35.34 million 
more than stipulated by the lending formula, Tanzania and 
Uganda had been underallocated by shs. 6.64 million and
shs. 28.69 million respectively. The author learned that the
deviations were mainly due to the"pressure" of demand for
IP
investment funds arising from Kenya . The demand for
the Bank's funds in Tanzania was lower than that of Kenya.
The low "pressure"of demand in Tanzania may be explained
by the tendency there to rely more on the national
13financial institutions . As for Uganda, the facts that
the economy was in depression and that there were very 
few competent entrepreneurs are the two main explanations 
for the low"pressure”of demand for investment funds.
The point made above that the Bank seemed not to
be capable of complying with the lending formula was
based on the fact that it had been experiencing a short-
14age of funds to lend since 1975 . Yet its chance of
complying with the lending formula lay in it having 
substantial sums of funds. This argument will be 
elaborated using a hypothetical case. Suppose that the 
Community had not broken up and therefore that the Bank 
had been able to complete its second five year period of 
lending. Suppose also that the management of the Bank 
had decided in 1977 that since the Bank was off the 
course to complying with the lending formula, no more 
funds would be allocated to Kenya in 1978. Suppose 
further that the Bank had decided to allocate the funds 
it had in 1978 (the fifth year of the second five year 
period) to Tanzania and Uganda in such a way that the 
lending formula would be complied with. Under these 
assumptions Tanzania and Uganda would have been allocated 
shs. 67.50 million and shs. 89.55 million respectively. 
These figures are arrived at first, by equating the 
cumulative amount which had been allocated to Kenya to 
22.50 per cent. Second, the amount corresponding to 
the expected share of Tanzania and Uganda, 38.75 per cent,
is worked out. Finally, the cumulative amounts which 
had been allocated to the two countries by 1977 is 
subtracted from their expected shares.
It should be realised that the amount which should 
have been allocated to Uganda in 1978, shs. 89.55 million 
in order to comply with the lending formula, was greater 
than the amount the country had been allocated in the 
previous four years. In view of the difficulties the 
Bank had been experiencing in obtaining funds to lend, 
it would be unrealistic to expect that the Bank would 
have been able to lend such an amount. Even in the case 
of Tanzania, it would also have been unrealistic to 
expect that in one year she would have been allocated 
about 65 per cent of the total amount she had been lent 
in the previous four years.
6.6.2 Disbursements to Kenya. Tanzania and'Uganda.
1974-1977
This subsection evaluates the effectiveness of the 
Bank as a mechanism for reducing industrial imbalances 
for the 1974-1977 period using the disbursement criterion 
The term fund absorptive achievement, which is related to 
disbursement,will also be used as was done in subsection 
6.5.2. The focus of interest is once again on the 
cumulative amounts in the final year of lending.
Table 6.5 shows the cumulative amounts which were 
disbursed to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda between 1974 and 
1977. It also shows fund absorptive achievements in 
the three countries and the extent to which the amounts 
disbursed to the three countries deviated from what 
could have reduced industrial imbalances as required 
by the lending formula principle. It may be seen that 
by 1977 Kenya had received Shs. 73o08 million, while 
Tanzania and Uganda had received Shs. 72.63 million and 
Shs. 71«11 million respectively. The fact that Kenya 
absorbed more funds than either of the two countries was 
inconsistent with the idea behind the lending formula, 
which was that more funds should go to Tanzania and 
Uganda.
The last row shows that the deviation in Kenya was 
11.20 per cent above the 22.50 per cent mark which was 
supposed to be her share according to the lending formula. 
Tanzania and Uganda were 5.25 and 5o85 per cent below 
their expected shares. This meant that according to 
the disbursement criterion the industrial imbalances 
between Kenya and the other two countries widened 
between 1974 and 1977. It may be recalled that in 
Chapter 5 it was seen that value added indicator showed 
that industrial imbalances between Kenya and the other 
two countries did indeed widen between 1968 and 1977o
It is of interest to note that while fund absorptive 
achievement in Kenya and Tanzania had gone up by 6 and 3
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percentage points between 1973 and 1977, in Uganda there had 
been a very large increase of 65 percentage points.
This increase calls for explanation. The broad 
explanation is that most of the amount allocated in 
1969-1973 was disbursed in the 1974-1977 period^. Also 
the amount allocated to Uganda in the latter period was 
disbursed without much delay. There are three more 
specific explanations. The first is that the govern­
ment rather belatedly started to promote industrial 
development, something which had been neglected since 
the Amin regime came into power. The government urged 
those responsible for project implementation to see to 
it that production started as soon as possible. The 
second explanation is that the country now had more 
foreign exchange than in the past because of the high 
price of coffee on the world market. This meant that 
projects which could not in the past be implemented 
because of the scarcity of foreign exchange now no 
longer faced that problem. Finally, some projects 
which could not be implemented because their Asian 
owners had been expelled in 1972 could be implemented 
during the 1974-1977 period because they had been 
reallocated to new owners.
The explanations given above also serve a useful 
purpose of showing some of the major determinants of fund 
absorptive achievement. It may be added that an 
economy which functions well, as the Kenyan one was 
doing, tends to have a high fund (finance) absorptive
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achievement. As was seen above, Tanzania’s absorptive 
achievement was not far behind Kenya’s. In fact, the 
absorptive achievements in the three countries was very 
high even by the international standards
A visual picture which fund absorptive achievement 
paints concerning the effectiveness of the Bank as an 
instrument for reducing industrial imbalances for the 
1974-1977 period is shown in Figure 6.3. The results 
of the 1969-1973 period have also been included in order 
to compare the effectiveness of the Bank in the two 
periods. It may be seen that the Bank was more effect­
ive in the 1974-1977 period than it had been in the 
1969-1973 period (see Part A and B of the figure).
Part C of the figure shows that for the 1969-1977 
period Tanzania received more funds than Kenya.
However, Uganda received less than Kenya. It will be 
recalled that both Tanzania and Uganda were expected to 
receive more funds than Kenya if there was to be a 
reduction in industrial imbalances. At the end of the 
1969-1977 period, funds had been disbursed in the follow­
ing ratios: 34.42:39.24:26.34, for Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda respectively. This meant that while Kenya and 
Tanzania were 11.92 and 0.49 percentage points above the 
marks required for the reduction of industrial imbalances 
in accordance with the lending formula, Uganda was 12.41 
percentage points below what should have been her share.
These findings mean that the Bank was not an effective
mechanism for reducing industrial imbalances.
In winding up the discussion on the effectiveness
of the Bank from the standpoint of disbursement, it
should be pointed out that that indicator is a second
best one. The best indicator is whether or not the
projects financed by the Bank became operational and
17whether or not they were commercially successful.
This will be investigated in chapter 7o
The assumption underlying the idea of allocating
more funds to Tanzania and Uganda seems to have been
that the co-operant factors (seen in chapter 3) would
be available. It seems also that there was another
assumption, namely, that the main constraint to
industrial development in the two countries was the
scarcity of finance. This assumption, as Newlyn (1977)
18points out, has been seriously questioned. As for
the first assumption, the Ugandan situation has shown 
how it stood on its head. However, because those who 
devised the Bank could not foresee the political and 
economic changes which were to take place in Uganda, 
the assumption that co-operant factors would be present 
was a reasonable one. It must, however, be reiterated 
that the benefit of hindsight suggests that it is more 
reasonable to assume that fund absorptive achievement 
will differ between member countries of an economic 
integration scheme. Having made this assumption, then
a proviso concerning how low fund absorptive achievement 
could be improved in a country which deviates from 
expectation needs to be present.
6.6.3 Sources of Finance and the Balanced Industrial 
Development Objective, 1974-1977
In this subsection the effectiveness of the Bank 
as an instrument for reducing industrial imbalances 
will be evaluated using the Bank and Non-Bank sources 
of finance. The period covered is from 1974 to 1977 
and the focus of interest is again on what had taken 
place at the end of that period.
The amounts supplied by the two sources of finance
are shown in Table 6.6 below. The importance of the
Bank as a source of finance is shown in the last row of
the table. It may be seen that while the Bank’s
contributions towards the total cost of projects in
Kenya between 1974 and 1977 was 5*2 per cent, its
contributions in Tanzania and Uganda were 15.2 and
19.1 per cent respectively. This means that Kenya
would have been least affected by the break up of the
Bank. Uganda would have been most affected and the
effect on Tanzania though would have been between the
two extremes; it would have been closer to Uganda’s
than Kenya’s. It is of interest to note that the
Bank was most appreciated in Uganda, and that Tanzania
19also appreciated its existence more than Kenya.
It is also noteworthy that in both Kenya and Tanzania 
the importance of the Bank fell between 1973 and 1977.
In Kenya, it fell from 10 per cent to 5.2 per cent 
(for these comparisons see Tables 6.3 and 6.6).
However, in terms of the amounts allocated by the Bank 
in the 1969-1973 and 1974-1977 periods, Kenya’s 
allocation at the end of the first period was Shs. 68.49 
million and in the second period she was allocated 
Shs. 99*87 million. For Tanzania, her allocations were 
Shs. 98.21 million and Shs. 95.22 million for the two 
periods. Uganda’s allocations were Shs. 95.22 million 
and Shs. 82.45 million for the 1969-1973 and 1974-1977 
periods respectively (see again Tables 6.3 and 6.6 for 
the absolute amounts distributed). Uganda was, there­
fore, the only country whose allocations did not rise. 
The rise in the importance of the Bank in relative 
terms was, therefore, an indication that the Non-Bank 
source had hardly improved in Uganda. In contrast, 
the Non-Bank’s contribution to the cost of projects in 
Tanzania was by 1977 about 1.5 times what it had been 
by the end of the 1969-1973 period. In Kenya, the 
Non-Bank’s contribution by 1977 was about three times 
what it had been by the end of the 1969-1973 period.
A question which must be answered is what the 
difference in importance of the two sources of finance 
for the projects tells us about the effectiveness of 
the Bank as a mechanism for reducing imbalances in the
1974-1977 period. The terms ’balancing” and "disparity"
effects will once again be used. It may be recalled
that the "balancing effect" was represented by the 
amount by which the Bank’s allocations to either Tanzania 
or Uganda exceeded the amount allocated to Kenya, and 
the "disparity effect" was the amount by which the 
finance supplied by the Non-Bank in Kenya exceeded the
finance supplied by the Non-Bank sources in either
Tanzania or Uganda.
The "balancing effect" in the case of Kenya and 
Tanzania was Shs. 4®83 million by the end of the 1974- 
1977 period (computed from Table 6.6). The "disparity 
effect" between the two countries was Shs. 1237®22 
million (see again the statistics in Table 6.6). The 
net effect was, therefore, overwhelmingly that of 
disparity represented by Shs. 123Z.39 million. The 
conclusion drawn from this is that the Bank was not 
an effective mechanism for reducing industrial imbalances 
between Kenya and Tanzania.
The same conclusion applies even more to the case 
of Kenya and Uganda. The "balancing effect" did not 
exist because the Bank at the end of the 1974-1977 
period had allocated Kenya Shs. 17.42 million more than 
it had allocated Uganda (see Table 6.6). The "disparity 
effect" was represented by Shs. 1470.37 million. The 
net effect was, therefore, Shs. 1487.79 million which 
is the sum of the two amounts. Notice that this
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"disparity effect" is greater than that between Kenya 
and Tanzania (Shs© 1232.39 million).
It is instructive to compare the "disparity effects" 
between Kenya and the other two countries at the end of 
the 1969-1973 and 1974-1977 periods. This is done in 
order to illustrate the author’s argument that the 
circular and cumulative causation phenomenon was 
reflected in the different capacities to invest between 
Kenya and the other two countries. Only the Non-Bank 
supplied amounts will be used since that source 
represents what may be called "purely" national efforts 
to finance industrial projects. The inclusion of the 
Bank would introduce the "balancing" element which the 
author wishes to isolate.
Bor Kenya and Tanzania, the "disparity effect" by 
the end of the 1969-1973 period was Shs. 216.02 million
and Shs. 1232.39 million at the end of the 1974-1977
period. Bor Kenya and Uganda, the "disparity effects" 
were represented by Shs. 268.69 million and Shs. 1487.79 
million for the two periods respectively. The circular 
and cumulative causation process is indicated by the 
fact that Kenya’s capacity to invest which was greater 
than the other two countries’ at the end of the 1969-1973 
period, was even greater at the end of the 1974-1977 
period, hence the increase in the "disparity effects".
It may be asked whether at the time of designing
the Bank it could not have been foreseen that the
cumulative causation process would make the impact of
the Bank small. It seems that this possibility was
overlooked since that was not mentioned in the Bank’s
Charter. Instead, policy-makers in Tanzania predicted
greater scale of activities of the Bank than were actually
to take place. As Hazlewood (1979) has argued, it is
possible that if the future of the East African Community
had been certain, the Bank could have attracted more
21funds and expanded its scale of lending. This was 
also the view of the former Director-General of the
pp
Bank (from 1967 to 1977) whom the author talked to.
As was noted above, the Bank had not complied with 
the lending formula by the end of the 1974-77 period.
It may be asked whether it would have made much difference 
if the Bank had fully adhered to the prescribed lending 
formula. To answer this question, a comparison will 
be made between the actual and the expected allocations.
To be able to work out the expected allocations at the 
end of the 1974-77 period, it is assumed that for each 
year of the Bank's lending activities it had complied 
completely with the prescribed lending formula. Under 
this assumption, the amount allocated to Kenya at the 
end of the four year period should have been Shs. 64.6 
million. According to this scenario and the actual 
situation, Kenya had been over allocated by Shs. 35.3 
million. On the other hand, Tanzania and Uganda had 
been under allocated by Shs. 6.5 and Shs. 28.7 million 
respectively (obtained by subtracting the expected 
allocations from the actual in Table 6.6).
These deviations did not contribute much to the 
Bank's ineffectiveness as an instrument for correcting 
industrial disparities in the 1974-77 period. To 
illustrate this point the "balancing effect" as a result 
of compliance, will be compared with the "disparity 
effect". In the case of Kenya and Tanzania, the 
"balancing effect" would have been Shs. 46.6 million.
But the ^ disparity effect" would have been Shs. 1232.39 
million. In other words, by completely complying 
with the lending formula, investment differentials 
between the two countries would have been reduced by 
3.8 per cent.
In the case of Kenya and Uganda, the "balancing 
effect" would also have been Shs. 46.6 million because 
both Uganda and Tanzania were supposed to receive equal 
amounts. But the "disparity effect" between Kenya and 
Uganda would have been Shs. 1470.4 million. This means 
that total compliance with the prescribed lending formula 
would have reduced the investment differential between 
the two countries by 3.2 per cent. A noteworthy point 
is that in both the Kenya - Tanzania and Kenya - Uganda 
cases the "disparity effect" greatly outweighed the 
"balancing effect" in the hypothetical scenario of 
complete compliance with the lending formula.
Figure 6.4 gives a visual picture of the importance 
of the Bank and Non-Bank as sources of finance for the 
projects in whose financing the Bank participated 
during the 1974-1977 period. The ineffectiveness of
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the Bank in the case of Kenya and Tanzania is represented 
by distance I^E, and in the case of Kenya and Uganda, by 
the distance
A question may be asked about how much fund the 
Bank needed in order to bring about balance in industrial 
development between its member countries. That balance, 
even if the Bank were able to bring it about, would have 
been partial, since it would have been only for the 
projects in whose financing the Bank would have partici­
pated, not the whole industrial sectors in the three 
countries. In attempting to answer the above question, 
a hypothetical situation is created by making a number 
of assumptions. Suppose that the Bank could easily 
obtain funds to lend. Suppose also that before decid­
ing on the allocations, the Bank knew the total cost of 
projects (in whose financing it would be involved) 
which were to be undertaken in its three member countries. 
Suppose further, that the Bank was to adhere strictly to 
the prescribed lending formula (22.50 per cent for Kenya, 
38.75 for Tanzania and 38.75 for Uganda).
Under these assumptions the Bank should have
allocated at the end of the 1974-1977 period Shs. 9184
million, which is 32 times the actual amount it had 
23allocated. If this amount had been allocated as the 
prescribed lending formula required, the "disparity 
effect" would have been completely offset. Tanzania 
and Uganda would each have been allocated 3559 million 
and Kenya would have been allocated Shs. 2066 million.
In view of the fact that the Bank had been experiencing 
difficulties in obtaining small amounts of funds to lend, 
it was almost impossible that it could obtain the 
Shs. 9184 million. A point which should be stressed is that 
for the Bank to be completely effective, to counter­
balance the "disparity effect", then it required an 
enormous amount of funds.
6.6.4 National Development Banks as Covert Rivals 
of EADB
It was mentioned earlier that two financial institut­
ions whose objectives were similar to the Bank's (EADB) 
were set up in Tanzania and Kenya in 1970 and 1973, 
respectively. Uganda also set up a similar institution 
in 1973. While there is no firm evidence that the Bank 
and these national financial institutions were rivals, 
there are reasons to suppose that that was the case.
This argument is based on the importance of the national 
financial institutions vis a vis the Bank.
The importance of the Tanzanian Investment Bank (TIB) 
as a source of finance for projects in the country, is 
shown by the scale of its lending. Between November,
1970 and July, 1978, it lent Shs. 677«52 million.
On the other hand, the Bank lent to projects in Tanzania 
Shs. 202.71 million between 1969 and 1977 (this is the 
sum of the amount allocated to Tanzania as shown in 
Tables 6.1 and 6.4). Notice that the TIB lent about
3« 3 times more money than the Bank did. Moreover, the 
TIB achieved that in a shorter time than the Bank, six 
years and nine months, compared to nine years for the 
Bank. Clearly, the TIB was a more important source of 
finance than the Bank. Given the tendency mentioned 
earlier for Tanzania to rely more on national institutions 
and also given the importance it attached to industrial 
development, it was to be expected that the TIB would 
play an important role since it was the main instrument 
for financing industrial projects. This meant that 
the Bank was a gap-filler.
In Kenya, the Industrial Development Bank (IDB) lent 
Shs. 310.85 million between 1973 and 1 9 7 7 . The-Bank 
lent to the projects in the country Shs. 168.36 million, 
between 1969 and 1977 (see Tables 6.1 and 6.4). In 
other words, the IDB lent approximately 1.8 times in 
only five years the sum the Bank lent in nine years. 
Therefore, the national financial institution in Kenya, 
like the one in Tanzania, was more important than the 
Bank. Kenya had actually several other financial 
institutions from which finance for industrial develop- 
ment could be obtained. This reduced further the 
importance of the Bank.
The importance of a financial institution in 
Uganda, the Uganda Development Bank (UDB), is also shown 
by the magnitude of its lending. It lent Shs. 156.78 
million between 1973 and 1976 (data from 1977 to 1982
were not available when the author visited the UDB in
27September, 1982). The Bank lent to projects in 
Uganda Shs« 177*67 million between 1969 and 1977 (see 
again Tables 6.1 and 6#4)o This meant that the Bank 
was a more important source of finance than the UDB. 
Notice, however, that the amount the UDB lent over only 
four years was about 88 per cent of what the Bank had 
lent over nine years. It is probable that if the UDB 
had operated for as long as the Bank did, it would have 
lent more than the Bank.
A point which the author wishes to underline about 
the above findings, is that the emergence of national 
financial institutions after the creation of the Bank 
tended to reduce the importance of the Bank as a 
mechanism for reducing industrial imbalances. It will 
be recalled that the national financial institutions 
had similar objectives as the Bank in so far as the 
promotion of industrial development was concerned.
It may also be added that given the facts that there 
was no co-operation in industrial development on the 
Common Market basis, the emergence of similar national 
financial institutions was no surprise.
6.7 The Industrial Complementarity Objective
This section evaluates the performance of the Bank 
in so far as the industrial complementarity objective 
was concerned. As will be seen later, the Bank took 
that objective to mean rationalising industrial product­
ion in the East African Community. As a prelude to 
evaluating the performance of the Bank, some background 
literature from both the political and economic stand­
points is discussed.
6.7.1 The Absence of Close Political Co-operation 
as an Obstacle to Rationalising Industrial 
Production in EAC
At the beginning of the 1960s, there was an 
opportunity for Kenya, Tanzania (then Tanganyika) and 
Uganda to federate. At that time, Nyerere held the 
view that meaningful economic co-operation could only
be achieved in a framework of close political co-oper-
28 29ation. Policy-makers in Kenya also seemed to be
keen on close political co-operation, but those in
Uganda were sceptical about the i s s u e . U g a n d a ’s
scepticism was largely based on the different political
structures in the three countries and on the fact that
while in Kenya the large scale farmer was more important
than the small scale one, in Uganda, the reverse was
the case. The Ugandan Prime Minister claimed to be a
31firm supporter of the small farmer in Uganda.
By the time Kenya became independent in 1963 (she 
was the last of the three territories to gain independence) 
the prospects of federation were remote. This was
partly due to the Ugandan scepticism and more importantly
32due to the failure to agree on power sharing. Moreover,
it was alleged that Kenyan politicians had never been
serious about political federation, that the issue had
been used to facilitate rapid attainment of independence.
Politicians on the Kenyan Government side denied that
33that had ever been their strategy.
It was probably the above facts and allegations that 
led to Robson's (1968) observation:^
...... integration will be a perennial concern
of African States for a long time to come, it 
is unrealistic to suppose that its progress 
will be either smooth or rapid
Robson was also aware of the political difficulties
faced by other economic integration schemes on the
African Continent. Hazlewood (1967) remarked that
effective economic union could be achieved only within
35the framework of political association. Green and
Krishna (1965) explained why political association is
36difficult to achieve. They argued that unless there
were strong reasons to believe that national economic 
interests will be served and that no serious blows will 
be dealt to national key economic sectors, no state will
accept to surrender the controls of certain economic 
policies to a supranational institution. They also 
argued that political divergence either in substance 
or in style which lead to acrimony will destroy the 
atmosphere of mutual goodwill and belief in real common 
interest.
Policy-makers in Tanzania and Uganda had since the 
1920s expressed concern that their territorial interests 
were being harmed. This view was still held in the 
1960s, hence the restriction of imports of some products 
from Kenya. As was argued earlier, policy-makers in 
Tanzania and Uganda seemed to misunderstand what was
/s
the raison d’etre of a Common Market. Since the 
existence of an economic integration scheme depends on 
the perception by national policy-makers that national 
interests will be served by being members, it is import­
ant that those policy-makers should have a realistic 
perception of what may come from economic co-operation.
With regard to the point about political divergence 
in style or substance, there is reason to think that 
Tanzania’s socialist policies and Kenya’s pursuit of 
capitalist policies contributed to a political environ­
ment which was not conducive to effective co-operation. 
The author knows, from his personal experience as an 
employee of the East African Community at its head­
quarters, that the difference in ideology between the 
two countries created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion.
In such an atmosphere, it would have been unrealistic to
expect that rationalising industrial production between
Kenya and Tanzania could be achieved. In this connection,
a question posed by Robson (1968) about whether economic
co-operation without political unity can maximise the
37gains from economic integration, is relevant. The 
experience of the East African Community suggests that 
the answer is negative. Thirlwall (1974), uses the 
European Economic Community to argue that the absence
of political solidarity makes it difficult to have an
3 8effective economic integration. Nyerere’s remark 
(seen in Chapter 4) to the effect that in the absence 
of political federation between Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda, nationalism would, as time passed, make regional 
co-operation difficult, is noteworthy. Equally note­
worthy is the fact that Tanzanian policy-makers were 
impatient about the unequal distribution of the benefits 
from the Common Market. This impatience may be 
interpreted as stemming from the ambitious targets
which the policy-makers in Tanzania had set in the
39period soon after independence.
6.7®2 The Economic Consideration in Economic 
Integration in LDCs
The main economic argument for regional economic 
integration in the developing world is, as Robson (1980) 
correctly points out, to; rationalise the emergent
structures of production.^ Efficient utilization of
resources, as was seen in Chapter 3, is the main benefit
expected from rationalising production in an economic
integration scheme. More specifically, three grounds
in support of regional co-operation in the less developed
world may be offered. The first is that the smallness
of national market (in terms of purchasing power) which
is a hindrance to the exploitation of economies of scale,
41may be overcome by pooling national markets. The 
second argument, which Is related to the first, is that 
market enlargement may improve the prospects of inflow 
of foreign investments in an economic integration 
scheme.^2 The third argument is that market enlarge­
ment may make it possible for diversification to take 
place. The diversification may arise from high demand
for certain goods produced by one partner and exported
43to another where their demand may be higher.
The diversification point may be appreciated if it
is remembered that developing countries which depend
mainly on primary products are often vulnerable either
because of changes in weather (for agricultural produce)
44or because of the fall in prices on the world market.
The implication of this is that diversification in 
industrial products is likely to be more beneficial 
than diversification in agricultural produce.
6*7.3 Rationalisation of Industrial Production in
Some Other Economic Integration Schemes of LDCs
This short subsection examines the importance 
policy-makers, mainly on the African continent, have 
attached to rationalising production in regional economic 
groupingSo A question to be answered is why there has 
been a gap between the stated objective and the actual 
results*
The potential benefits from co-ordinating and
harmonising national development plans in Africa were
appreciated in the early 1960s* The United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), in recognition
of those benefits, undertook a feasibility study of how
rationalisation of industrial production in several
regions of Africa could be brought about. By 1965, it
had produced a report on how that objective could be 
45achieved* This report was presented to the African 
national policy-makers who had assembled in Lusaka in 
that year. In spite of the Pan-Africanism spirit which 
was strong at that time, no action was taken to translate 
the recommendations of the UNECA into action* However, 
national policy-makers continued to voice interest in 
the benefits of regional economic co-operation* For 
instance, a paper published by the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) in 1975, 
mentions that national policy-makers appreciated the
46
potential benefits of regional economic co-operation* 
Interest shown in regional economic co-operation
in Africa was translated into agreements in several
regions. There was the Treaty for East African
Co-operation in December, 1967, but this Treaty did not
give prominence to the rationalisation of production*
The issue is only mentioned in the Charter of the Bank
and even there, it is overshadowed by the industrial
imbalances reduction objective* Ndegwa (1968) suggested
that the Bank was created because policy-makers in Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda had failed to agree on the list of
industries in which rationalisation could be carried 
47out* On this issue, the Treaty was a retrogressive 
step compared to the Kampala Agreement because the 
latter (see Chapter 4) had a list of industries whose 
production was to-be rationalised*
West Africa has several examples which show attempts 
to translate interest in regional economic co-operation 
into action. The Community of West African States 
(CEAO) created by the Treaty of Abidjan in 1973, has as 
one of its objectives to rationalise industrial product­
ion among the six members of that Community*^ Since 
the signing of that Treaty no progress has been made 
towards rationalising production* This can be explained 
by the fact that the region does not yet have a regional 
industrial policy. One of the causes of the delay in 
coming to an agreement on the regional policy could be 
a conflict of national economic interest between the 
more economically advanced members and the backward ones.
The former members may insist on high degree of free
operation of market forces. This is because in an
economic grouping of countries that are at different
levels of economic development, free operation of market
forces tends to work more in favour of the more economic-
49ally advanced countries* On the other hand, the
economically backward members are likely to strive to 
regulate the operation of market forces and may seek to 
guide those forces to distribute evenly the benefits 
from an economic integration scheme* The failure in 
the East African Community to have a regional policy 
was, as explained above, due to a conflict in what 
national policy-makers perceived to be national economic 
interest*
The Lagos Treaty of 1975, which created the 
Economic Community of West African States, has as one 
of its objectives the harmonisation of industrial
50development among the sixteen members of that Community.
However, up to now (early 1985) there is no agreement on
the strategy for the development of industries in a
harmonised manner in that Community*
The Mano River Union, which came into existence in
1973, has also as one of its objectives to rationalise
industrial production between the three member countries,
51Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia* A commission was 
set up to decide the location of "Union Industries11.
Robson (1983) reports that ten years after the creation
of the Mano River Union, little progress had been made
52in rationalising industrial production in that union*
The Senegambia Economic and Monetary Union is yet
another example which shows the appreciation of efficient
utilization of regional resources. The principal stated
reason for co-operation was to optimize the exploitation
53of the resources of Senegal and the Gambia* In 1976, 
a convention for establishing a committee to co-ordinate 
the development of the Gambia River basin was signed. 
According to Robson (1983) ..... "the results of co-oper­
ation have been modest and no greater than those
achieved by many countries lacking formal treaties or
. 54machinery of co-operation,f.
The Andean Pact of five South American countries 
also shows the appreciation of rationalising industrial 
production among member countries. The members agreed, 
among other things, on sectoral programmes for industrial
C c
development. These programmes were about the alloc­
ation of some industries to the members in a manner that 
matched supply with demand.
It may be of interest to note that the benefits of 
rationalising production in the fertilizer industry in 
the Andean grouping was estimated to be a 40 per cent
56fall in the price that would be paid by the consumer.
This point should have been of interest to policy­
makers in the East African Community where there was 
over-capacity in a similar industry. But the Andean 
experience also shows that the conflict in what
policy-makers consider to be of national interest has
57made it difficult to rationalise industrial production.
6.7.4 Attempts by the Bank to Bring about Industrial 
Complementarity and Results Achieved
The Bank correctly interpreted industrial complement­
arity to mean rationalising industrial production in the 
East African Community. The first practical step the 
Bank took in trying to make the industrial sectors of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda complementary was to conduct 
a feasibility study of industries in which complement­
arity seemed possible. Forty seven industries were
58selected for a preliminary feasibility study. This
study led to the selection of eight industries for a
59more detailed examination. It was reported that
rationalisation was possible in all eight industries.
The Bank was only focusing on the economic aspects and 
ignored whether other requisites for rationalisation, 
such as the co-operation of private vested interests 
as well as the guardians (national policy-makers) of 
national economic interest. More is said below about 
this point later.
The author learned from his interview with the 
former Director-General of the Bank that it tried in 
the mid- 1970s to sell the idea of rationalising product­
ion in the eight industries to its three member countries 
through the East African Community Secretariat. The
Bank failed. This was no surprise, for two main 
reasons. First, ever since the Amin Government had 
come into power (starting from 1971) political relations 
between Tanzania and Uganda had been acrimonious. 
Therefore, it was to be expected that negotiation concern­
ing rationalisation of production could not take place
60in such a political environment. The second reason 
is that the political will to co-operate between Kenya 
and Tanzania had become weak in the 1970s because of the 
economic hardships faced by the three countries in the 
early and the mid-1970s and because of ideological 
divergence between the two countries. Because of that 
ideological difference, insults between the two countries 
were traded in national newspapers and other news media 
which usually expressed national governments’ views.
The fact that national governments did not discourage 
the trade of insults was indicative of the lack of 
concern regarding the likely adverse effect those insults 
could have on the East African Community (EAC).
Before that stage of hostile political relations
had been reached, the Bank had taken the second practical
step towards bringing about industrial complementarity.
It convened a meeting in 1972 of the producers of iron
and steel in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with a view to
persuading the producers to find a way of rationalising 
61production. This industry was one of the eight in 
which a feasibility study had been carried out. The 
Bank’s study of the iron and steel industry had identified
three major problems, namely, uneconomic competition, lack 
of diversification and limits on expansion* The author 
considers lack of diversification to have been the real 
problem because the demand for various iron and steel 
products in the EAC exceeded, in 1972, the total installed 
capacity*^
At the meeting, it was made clear that the uneconomic 
competition was a problem for Kenya alone, where three 
hot rolling mills had been set up in a short period of 
two years, Tanzania had one plant which by 1972 was 
not able to satisfy the domestic demand. Uganda also 
had one plant, but it was meeting all the domestic demand. 
The meeting failed to produce a formula for rationalising 
iron and steel production in the Community.
This failure was to be expected. The East African 
Community, unlike the Andean Community, did not have a 
regional industrial development policy* In this 
connection, an observation by Hazlewood (1979) is
64
relevant*
It would have been difficult for the Bank alone 
to pursue this aim (bringing about industrial 
complementarity). It could have done so if 
agreements had existed between the partner states 
on a pattern of industrial specialisation into 
which investments would fit*
This, in turn, required the presence of an effective 
regional planning machinery which, from the author’s 
knowledge, existed only on paper*
A serious obstacle to rationalisation of production 
in an economic integration scheme is how to compensate 
those producers who may be adversely affected by the 
rationalisation. This issue is very often ignored.
The Bank did not address it at all. For instance, those 
producers in Kenya who were competing against each other 
in a limited number of iron and steel products (only 
three types were produced) might have accepted to branch 
out into other types of iron and steel products if they 
were assured of assistance to modify the existing plants. 
They may also have needed to be assured that there would 
be adequate demand for the new goods to be produced.
In view of the fact that demand exceeded supply in the 
Community, the question of the assurance about adequate 
demand did not arise.
The author holds a view that the rationalisation 
of production in an economic integration scheme of the 
less developed countries would be easier to achieve in 
new industries. This is because no vested interest 
groups would be present to fight against the rationalis­
ation which would adversely affect their commercial 
interests. Effective rationalisation of production 
would exist if national governments first agreed on 
industries in which rationalisation would take place, 
and secondly, if national governments honoured the 
agreements signed.
This point can be illustrated by the motor car tyre 
and tube industry in the East African Community. The
first large scale plant which was to produce tyres and
tubes for the Community1 s market and was established in
Tanzania with the help of an American company, General 
65Tire. Some years later, another American company,
Firestone, set up a similar plant in Kenya, probably
due to the fact that the demand for tyres and tubes was
66greater in that country than in the other two* Kenya
cannot be accused of having violated rationalisation in
the tyre and tube industry because agreement on it had
not been ratified. It should be realised that an offer
by a multinational to set up an important plant in the
country would hatfe been very tempting* To refuse the
offer would have been interpreted by some Kenyan
politicians as retarding the economic growth of the
nation, while the economic growth of another nation,
Tanzania, was being promoted by a similar industry*
Actually, some politicians in Kenya had said that it
was unacceptable that the economic growth of that country
should be retarded in order to help Tanzania and Uganda
67catch up with Kenya*
Summary
It was seen in the first part of this chapter that 
the Bank was an ineffective instrument for reducing 
imbalances* This was to a very small extent the case 
because it had not fully complied with the prescribed
lending formula. The principal reasons for its
ineffectiveness were that it did not have adequate funds
to offset the "disparity effects1 of the Non-Bank and the
fact that it had no control over the fund absorptive
achievement of its member countries* It was concluded
that in the light of those obstacles the Bank had been
asked to carry out a very difficult task indeed*
The Bank, as was noted in the second part of this
chapter, completely failed to make its member countries
industrially complementary. However, the Bank cannot
be blamed for that failure. This is because it tried
to sell the idea of rationalising production in certain
industries on the East African Community basis* In
addition, it brought together the producers of iron and
steel so that a formula for rationalising production
could be worked out* Nothing came from these efforts*
The Bank, as the observation by the Director of
its Operations shows, had no legal power to do what was
68beneficial to its member countries5
The East African Development Bank has no legal 
power to do what it may think is good for the 
East African Community. For instance, it cannot 
select and allocate industries or projects so as 
to avoid a wasteful duplication of resources*...*
This was due to the absence of agreement on the harmonis­
ation of industrial development on the EAC basis.
If the Bank's member countries intend to attract
finance from the rich countries, they will have to agree
on a regional development policy. It was learned
during fieldwork that both the World Bank and the
European Investment Bank were willing to give loans to
the Bank (EADB) to finance the East-African oriented 
69projects* The East African region could benefit if 
the production of regional projects were rationalised* 
The next chapter, which deals with the determinants of 
success and failure of projects co-financed by the Bank, 
provides guidance about which types of project might be 
successful in the future*
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CHAPTER 7
E F F E C T I V E N E S S  O P  E A D B  E V A L U A T E D  
U S I N G  P E R F O R M A N C E  O F  P R O J E O O f S
7ol Introduction
This chapter intends again to evaluate the effective­
ness of the East African Development Bank (EADB) in its 
primary objective of reducing industrial imbalances 
between Kenya and her two partner states in the East 
African Community. This time its effectiveness is 
assessed on the basis of the performance of the projects 
it cofinanced in its three member countries.
It was seen in Chapters 2 to 6 that the reduction 
of industrial imbalances between Kenya on the one hand 
and Tanzania and Uganda on the other, was a requisite 
for the political cohesiveness of the East African 
economic integration scheme. But it was also noted 
that balanced development among the members of that 
economic block was an unrealistic goal. This was 
chiefly because conditions conducive to economic growth 
were not evenly spread in the three countries. For 
example, it was revealed in Chapter 6, that finance 
absorptive achievements of the three countries were, 
for a variety of reasons, different. In this chapter, 
it will be seen that the performance of projects in 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was different because the
co-operant factors responsible for the success or 
failure of projects were not evenly distributed among 
those countries.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, how 
the different performance of projects the EADB cofinanced 
influenced its effectiveness as an instrument for 
correcting industrial imbalances, is analysed. Second, 
the factors which determined the performance of those 
projects are examined.
Two main arguments are advanced in this chapter.
The first is that the effectiveness of the EADB 
depended on it having influence over the determinants 
of performance of projects. The second is that even if 
the EADB had had the power to ensure that the projects 
it cofinanced would succeed, but was not in a position 
to determine the size of projects undertaken in the 
three countries, then it could not be an effective 
instrument for reducing industrial imbalances. Under­
lying this argument is an important point touched on in 
Chapter 6 concerning the unequal capacity of the three 
member countries of the EADB to generate investment.
7.2 The Performance of Projects
The word "performance" is used in this chapter to 
refer to whether or not a project had come into product­
ion and had been able to repay the Bank's (EADB) loan
from the proceeds of its sales. A project which came
into production and was able to repay the Bank's loan 
will be said to have succeeded. A project will be 
described as unsuccessful if the converse had happened.
The projects the EADB cofinanced are classified by 
this study into three; large, medium and small scale, 
according to the magnitude of investment in each 
project. A large scale project is defined as an 
investment proposal of at least shs. 50 million. A 
medium scale project had between shs. 20 and shs. 49 
million invested in it. And a small scale project was 
one in which between shs. 1 and shs. 19 million was 
invested.
It is important to explain, albeit briefly, how
the Bank selected projects to finance. It, like other
development-oriented financial institutions, waited to
be approached by sponsors of projects for loans.
But in the initial period of the Bank's activities, it
tried to identify projects which were East African
Community-oriented. None of those projects were financed 
1by ihe Bahk. .
Applications for loans which the Bank received 
were appraised from four angles. The first was the 
technical feasibility of a project. The second was 
whether or not the project would be so commercially 
viable that it would repay the Bank's loan and remain a 
sound business. The third was whether or not the
project would make significant economic contributions 
to the economy in which it was located. These 
contributions included employment creation, saving or 
earning foreign exchange, the creation of forward or 
backward linkages or both, and imparting of technical 
skills to some of the labour force. The fourth angle 
was whether or not the project had a satisfactory 
managerial set up. As will be seen later in this 
chapter, the managerial factor was of crucial importance 
in determining whether or not a project succeeded. A 
project which satisfied the four criteria, qualified 
for a loan. The maximum amount the Bank was permitted 
to lend was shs. 20 million.
7.2.1 The Performance of Large Scale Projects
The Bank cofinanced seventeen large scale projects 
in its three member countries. They are shown in 
Table 7.1 below. Eight of those projects were in 
Kenya, six were in Tanzania and three were located in 
Uganda. The number of successful projects were five 
in Kenya, three in Tanzania and none in Uganda. Since 
Kenya, the most industrialised of the three countries, 
had more successful projects than either of the two 
countries did, the conclusion one may draw at first 
thought is that there was a movement towards the 
divergence of industrial imbalances. It is
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wiser to examine the amount of investment involved in 
the successful projects in both Kenya and Tanzania 
before drawing any conclusion. This is done because 
a country may have a bigger number of successful 
projects than another and yet the amount of investment 
in those projects may be less than that in a country 
with fewer projects.
The total amount invested in the three successful 
projects, as Table 7*1 indicates, in Tanzania was 
shs. 216.2 million. The amount in the Kenyan five 
successful projects was shs. 1690.2 million (see 
Table 7«1 again). Therefore the conclusion reached 
above that there was a movement towards the divergence 
of industrial disparity between Kenya and Tanzania is 
now confirmed. The disparity, which the study prefers 
to call a gap in "effective investment11, is shs. 1474 
million. The term effective investment refers to the 
amount of investment in the successful projects.
In Uganda, as was stated above, all the three 
projects the Bank financed there failed. Therefore, 
the effective investment gap between her and Kenya was 
shs. 1690*2 million, the total amount in the successful 
projects in the latter.
It should be realised that it is not only the 
difference in the number of successful projects in the 
three countries which can explain the ineffectiveness 
of the Bank as an instrument for reducing industrial
imbalances. The size of projects in the three countries 
has to be taken into account. Table 7*1 shows that, 
on the whole, projects in Kenya were bigger than those 
in Tanzania and Uganda. To illustrate how this 
situation undermined the achievement of the reduction 
of industrial imbalances, it is assumed that all the 
projects in the table had succeeded. There would 
still have been a huge investment gap of shs. 1283.7 
million between Kenya and Tanzania in favour of the 
former. And the amount of investment in Kenya would 
have exceeded the amount in Uganda by shs. 1648.5 
million. As long as the Bank was not the determinant 
of the amount of investment in the projects in the 
three countries, then it could not be realistically 
expected to correct industrial imbalances between Kenya 
and the other two countries.
It is noteworthy that if the money from the Bank 
is excluded, the distribution of total investment in 
the large scale projects was as follows: Kenya had
generated 63.9 per cent while Tanzania and Uganda 
produced 23«7 and 12.4 per cent respectively. The 
Bank's funds are excluded because they have a "balancing 
element", which was explained in Chapter 6. That 
element, as was seen, was too small to offset the 
"disparity effect" from the Non-Bank sources of finance. 
In the present case, the Non-Bank sources in Kenya 
generated 40.2 per cent more than the Non-Bank did in
Tanzania, and 51*5 per cent more than the Non-Bank 
achieved in Uganda*
It is also noteworthy that due to the larger size 
of projects in Kenya, the Bank's contribution to their 
cost was, in percentage terms, the lowest in the three 
countries. Table 7*1, column 4, shows that the average 
contributions of the Bank were 4.1, 8*7 and 13.2 per 
cent in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, respectively.
Yet, in absolute terms, the large scale projects in 
Kenya received a bigger sum than similar projects did 
in either Tanzania or Uganda.
Since this chapter is mainly concerned with the 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the Bank from the 
standpoint of the performance of projects, the distribut­
ion of its loans to both the successful and the unsuccess­
ful projects must be examined. The Bank's funds lent 
to the successful projects in Kenya, (calculated from 
Table 7.1, column 3) was shs. 60.8 million. In 
Tanzania, the corresponding amount was shs. 25 million. 
This means that the difference between these two sums, 
shs. 35.8 million, represents a gap in effective 
investment in favour of Kenya. Because there were no 
successful projects in Uganda, the effective investment 
difference between her and Kenya was shs. 60.8 million. 
Therefore, due to the fact that projects performed best 
in Kenya, a fact over which the Bank had hardly any 
control, the Bank turned out to be an instrument for
reinforcing industrial disparities. This is, of 
course, contrary to what was supposed to happen.
The amount of the Bank's funds in the unsuccessful 
projects in Kenya was shs. 26 million, and the corres­
ponding sum for Tanzania was shs. 31 million (see 
again Table 7*1, column 3). In Uganda, since all the 
projects failed, shs. 60 million of the Bank's money 
was in the unsuccessful projects. However, because 
the Ugandan Government had guaranteed the three large 
scale projects, the Bank's loans were repaid by the 
Government. Therefore, the total amount of the 
Bank's funds in the large scale unsuccessful projects 
was shs. 57 million, or 26 per cent of the amount lent 
to the large scale projects. This was too high a 
proportion to write off and still hope to become an 
effective instrument for contributing to investment 
equalization between Kenya and her two partner states. 
As was noted in Chapter 6, the Bank had since-1975 been 
experiencing a shortage of funds to lend.
EADB's Claim to Investment Generation
The Bank (EADB), as may be seen from the quotation 
below, claimed to have played a part in generating 
investment :
It is important to appreciate that the role of an 
institution like the EADB should not be judged in 
the light of the size of resources that itself 
commits to projects but on the total investment 
which, along with other financial institutions, 
it has helped to generate. ^
The claim to f,the total investment, it (EADB) has
helped to generate” is not a valid one. This is 
because the EADB did not play the role of a merchant 
bank by organising the entire financing package of 
projects. Also, there is no evidence of it having 
helped the projects it cofinanced to obtain loans from 
other financial institutions. And, as was seen in 
Table 7ol, the EADB*s contribution to the projects 
averaged 4«1 per cent in Kenya, 8,7 and 13,2 per cent 
in Tanzania and Uganda respectively.
The Bank*s perception of its role as a catalyst 
in the generation of investments can in future be 
matched by practice in two ways. First, it would have 
to act, to some extent, as a merchant bank. Its 
success in this direction may very much depend on its 
reputation in the eyes of other lending institutions. 
Second, and related to the reputation of the EADB, it 
would have to ensure that it selected projects which 
have high chances of succeeding. Its contribution as 
a catalyst would be more significant among the larger 
scale projects than the smaller ones.
7.2.2 The Performance of Medium Scale Projects
The Bank (EADB) co-financed also seventeen medium 
scale projects in its member countries. Five of those 
projects were in Kenya, seven were in Tanzania and five
were located in Uganda. These projects are shown in 
Table 7.2 below. This table indicates that there were 
two successful projects in Kenya, three projects succeed 
in Tanzania and in Uganda only one project was success­
ful. As was explained in subsection 7.2.1, it is the 
amount of investment in the successful projects rather 
than the number of these projects which is a better 
indicator of whether or not there was a movement towards 
the reduction of industrial imbalances. However, 
knowing the number of the successful and the unsuccessful 
projects helps to show the extent to which either of the 
two types of performance was spread in each country.
The amount of investment in the successful projects 
in Kenya was shs. 56 million and the amount in similar 
projects in Tanzania was shs. 99.30 million. Because 
the amount in Tanzania exceeds that in Kenya, it means 
that from the standpoint of medium scale projects there 
was a movement towards a reduction of industrial dispar­
ities between the two countries. This movement is 
represented by Shs.43.3 million. However, if both the 
successful large and medium scale projects in the two 
countries are considered together, there is still a very 
big gap in effective investment in favour of Kenya.
A
It is represented by shs. 1430.7 million.
The gap in effective investment between Kenya and 
Uganda in the medium scale projects was shs. 30 million 
in favour of Kenya. This represented a movement,
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albeit small, towards the divergence of industrial 
disparities between the two countries. The divergence 
becomes enormous if the difference in effective invest­
ment shown by the large scale projects is added to the 
shs. 30 million. The total amount becomes shs. 1720.2 
million.
Because the average size of projects in the three 
countries was almost the same, the medium scale projects 
in Kenya did not play as significant a role in widening 
industrial imbalances between her and Uganda as the 
large scale projects did. The average size of the 
medium scale successful projects in Tanzania was bigger 
than the average size of their counterparts in Kenya. 
This means that there were two intertwined forces which 
worked towards the reduction of investment differentials 
between the two countries.
It is instructive to examine again the amount of 
the Bank’s funds which was involved in both the success­
ful and the unsuccessful projects. In Kenya and 
Tanzania, the amounts in the successful projects were 
shs. 12.50 and shs. 39 million respectively. Since the 
amount in Tanzania is greater than that in Kenya, then 
according to the principle of discrimination in favour 
of the former stipulated in the charter, the Bank had 
achieved its task in so far as the medium scale projects 
were concerned. The industrial imbalance reduction 
effect is shs. 26.5 million. It should be realised,
however, that the Bank’s effectiveness had been very 
largely accidental because it had no control over the 
determinants of the success of the projects.
The amount of the Bank’s money in the one medium 
scale successful project in Uganda was shs. 10 million.
As this amount is less than that involved in the two 
medium scale successful projects in Kenya, shs. 12.5 
million, it means that the Bank, in principle, had been 
ineffective as an instrument for reducing industrial 
disparities between the two countries. However, there 
was very little difference, shs. 2.5 million, between 
the amounts in Kenya and Uganda.
The Bank’s loans involved in the unsuccessful 
projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were shs. 20.4, 
shs. 39o2 and shs. 37 million respectively. A total of 
these amounts forms 61 per cent of the loans the Bank 
had lent to the medium scale projects. This was too high 
a proportion of the Bank’s funds to be tied up.
The solution to this problem, as was mentioned earlier, 
was to raise the number of successful projects. As 
will be seen in the next section, this is not something 
which the Bank on its own could bring about.
7.2.3 The Performance of Small Scale Projects
The largest number of projects cofinanced by the 
EADB came from the small scale class. Forty such
projects were financed. Eleven of them were in Kenya, 
ten were in Tanzania and nineteen were located in 
Uganda. Table 7o3 below indicates that ten out of 
eleven projects in Kenya were successful, while in 
Tanzania seven out of ten were also successful. The 
amount of investment in those successful projects was 
shs. 94066 million in Kenya and shs. 86.70 million in 
Tanzania. There was, therefore, a small gap in 
effective investment of shs. 7o96 million in favour of 
Kenya.
In Uganda, only one small scale project succeeded. 
The disparity in effective investment between her and 
Kenya was shs. 91*62 million in favour of the latter. 
This meant that there had been a movement towards the 
divergence of industrial imbalance between the two 
countries. If the three classes of projects are taken 
together, the amount of effective investment in Kenya 
is found to exceed that in Uganda by shs. 1811.82 
million. This divergence in industrial imbalance is 
consistent with the results in Chapter 5.
The overall disparity in effective investment 
between Kenya and Tanzania - when the three classes of 
projects are considered together - is shs. 1438.7 
million. This shows that the Bank participated in the 
process of the divergence of industrial imbalances 
between the two countries, which is the opposite of 
what had been expected.
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The amount of the Bank’s funds involved in the 
successful small-scale projects in Kenya was shs* 30.32 
million and in Tanzania it was shs. 42.46 million.
Because the sum in the latter is greater than that in 
the former, it means that the Bank’s loans to the small 
scale projects had contributed to the reduction in 
effective investment between the two countries. The 
balancing effect is shs. 12.14 million. This result 
must be reconciled with what was seen earlier that the 
effective investment gap was in favour of Kenya. If 
the amount of the Bank’s loans in Tanzania had not been 
greater than that in Kenya, the effective investment gap 
would have exceeded the shs. 7®96 million seen above.
The difference in the Bank’s loans to the successful 
projects in Kenya and Uganda (which may be worked out 
from Table 7®3) is shs. 27® 32 million in favour of the 
former. The Bank, therefore, was involved in the 
process of the divergence of effective investment. The 
obverse had been expected to happen.
It is important to examine from another perspective 
the amount of the Bank’s money which had gone to the 
small scale successful and the unsuccessful projects in 
the three countries. The amounts in the successful 
projects in Kenya and Tanzania were, as is shown above, 
shs. 30.32 and shs. 42.46 million respectively. This 
means that in the former 79 per cent of the Bank’s funds 
had gone to the successful projects, while in the latter
the corresponding figure is also 79 per cent. The 
Bank’s money in the unsuccessful projects is, of course, 
represented by 21 per cent. This was the least proport­
ion of the Bank’s funds in the three types of the 
unsuccessful projects in Kenya and Tanzania. In Kenya, 
30 per cent of the Bank's loans had gone to the 
unsuccessful large scale projects and 62 per cent had 
gone to the unsuccessful medium scale ones. The corres­
ponding figures for Tanzania are 65 per cent for the 
former class of projects and 50 per cent for the latter 
class.
With the benefit of hindsight arising from the 
above findings, it can be argued that the Bank should 
have lent a greater proportion of its funds to the small 
scale projects. This is because a greater number of 
them, in Kenya and Tanzania, succeeded than was the case 
for the other two types of projects. In future, the 
Bank should bear in mind this lesson of experience when 
it is considering projects to finance. More important, 
the factors which were responsible for the impressive 
performance of the small scale projects should be 
carefully considered. More will be said about this in 
section 7®3.
The importance of the Bank to its member countries 
from the standpoint of the small scale projects deserves 
to be commented on. Table 7.3 shows that the Bank's 
contribution to the cost of those projects was 34 per cent
in Kenya. This was a higher share than in the other 
two class of projects. The shares in the large and 
medium scale were 4.1 and 21.7 per cent respectively.
But in spite of its contribution being the highest in 
percentage terms among the small scale projects, in 
absolute terms the greatest amount had gone to the large 
scale projects. This allocation of the Bank’s funds 
may be justified on the ground that the large scale 
projects contribute more to the economy in terms of 
employment, net savings in foreign exchange and in 
structural transformation than the small scale projects.
In Tanzania also, the share of the Bank's contribut­
ion to the cost of the small scale projects at 46 per 
cent was also higher than its share of the cost of the 
other two class of projects. But unlike in Kenya, the 
small scale projects in Tanzania had received the least 
amount compared to the other two class of projects.
In view of the finding that the small scale projects had 
performed better than either of the other two classes, 
more funds should have been allocated to those projects 
if the Bank had been able to predict that outcome in 
advance.
In Uganda, the Bank's share of the cost of the small 
scale project was, as Table 7®3 indicates, 40.7 per cent. 
This was also a higher contribution than the Bank's share 
of the cost of either of the other two classes of projects. 
But in absolute terms the amount allocated to the small
scale projects ranked a close second to that allocated 
to the large scale projects (see Tables 7.1 and 7®3).
Due to the abysmal performance of projects in Uganda, 
one cannot say with a reasonable degree of confidence 
how the Bank should have allocated its loans to the 
three classes of projects. All one can say is that 
smaller projects are often easier to manage than the 
larger ones. And since, as will be seen later in this 
chapter, management is a very important factor for the 
success of a project, the Bank may consider to allocate 
more of its funds to the small scale projects in Uganda.
It was learned from an interview with the Bank’s 
Director of Operations that one of the considerations 
borne in mind when deciding on the distribution of loans 
was financial prudence. This term meant, inter alia, 
not putting too much money in a few projects; it was 
instead spread to many projects. It was, correctly, 
assumed that the probability of many projects becoming 
unsuccessful was lower than that of a small number of 
projects failing. An inspection of Tables 7®1 to 7® 3, 
columns 5, shows that the Bank carried out its policy 
of financial prudence for most of the time. The except­
ion was in the large scale projects in Uganda (see 
Table 7.1). But, as may be seen from Table 7®3, the 
Bank spread its funds most to the small projects in 
Uganda. This did not, however, guarantee a higher 
degree of success than in the other two countries where
the risks were less evenly spread. It follows from 
this that the distribution of funds to as many projects 
as possible, per se, does not ensure that they will 
succeed. Therefore, while financial prudence is a 
sensible practice, the Bank also needs to devise a 
method of ensuring that most of the projects it will 
cofinance will succeed. It can derive such a method 
from a careful study of the determinants of success and 
failure of projects. More will be said about this 
point in section 7®3.
7®2.4 An Overview of Bank’s Performance
It was seen in the previous three subsections 
that the Bank was an ineffective instrument for reducing 
industrial imbalances between Kenya and the other two 
countries. This was because Kenya not only had more 
successful projects than either of those two countries, 
but also the amount of investment in the successful 
projects in Kenya was greater than either in Tanzania 
or Uganda. It was also shown that the different sizes 
of projects - they were, on the whole, larger in Kenya 
than in the other two countries - explains the gap in 
effective investment between her and Tanzania and Uganda. 
This subsection brings together the performance of the 
three types of projects which is used to give an overview 
of the ineffectiveness of the Bank.
The investments in the three classes of successful 
projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are shown in 
Figure 7*1 below. The amount in Kenya was shs. 1841 
million. The corresponding amount in Tanzania was 
shs. 404 million. This means that there was a gap of 
shs® 1437 million in favour of Kenya; it is represented 
in Figure 7.1 by KT. The investment gap between Kenya 
and Uganda was shs. 1810 million and is represented by 
KU.
In order to understand how difficult it was for the 
Bank to correct industrial imbalances between Kenya and 
the other two countries, the results in the previous 
paragraph will be compared with what could have ideally 
occurred. The ideal would have happened if all the 
projects the Bank cofinanced had succeeded. This is 
shown also in Figure 7ol by the dotted lines superimposed 
on the actual results discussed above. The gap in 
investment between Kenya and Tanzania would have been 
shs. 1216 million in favour of the former. This is 
represented by Kg Tg in Figure 7.1. It should be 
realised that this distance is shorter than KT. The 
difference between the hypothetical and the actual 
situation which K g  T g  and KT represent is shs. 221 
million. This means that the investment gap between 
Kenya and Tanzania would have been less if all the 
projects in the two countries had succeeded. Neverthe­
less, a big gap in investment of shs. 1216 million 
would have been present.
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For Kenya and Uganda, the investment disparity 
under the hypothetical scenario would have been shs* 1617 
million or Kjj U^ in Figure 7*1. Since this is 185 
million less than the actual investment gap seen earlier, 
the conclusion is again that if all the projects the 
Bank had cofinanced in Kenya and Uganda had succeeded, 
there would have been a greater movement towards reducing 
industrial imbalances between the two countries than did 
actually happen* And if equality in investment 
between the two countries was to be achieved, shs* 1625 
million should have either been generated in Uganda or 
should have been allocated to her by the Bank.
But the Bank, as was explained in Chapter 6, did 
not have sufficient funds to lend from 1975 onwards.
It could not, therefore, lend the above sum to Uganda 
in order to equalize investments there with those of 
Kenya* The equalization of investment between Kenya 
and Tanzania would have required shs. 1216 million. 
Therefore, the total amount the Bank needed for balancing 
investments between Kenya and the other two countries was 
shs. 2841 million.
In chapter 6, it was noted that the Bank had not 
fully complied with the lending formula. The question 
which needs to be answered now is whether or not the 
non-compliance made a significant difference to the 
reduction of investment gap between Kenya and the other 
two countries. It will be recalled that at the end of
a five year period the Bank was expected to have 
allocated the funds it had in such a way that Kenya 
would have received 22*50 per cent of the total funds 
lent, and that Tanzania and Uganda would each have 
received 38*75 per cent of those funds*
The Bank lent shs. 549 million during the nine 
years, 1969-1977. If the lending formula had been 
fully complied with, Kenya should have received shs*123.5 
million and Tanzania and Uganda should each have been 
allocated shs. 212*7 million. The Bank’s ’’balancing 
effect” would, therefore, have been the amount by which 
the sum allocated to either Tanzania or Uganda exceeded 
the sum allocated to Kenya. The amount in question is 
shs. 89*2 million*
The impact this amount would have had on the 
reduction of industrial imbalances is illustrated by 
going back to the hypothetical situation discussed above. 
This is the scenario where all the projects cofinanced 
by the Bank had succeeded. In that scenario, the 
investment gap between Kenya and Tanzania would have 
narrowed slightly, from shs* 1216 to shs. 1127 million 
in favour of the former. This reduction in investment 
differentials is represented in Figure 7.1 by Kg Tg, 
which is a shorter distance than Kg Tg. The balancing 
effect is Kg Kg, which means that less investment would 
have taken place in Kenya because the Bank: would have* 
allocated less money to her.
The gap in investment between Kenya and Uganda 
under the total compliance with the lending formula scenario 
would also have been reduced from shs. 1617 to shs. 1528 
million. The reduction corresponds again to Kg Kg (the 
balancing effect) in Figure 7.1, while the disparity in 
investment between the two countries is represented by 
Kg Ug. It is clear that the Bank’s ’’balancing effect” 
in both Uganda and Tanzania would have been overwhelm­
ingly offset by the "disparity effect”.
This disparity effect was due to two factors, the 
higher number of successful projects in Kenya than in 
either of the other two countries and because the 
projects in Kenya, especially the large scale ones, were 
bigger than those in Tanzania and Uganda. The latter 
factor will now be examined briefly. Table 7.1 shows 
that Kenya had five projects in which the amount 
invested in each was over shs. 100,000. Tanzania had 
only one such project. All the three projects in 
Uganda were over that mark, but the total investment in 
them was shs. 1648 million less than that in the large 
scale projects in Kenya. Investments in the large 
scale projects in Tanzania was shs. 1284 million less 
than the amount invested in similar projects in Kenya.
The amount of investment in the medium and small scale 
projects in Tanzania was greater than that in the two 
classes of projects in Kenya. This meant that it is 
the large scale projects in that country which were 
responsible for the investment gap between her
and Tanzania.
The amount of investment in both the large and the 
medium scale projects in Kenya was greater than that in 
similar projects in Uganda. And the amount of invest­
ment in the small scale projects in the latter was 
bigger than investment in the former. However, due to 
an enormous gap in investments in the large scale 
projects which was in favour of Kenya, the overall gap,
as was noted above, was in favour of Kenya. As long as
5
the Bank was not able either to determine the size of 
projects in its three member countries or to lend large 
amounts to offset disparity in investments, it was 
unrealistic to expect it to reduce industrial imbalances 
between Kenya and her two partner states.
7.3 The Identified Determinants of Performance 
of Projects
This section intends to discuss the identified 
determinants of the performance of the projects which 
the Bank (EADB) cofinanced in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
The aim of this discussion is twofold. First, it is 
designed to shed more light on how unrealistic the 
reduction of industrial imbalances objective was.
Second, it should offer insights into what can be done 
to encourage industrial development in the three member 
countries of the Bank.
Factors which determined the performance of the 
projects fall into two categories, macro and micro.
The former affected the latter. For instance, the 
success or failure of projects due to high or low demand 
depended on whether or not an economy was depressed.
The effect of the macro and micro determinants on the 
performance of projects are discussed both in this 
section and in the appendix.
The main factors which were identified by the Bank 
as the determinants of the success of projects are shown 
in Table 7.4 below. The factors which led to the 
failure of projects, as will become clear in the course 
of the discussion, are largely the converse of the 
determinants of success. There is, therefore, no need 
to have a separate table and a detailed discussion of 
the determinants of the failure of projects.
The factors in Table 7*4 are ranked according to 
how frequently they were cited as being responsible for 
the success of projects. Competent management comes 
first. The Bank had actually singled out the managerial 
factor as the most essential determinant of success of 
projects early in its second five year term of lending 
activities. Competent management is characterised by
a high degree of accuracy in predicting conditions which 
will influence the performance of projects, the existence 
of contingent plans in case the unexpected happens, and 
a constant drive by the management to make a project a
TABLE 7o4: Rank and Frequency Distribution of
Determinants of Success of Projects
Factor Frequency
lo Competent Management 15
2o High Demand 14
3* Non-Tariff Protection and 
Government Assistance 8
4o Tariff Protection 7
5o Adequate Supply of Inputs 6
60 Price Rise 5
7o Constant Availability of 
Technicians 4
80 Exemption of Inputs from 
Import Duty 1
9o Diversification of Products 1
10. High Quality of Product 1
Total 62
Sources: Compiled from:
East African Development Bank*s Annual 
Reports. 1969-77, and from projectsfiles 
kept by EADB0
commercial success. These characteristics were learned 
from interviews with many officials of the Bank during 
fieldwork. The view that the managerial factor is of 
great importance is shared by the World Bank, It has 
remarked that the shortage of entrepreneurs (who may be 
managers of their own enterprises) in the developing
7
world, is a major obstacle to their economic development.
High demand, as Table 7o4 indicates, ranks second 
and was almost as frequently cited as the competent 
management factor. It should be realised that if the 
management team running an enterprise had been the same 
team which decided the project to undertake, then it had 
an opportunity to influence the success of the project 
it chose. This could have been done by selecting a 
project whose products were or would in the future be 
in high demand. It would not be valid to argue that 
without the benefit of hindsight revealed above, those 
who selected a project to undertake could not have known 
the great importance of the pressure of demand. Any 
reasonable person intending to set up a business has to 
try to find out how much he will be able to sell. And 
if the sales seem to be low and not likely to generate 
a reasonable return on the capital to be invested, then 
he may have to abandon that project and look for another 
one. The ability to estimate accurately the demand 
for a given product depends mainly on assembling carefully 
data on how much of that product has been consumed in the 
recent years, on the factors which have influenced that
consumption and on making a realistic projection of the 
future demand, A competent team of managers, operating 
in a predictable economic environment, should be able 
to predict with a high degree of accuracy the size of 
demand. A project in the appendix called the 
Panafrican Paper Mills (PPM) shows how the competent 
management and high demand factors made that project 
commercially successful.
In the third place among the determinants of success 
of projects are the non-tariff protection and the 
Government’s assistance given to projects. The non­
tariff protection took the form of banning of imports 
of competing products. The PPM project, mentioned 
above, received non-tariff protection for some years. 
Government’s assistance also included helping a project 
to obtain the necessary land, where that was a problem, 
ordering some Government departments to buy products 
of a given project and finding ways of helping projects 
in problems. Projects which were assisted in such 
ways are found in the appendix.
Tariff protection ranks next to the non-tariff 
protection and the Government assistance. Prom the 
point of international trade, tariff protection was 
better than a ban of imports. But the latter was a 
more effective method of ensuring that the products of 
a project would be sold. In other words, the banning 
of imports of competing products enhanced the demand
for local products more effectively than tariff 
protection. Creating high tariff walls, as was done 
in a number of cases for the EADB cofinanced projects,^ 
was a second best way of enhancing the demand for the 
locally produced goods*.
The availability of inputs is the fifth ranked
determinant of the success of projects. For some
projects which used imported inputs the availability
of such imports depended on whether or not the country
in which a project was located was faced with a foreign
exchange shortage problem. For those projects which
used mainly local inputs, their availability depended
largely on whether or not the project had adequate
9
working capital.
The price rise for the products of a project is 
ranked after the availability of inputs. The prices 
of a number of goods deemed to be essential were 
controlled .by the national government in order to 
protect the consumer. Producers of such products had 
to obtain permission to increase prices. The extent 
to which the price rise helped a project to become a 
commercial success depended on how high the price was 
raised. In one extreme case a price rise of nearly 
94 per cent was granted and despite a fall in sales 
in comparison with the previous year, greater profit 
was realised.^ This case illustrates a gross 
deterioration of the economic welfare of the consumer
and a trade off of consumer welfare for commercial 
profit. This trade off was discussed in chapter 3 
of this study.
Constant availability of competent technicians was 
yet another determinant of the success of projects.
Some projects had expatriate technicians who were 
employed on the basis of contracts for a given period.^ 
When the expatriates left, those projects which had not 
trained local people and which were not able to attract 
the type of technicians they needed from other sectors 
of the economy, had production interrupted. This 
reflected lack of foresight on the part of management. 
Technicians should have been trained while the 
expatriate staff were still around and should have had 
a reasonable time of working alongside the foreign 
technicians.
Exemption of inputs from import duty is listed 
among the determinants of success of projects. But, 
as Table 7«4 indicates, it was not a frequent determinant. 
This factor helped a project to become commercially 
successful by reducing production costs since imported 
inputs were duty-free. Projects which in the future 
are most likely to benefit from such a form of subsidy 
are the ones whose inputs will be mainly imported.
Those projects could, however, run into problems in the 
period of foreign exchange scarcity. The Arusha 
Pharmaceuticals in the appendix and Dawa Pharmaceutical
illustrate those two conflicting points*
Diversification of products helped one project to 
12become profitable• Instead of putting too much of 
one product on the market, a variety of products which 
were in some ways similar were produced. This seems 
to have been a sensible business strategy of matching 
supply with demand for different types of goods*
Such a strategy is most probably likely to be a product 
of the competent management mentioned earlier.
Finally, high quality of product was also identified
as one of the factors which contributed to the success 
13of a project* This factor is closely related to the 
high demand one in the sense that a high quality product 
will face pressure of demand provided that it is 
reasonably priced* Producing goods of high quality is 
important, especially for those projects whose products 
face competition from imports. In future, the Bank 
may have to bear that in mind when its staff are 
appraising projects to finance.
An important question which must be answered now 
is the extent to which the Bank controlled the determin­
ants of success of projects discussed above. It had 
hardly any influence over those determinants. In the 
light of this answer, it is inevitable to conclude again 
that the Bank was asked to carry out a very difficult 
task indeed, the reduction of industrial imbalances*
More reasons to back this conclusion will be discussed 
later.
Meanwhile, factors shown in Table 7*4 will be 
revisited with a view to suggesting ways in which the 
Bank could help to improve the success rate of projects 
it will finance in the future. To begin with, it 
needs to have a systematic method of assessing the 
determinants of the success and failure of projects. 
Insights gained from that can then be used to enhance 
the success of projects. For instance, it could care­
fully and critically assess whether or not there is 
adequate demand for the product to be produced. Given 
the importance of Governments non-tariff protection and 
its assistance to projects, it would be commercially 
strategic if projects were selected from those fields of 
economic activities which have been designated as 
priority areas. Projects from such areas would not 
only stand a good chance of being assisted by the 
Government, but they would most likely also be protected 
by a high tariff. If that commercially advantageous 
strategy is not conceived by the formulators of projects 
the Bank could advise them to consider it. Another 
factor which the Bank could ask those who come to it 
for loans, is to have an efficient team of managers to 
run their projects*
The effect of taking the four factors (demand, non­
tariff and tariff protection, Government’s assistance 
as well as efficient management) may be assessed in 
cumulative frequency terms shown in Table 7°4. These
factors account for 44 out of 62 cumulative frequencies
shown in the table. This represents 71 per cent of
the total number of times factors listed in the table
are cited as being the determinants of the success of
the projects cofinanced by the Bank.
The strategy mentioned above of selecting projects
to be undertaken from Government’s priority areas of
economic activity, may also facilitate obtaining
permission to raise the price of the product*
Constant availability of well-trained technicians, as
was argued above, is a problem which a competent team of
managers (capable of planning for the future) should be
able to solve. This team should also be able to
procure the working capital in both local and foreign 
14currency* These two additional factors, price rise
and availability of technicians, raise cumulative
frequency to 53 or 85 per cent of the total in Table 7*4*
Improving the quality of a product is also something
in the power of management to influence* And so are
the other two determinants of the success of projects,
15the exemption of inputs from import duty and the 
diversification of products, wherever that is applicable.
Some Determinants of Failure of Projects
It is clear that the linchpin of the success of 
projects was the competence of those who ran them. It 
must, however, be pointed out if the economic environment
in which they operate is a very difficult one, their
competence alone will not enable projects to succeed.
The economic climate in Uganda in the 1970s was so bad
that even an able management team would not have
successfully run projects there. To make matters
worse, the turnover of managers in many projects
cofinanced by the Bank was so rapid that those projects
16were virtually lacking sense of direction. N;o 
wonder, therefore, that almost all the projects in 
Uganda failed*
In Kenya and Tanzania where the conditions conducive 
to the success of projects were better than in Uganda, 
the most frequently cited cause of failure of projects 
was poor management. As was explained earlier, this 
factor is the converse of the most commonly cited' 
determinant of the success of projects cofinanced by the 
Bank. It was also explained above that a competent 
management team could have positive influence over many 
factors responsible for the success of projects. The 
opposite could be true if projects were run by incompetent 
managers. One characteristic of the projects incompet­
ently managed was the absence of proper planning and one
of the manifestations of that was inadequate supplies 
17of inputs* Shortage of inputs is, actually, mentioned
18as one of the major causes of failure of projects, 
liquidity problems and the scarcity of foreign exchange 
were the other causes of failure of projects. The
liquidity problem arose from lack of sufficient working 
capital. The scarcity of foreign exchange is a problem 
which was faced mainly by those projects which depended 
heavily on imported inputs. Before the Bank introduced 
a policy (in the 1980s) to provide loans for purchasing 
foreign inputs, a number of the projects it had co­
financed had their production targets reduced by lack
19of sufficient supplies of inputs.
Technical faults were also cited as the cause of
20failure of some projects. 3?he persistence of this
problem was due to the lack of well-trained and
experienced technicians. As was explained earlier,
that problem could have been avoided if those who ran
projects included in their plans how to ensure that
qualified technicians would be always available*
Finally, yet another major factor which led to the
failure of a project was the lack of power supply
(electricity) due to the inability of a parastatal
organisation to fulfil its duty of making power available
21in the region where a project was located* This 
project is an example of the importance of the avail­
ability of the co-operant factors (discussed in 
Chapter 3). The Bank should carefully consider this 
factor when it is appraising projects to finance.
Other less frequently cited causes of failure of projects 
which the Bank should not totally ignore are shown in 
the appendix.
Summary
This chapter set out to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the East African Development Bank (EADB) from a new 
perspective which is an extension to the perspectives 
seen in chapter 6. The perspective, as was seen, is 
how the actual performance of projects helped or hindered
the EADB as an instrument for reducing industrial
imbalances between Kenya and her two partner states 
in the East African Community.
It was found that Kenya not only had more successful 
projects than either of her partners, but also that the 
amount invested in those projects was greater than the 
amount invested in similar projects in Tanzania or 
Uganda. In other words, there was what this study 
called an "effective investment1 gap in favour of Kenya. 
It was also found that this investment gap was due to 
the fact that Kenya’s capacity to generate investment 
was much greater than that of either of her two 
partner states. This is clearly shown by the large 
scale class of projects. It was demonstrated that even
if the EADB had allocated the funds it had strictly in
accordance with the prescribed formula, the ’’balancing 
effect” arising from that act would have been overwhelm­
ingly offset by the ’disparity effect” from the non-Bank 
sources of finance for projects. This led to the 
conclusion that the reduction of industrial imbalances 
goal was unrealistic.
The chapter also discussed the main determinants 
of success and failure of projects which the EADB had 
cofinanced. Competent management was found to be the 
single most important factor which enabled projects to 
succeed in an economy with predictable conditions. 
Several other determinants of the success of projects, 
it was argued, depended on this type of managerial 
factor. The failure of projects was found to be due 
to incompetent management. It was argued that this 
type of management also influenced other factors which 
contributed to the failure of projects.
In future, the Bank could contribute more to the 
economic growth of its member countries than it has 
done in the past by doing the following. First, it 
could combine both the theory of project appraisal and 
the lessons of its twenty years of experience concerning 
the determinants of performance of projects to ensure 
that the projects it will select for financing have 
very high chances of succeeding. Due weight will have 
to be attached to the management factor. Second, it 
will have to increase its efforts in searching for funds 
to lend, especially funds carrying low interest rates 
(soft loans).
Notes
As was explained in Chapter 6, the Bank tried to 
sell the East African-oriented projects to the 
Common Market Secretariat, but to no avail. If it 
had succeeded, it would have had to raise capital 
to lend to such projects which were large scale in 
nature. This might have called for either an 
increase in the authorized capital of the Bank or 
for an increase in the amount it could borrow, or 
a combination of both.
Guaranteeing the loans to projects was consistent 
with the declared policy of promoting industrial 
development. The three large scale projects 
needed to be guaranteed because their products, 
steel products, cement and salt, were among those 
considered by policy-makers in Uganda to be 
essential for the country.
East African Development Bank, Annual Report, 1970, 
p. 1.
This amount represents the difference between 
effective investment (investment in successful 
projects) in Kenya and Tanzania.
The size of investment to be undertaken was 
determined by the sponsors of a project long before 
they approached the Bank for a loan.
East African Development Bank, Annual Report, 1974, 
p. 2.
World Bank (1972), World Bank Operations, (Baltimore 
Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 91.
Cases in print are the Panafrican Paper Mills, the 
Rift Talley Textiles, the Nanyuki Textiles and the 
C.P.C. Industrial Products. These projects were 
financed by the Bank.
9. The Dawa Pharmaceuticals in Kenya, the East African 
Kenaf, and the Mwanza Tannery projects in Tanzania 
were adversely affected by not having adequate 
working capital.
10. The project in question is the Tanganyika Dyeing
& Weaving Mills, See East African Development Bank, 
Tanganyika Dyeing & Weaving Mills, Report on 
Approved Projects (1980), p. 47.
11. The Mwanza Tannery project cited above had its
production disrupted when the experienced foreign 
technicians left at the end of their contract.
12. The project in question was in Kenya. It was
engaged in producing rubber and plastic products. 
It was appropriately called the Rubber and Plastic 
Company.
13. The project which benefitted from the high quality 
of its product was the South Nyanza Sugar Company 
seen earlier.
14. Foreign currency was not as scarce as many people 
have claimed. The East African Development Bank, 
the Tanzania Investment Bank, as well as the 
Uganda Development Bank had substantial foreign 
currencies to lend. The real problem was and 
still is how to utilize in the best possible 
manner those currencies so that later on it would 
be possible to repay the loan.
15. A project which illustrates well the advantage of 
utilizing imported inputs which were free of import 
duty is the Chef Magic in Kenya. It was also 
financed by the Bank.
16. This was learnt from the person who had been for 
many years the head of the Bank’s regional office 
in Uganda.
17. The J.Ko Industries illustrate well this problem 
of the absence of planning. See East African 
Development Bank, J.K. Industries, Report on 
Approved Projects, (1980J, p. 36.
18. The shortage of inputs problem is illustrated by
the East African Kenaf Industries and the Tanzania 
Bay Corporation. Both of these projects which 
were financed by the Bank were in Tanzania.
19o Cases in point are the Arusha Pharmaceuticals 
in Tanzania, Dawa Pharmaceuticals in Kenya.
20. Examples of projects which were adversely affected 
by technical problems included, the Lake Katwe Salt 
in Uganda, Nyanza Salt Mines and Eibreboard in 
Tanzania.
21. The parastatal in question is the Tanesco, a 
power and lighting company, in Tanzania.
CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Introduction
This study had two broad objectives. The first 
was to investigate the nature, causes and the dynamics 
of industrial and trade imbalances in the former East 
African Common Market (EACM) mainly from 1962 to 1977* 
The second was to carry out evaluation of the mechanisms 
which were designed to make the EACM more equitable than 
it had been in the past.
8*2 Summary of Findings
The main findings of this study are summarised on 
chapter by chapter basis below. The introductory 
chapter explained that policy-makers in Uganda, and 
especially in Tanzania, were so sensitive to their trade 
deficit with Kenya that that sensitivity became a threat, 
in the early 1960s, to the economic co-operation between 
the three countries. In that chapter, it was also 
explained that the root cause of the trade imbalances 
was the uneven distribution of industries among the 
three countries. Furthermore, that chapter outlined 
how instruments which were designed to make the
East African Common Market more equitable than it had 
been, were supposed to operate.
Chapter 2 tried to show the magnitude of industrial 
and trade imbalances from the mid-1950s to the early 
1960s as well as providing historical explanations of 
the industrial disparities in the EACM. The historical 
accident which involved the settlement of more Europeans 
in Kenya than in either Tanzania or Uganda was cited as 
one of the explanations. This group of people had been 
exposed to how manufacturing industries were set up and 
run. This know-how was used in establishing some of 
the earliest manufacturing enterprises in Kenya long 
before similar industries were set up in Tanzania and 
Uganda.
The second explanation was that the Government in 
Kenya adopted interventionist policies, long before her 
partner states did, and that facilitated industrial 
development in the country. This means that the 
industrial imbalances in the EACM can be explained in 
terms of the early - late starter framework.
Another broad explanation of the industrial 
imbalances concerns a number of factors which made Kenya 
a more attractive industrial site in the EACM. First, 
she had a bigger population of consumers with high 
purchasing power (European and Asian settlers). Second, 
the relative concentration of industries in Kenya (in 
comparison with Tanzania and Uganda) meant that there
were greater prospects for investors to reap the 
benefits of such a concentration of industries - 
technical interdependence among producers and pecuniary 
gains - by locating plants in Kenya instead of building 
factories in the other two countries. The third factor 
is that Kenya was the financial centre in the EACM.
The fourth factor is that Kenya had more facilities to 
service and repair machinery than Tanzania and Uganda 
had. Finally, the Kenyan Highlands which was the hub 
of industrial activities in the country was strategically 
situated to serve some of the high purchasing power regions 
of Uganda and Tanzania. The existence of a well developed 
(by African standards) transportation system ensured 
that those regions of the two countries were easily 
reached by suppliers in the Highlands*
Chapter 2 also tried to show a causal relationship 
between industrial and trade imbalances using the goods 
traded in the EACM.
Chapter 3 provided a theoretical framework in 
which this study is placed. Four aspects of different 
branches of economic theory were reviewed. The first 
was the customs union theory. While some parts of that 
theory were found to be relevant, it was noted that the 
distributional aspect had been inadequately dealt with. 
Locational theory was reviewed next. The stipulation 
that the choice of an industrial site in initial stages 
of economic development may be accidental, was considered
relevant to what had obtained in the EACM. The theory 
of circular and cumulative causation, the third branch 
of economic theory reviewed, was also considered to 
provide a good explanation of why industrial imbalances 
between Kenya and her two partner states persisted. 
Finally, litereature on capital absorptive capacity was 
surveyed. The theory that there is a close relation­
ship between the performance of an economy and its 
capital absorptive capacity was also found to be applic­
able to what was happening in the EACM between 1968 and 
1977. Chapter 6 demonstrates clearly through fund 
absorptive achievement the relevance of that theory.
Chapter 4 first critically examined instruments 
designed to make the operation of the EACM more equitable 
than it had been before. Second, it also analysed the 
changes in industrial development in the three member 
countries of the EACM as well as the changes in intra- 
EACM trade.
This chapter has several arguments and observations® 
On the Distributable Pool (DP), two arguments are 
advanced. The first is that the scheme did not offer 
a significant amount of financial "compensation” to 
Tanzania and Uganda for their trade imbalance with 
Kenya. The second is that the DP arrangement failed 
to tackle the cause of industrial disparity in the EACM. 
It will be recalled that industrial disparity was 
responsible for trade imbalances.
The Kampala Agreement which tried to distribute
evenly some industries, to rationalise production in 
some of those industries and to regulate intra-EACM 
trade was criticised for being, on the whole, a movement 
towards reducing the potential benefits from economic 
co-operation. It was, however, pointed out that often 
a trade-off of benefits for an equitable operation of 
an economic integration scheme is inevitable if such a 
scheme is to be politically cohesive.
Chapter 4 showed that the manufacturing sectors 
of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda expanded between 1962 
and 196?. It was found that the expansion in Kenya 
had been greater than in either of her two partner 
states. Therefore, industrial disparity between Kenya 
and the other two countries had widened. It was also 
found that Kenya’s balance of trade surplus with these 
two countries had greatly increased between the two 
years. This was not surprising given that the main 
reason why trade imbalances existed was the unequal 
level of industrial development in the three countries, 
and given that the inequality has become greater in 
196? than it had been in 1962.
Chapter 5 covered the period when instruments 
designed to bring about balanced industrial development 
in the East African Community were in operation. The 
period is 1968-1977. The instruments were the Transfer 
Taxes and the East African Development Bank. The latter 
instrument, as was explained before, is the subject of
extensive investigation in Chapters 6 and 7. The 
results of that investigation are outlined later in 
this chapter.
An a priori assessment of what the Transfer Taxes 
could realistically he expected to achieve are as 
follows. First, the system of protective tariff could 
not be expected to make a noticeable impact in reducing 
industrial imbalances because the presumption that all 
that was required for industrial development equalization 
was to protect nascent industries in the less industrial­
ised partner was wrong. It could have been foreseen 
that barring drastic adverse conditions taking place 
in the more industrialised partner state, it was likely 
to generate more investment for industry than the less 
industrialised partner. This was partly because the 
former was keen to promote industrialisation, partly 
because it had created several financial institutions 
to promote industrialisation, and also because it was 
pursuing a strategy that had enabled industries to be 
established and flourish. The strategy was to rely 
mainly on private enterprise as the main agent of 
industrial development. The less industrialised 
partners were also keen to promote industrial develop­
ment and had financial institutions created to facilitate 
the realization of that objective. But their strategy 
of relying on public enterprise as the principal means 
of industrialisation could not be expected to generate 
such amounts of investment in industry which would
match those in the more industrialised partner. This 
is because the Governments of the less industrialised 
partners simply had limited financial resources to 
channel to their industrial sectors.
Moreover, as was seen in Chapter 7, making finances 
available does not necessarily lead to projects being 
implemented and producing as had been expected. The
availability of finance will lead to ’’effective 
investment” if co-operative factors are also present. 
Such factors which included pressure of demand, govern­
ment assistance of various types given to projects, and 
the buoyance of the economy, could be expected to be 
more available in Kenya than in the other two countries.
All in all, the balanced industrial development 
goal was found to be, from an a priori evaluation 
standpoint, an unrealistic goal. Similarly, the 
Transfer Taxes could not be expected to be an effective 
instrument for contributing to an equal distribution of 
industries between the three members of the East African 
Community.
Chapter 5 also examined the actual changes in the 
industrial sectors of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 
between 1968 and 1977. It was found that for both 
Kenya and Tanzania industrial production had expanded.
The expansion in the former had been greater than in 
the latter, which means that the industrial imbalance 
between the two countries had widened in favour of Kenya. 
This was contrary to what the Treaty for East African
Co-operation expected to happen. It was explained 
that the industrial development divergence occurred 
despite the fact that production expanded fast in both 
countries. The divergence was due to the faster rate 
of growth of production in Kenya and because the increase 
in absolute terms was greater in that country than in 
Tanzania.
In Uganda, industrial production in 1977 was 
substantially lower than it had been in 1968. This 
was a result of the mismanagement of the economy by 
the Amin government. The contraction of industrial 
production in Uganda, while in Kenya production had 
risen, meant that the industrial imbalances between the 
two countries had also widened*
Chapter 5 further examined the changes in intra- 
EACM trade. First, it was found that by 1977, trade 
imbalances between Kenya and the other two countries 
were greater than they had been in 1968. This was to 
be expected because, as was demonstrated in Chapter 2, 
trade imbalance was mainly due to industrial 
imbalance and it was seen that between 1968 and 1977 
industrial disparity between Kenya and the other two 
countries had increased. Second, it was found that 
both Kenya and Tanzania increased their exports 
(Tanzania’s exports to Uganda declined after 1971 due 
to political animosity between the two countries follow­
ing the assumption of power by Amin). The expansion
in the intra-regional trade was consistent with one of 
the raison d’etre of an economic block. Uganda’s 
exports to the other two countries declined because of 
the general fall in production in the economy.
The Ugandan situation illustrates a point that for 
a member of an economic integration scheme to benefit 
from the existence of a large regional market, she needs 
to increase production to satisfy some of the demand in 
that market. The requisite for this is the presence 
of policies which facilitate production to take place. 
Such policies were lacking in Uganda and these were 
present in the other two countries.
Chapter 5 marked the end of analyses which sought 
to shed light on the nature, the causes and the dynamics 
of industrial and trade imbalances in the East African 
Common Market. The next two chapters examined in depth 
the results achieved by a regional development bank, the 
East African Development Bank (EADB) in its two major 
objectives, the reduction of industrial imbalances and 
bringing about industrial complementarity among its 
three member countries. It will be recalled that the 
EADB was supposed to reduce industrial imbalances by 
allocating more funds to Tanzania and Uganda than it 
allocated to, Kenya. So, this system of discriminatory 
allocation of finance was supposed to contribute to 
more investment taking place in Tanzania and Uganda 
than in Kenya, thus reducing the existing industrial 
imbalances.
Chapter 6 evaluated the effectiveness of the EADB 
as an instrument for correcting industrial imbalances 
between Kenya and the other two countries from three 
angles. The first was whether or not it complied with 
the prescribed lending formula. It was found that in 
the initial five year period it did. But in the 
subsequent four year period it did not. Taking the 
two periods together, it was revealed that the EADB 
deviated from the lending formula in a manner which gave 
an edge to the persistence of industrial disparity.
That means that Kenya had been allocated more finance 
and the other two countries were allocated less than was 
stipulated by the lending formula.
The second angle was ftthe fund absorptive achieve­
ment”. This term refers to the fraction of the funds 
allocated to each country which was disbursed to the 
country in a given period, five years in the first 
instance and four years in the subsequent period. It 
was found that fund absorptive achievement in Kenya was 
the highest in the three countries. It was explained 
that the EADB had hardly any control over the determin­
ants of fund absorption which were largely macro factors. 
Since finance absorption was highest in Kenya, it was 
concluded that the Bank could not be an effective 
instrument for reducing investment gap between that 
country and Tanzania and Uganda*
The third perspective from which the EADB’s effect­
iveness was evaluated is that of the Non-Bank
sources as being the main source of disparity in invest­
ment in the manufacturing sector of Kenya and the other 
two countries. It was found that the "disparity 
effect” arising from the fact that more finance was 
provided by the Non-Bank sources in Kenya than was the 
case in either Tanzania or Uganda, overwhelmingly offset 
the EADB1 s "balancing effect”. This term refers to the 
amount by which the EADB’s allocations to either 
Tanzania or Uganda exceeded the allocation to Kenya. 
Because the EADB did not control the amount of loan to 
projects provided by the Non-Bank sources, and since 
that was the principal source of investment disparity, 
it was concluded that the Bank had been asked to carry 
out a very difficult task indeed. This was particularly 
so because the Bank had not been given the necessary 
financial resources with which to effect that task.
Chapter 6 also showed that the Bank completely 
failed to make its three member countries’ economies 
complementary in industrial field. This was partly 
because there was no agreement between those countries 
on the harmonisation of industrial development in the 
East African Community. The other reason is that 
there were neither incentives for producers in the 
community to rationalise production nor was there a 
scheme to compensate those producers who would close 
down certain lines of activity in the interest of 
rationalisation.
Chapter 7 evaluated the effectiveness of the Bast 
African Development Bank in reducing industrial 
imbalances using the performance of projects it had 
cofinancedo This is a better measure of the EADB’s 
effectiveness because unlike the fund allocation, 
disbursement criteria, it shows whether or not a 
project under investigation came into production and 
was a profitable business*. The fulfilment of the 
latter condition, as was explained earlier, enabled 
the project to repay the Bank’s loan®
The projects the EADB cofinanced were classified 
into three in Chapter 7, large, medium and small scale 
projects* Taking all these projects together, it was 
found that both the number and the amounts of investment 
in the successful projects were greater in Kenya than in 
either Tanzania or Uganda. This meant that the 
’’effective investment gap” (defined in Chapter 7) was in 
favour of Kenya. Therefore, the EADB had been ineffect­
ive since, according to its charter, it was supposed to 
reduce industrial imbalances by allocating more funds 
to the other two countries. It was explained that 
there seems to have been a confusion between making 
available funds and those funds being ’’effectively 
utilised”* This term refers to funds being invested in 
projects which later on turned out to be commercially 
successful*
It was also found that Kenya had, on the whole, 
larger scale projects than either of the other two 
countries. This was another major explanation as to 
why the Bank was ineffective* Furthermore, it was 
found that the amount of the EADB* s funds involved in 
the successful projects in the three countries was 
greatest in Kenya. That went against the principle 
behind industrial imbalances reduction arrangement which 
was that less amount should go to Kenya and that more 
should go to the other two countries. While this 
outcome meant that instead of the EADB being an 
instrument for correcting industrial disparities, it had 
contributed to their increase; that institution was not 
blamed for this result. This is becausa it scarcely had 
any influence over the determinants of performance of 
projects*
Chapter 7 also examined a variety of factors which 
were responsible for the success and failure of projects 
the EADB had cofinanced in the three countries. Those 
factors included the level of demand for a given product, 
the quality of management, government assistance, tariff 
protection, price rise for a good produced by a given 
project, and the availability of inputs. It was found 
that competent management was the single most important 
determinant of projects’ success. Conversely, where 
that factor was absent projects failed*
Chapter 7 further revealed that because the Non- 
Bank sources of finance generated more investments in 
Kenya than in the other two countries, the EADB could 
not have significantly offset the tendency towards 
investment disparity between her and the other two 
countries even if all the projects in Tanzania and Uganda 
had succeeded.
8* 3 Future Policy Implications Derived from 
Study Findings
Policy-makers in Eastern Africa appreciate the 
potential benefits from regional economic co-operation. 
This is demonstrated by an agreement to create a 
preferential trade area in that region* If that 
economic integration scheme is going to work smoothly, 
it is necessary that the member countries’ policy­
makers have correct expectations of what might or might 
not be achieved. The lessons of experience of the East 
African Common Market are an important input which can 
help in shaping realistic expectations*
First, it will have to be realised that it is 
extremely difficult for all member countries to gain 
equally from the operation of an economic integration 
scheme. What each member should strive for is to 
exploit the presence of such a scheme so that its economic 
welfare will be better than it would have been if it had 
not become a member. Such exploitation could involve
inducing both domestic and foreign investors to undertake 
economic activities geared to supplying more than one 
member country’s markets. This, as was seen in 
Chapter 3, would not only increase employment of the 
domestic resources but it would also contribute to an 
improvement of a member country’s balance of payments 
position.
[The second lesson which the EACM’s experience 
teaches is that where there is a high degree of free 
movement of trade and where member countries* capacity 
to satisfy demand in the region differ, trade imbalances 
are most likely to occur. Provided that a member 
country’s exports are rising and provided it is not 
paying too high a price by importing too many high cost 
products of partners, trade imbalances should not very 
much worry national policy-makers *
The third lesson from the EACM’s experience is 
that it is extremely difficult to rationalise production 
in an economic integration scheme in the absence of 
two cardinal requisites. One is an agreement among 
members on how the productive capacities to satisfy the 
demand in the economic block will be equitably allocated. 
The other is to have an arrangement which will motivate 
producers in the integration scheme to comply with the 
system of rationalisation set by the representatives of 
the member countries.
Finally, the EACM’s experience shows that using a
regional investment bank to correct industrial disparit­
ies in that integration scheme failed. This was 
chiefly because making finance available to the less 
industrialised members was not a sufficient condition 
for industrialisation. Other co-operative factors 
needed to be present for that to happen.
The East African Development Bank (EADB), as was 
explained in Chapter 1, is no longer required to bring 
about a reduction in industrial imbalances between Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. The restriction that the Bank 
should finance only industrial projects has been removed.
It is free now to finance projects from the manufacturing, 
agricultural, infrastructural, tourism and any other sectors. 
The Bank is also expected to provide technical assistance 
to its clients and to play the roles of a consultant 
and an agent of potential investors.
The EADB should mobilize soft loans which it will 
in turn lend at lower rates of interest than those 
prevailing in the world and on the East African money 
markets. The expansion of the sectors from which it 
can select projects to finance implies that there is 
scope for the increase of its lending activities. It 
should also pay particular attention to how it can 
contribute to raising the success rate of projects it 
has or will finance. To achieve this goal, it may 
partly draw on its experience concerning the determinants 
of the success and failure of projects it cofinanced.
If the EADB succeeds, there is reason to think that it 
can attract finance from the World Bank, the European 
Investment Bank and other sources. Both of these 
institutions were actually willing to lend the EADB 
substantial sums in recent years. The EIB was keen on 
financing, through the EADB, East African-oriented 
projects. The EADB should increase its efforts in 
identifying Bast African-oriented projects particularly 
in Tanzania and Uganda, where such projects were fewer 
in the past.
A useful policy which the EADB could adopt is to 
attach a very heavy weight to the quality of management 
when projects are being appraised. The Bank’s client 
could be asked to have a contingent plan about hiring 
managerial services should the performance of a project 
be hampered by managerial incompetence. The Bank 
should also increase its vigilance especially for those 
projects which have shown signs of being mismanaged.
The Mediator for East African Community Affairs 
recommended that the EADB should play the role of a 
technical advisor to potential investors. In order to 
play that role effectively, the staff of the Bank need 
to be trained in project appraisal. This calls for an 
acquisition of theoretical knowledge as well as 
practical experience. A secondment of some of the 
Bank’s staff to institutions such as the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank could provide 
invaluable lessons.
The Mediator also recommended that the EADB 
should play the role of a merchant bank. This would 
be an important role to play but at a future date after 
the EADB has steadily built a reputation of not being 
merely another of those financial institutions in East 
Africa. There are some people who think that the EADB 
is not clearly distinct in its functions from national 
financial institutions such as the Industrial Develop­
ment Bank in Kenya, the Tanzania Investment Bank and 
the Uganda Development Bank* There is truth in this 
body of opinion.
One of the ways in which the EADB could make itself 
distinct is for it to be actively involved in raising 
agricultural production. Periodic shortages of food 
in East Africa has recently cost a lot in terms of 
financial and human resources. As an incentive for 
increasing agricultural productivity, potential clients 
could be charged lower interest rates (they could be 
given soft loans) than clients engaged in other economic 
activities. The assumption here is that the EADB 
would continue to obtain loans on concessionary 
interest rates.
In conclusion, it must be stressed that the EADB 
may only be able to play a constructive part in the 
economic growth of its member countries if national and 
international co-operative factors are present. It 
must also be reiterated that the potential benefits
from the operation of that institution are likely to 
accrue to a member country in proportion to the effort 
it will make to exploit whatever advantages the Bank 
might offer.
APPENDIX I 
List of Projects
Page
I* Panafrican Paper Mills 321
2. South Nyanza Sugar Company 326
3® Nanyuki (Mount Kenya) Textiles 330
4» Rift Valley Textiles 335
5. Aluminium Africa Limited 337
6. General Tyre (EA) Limited 340
7* Lake Katwe Salt Company 344
8* Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited 349
9. Arusha Pharmaceuticals Limited 353
10o EMCO Steelworks (K) Limited 358
11* Kibo Paper Industries Limited 363
12* C.P.C. Industrial Products 367
13o JoKo Industries 372
14* Casement Africa Limited 377
15* Mafia Coconuts Limited 382
16* Ugma Steel and Engineering 387
Corporation
The Performance of Selected Projects 
Cofinanced by the Bank
The nature and the performance of selected projects 
cofinanced by the Bank are examined in this appendix 
with a view to shedding further light on the effectiveness 
of that institution in its principal objective, the 
reduction of industrial imbalances between Kenya, on the 
one hand, and Tanzania and Uganda, on the other. The 
primary aim of the exercise is to identify the factors 
which affected the performance of individual projects 
and to assess the extent to which the Bank had a control 
over those factors* The outcome of the assessment 
should enable one to say whether or not the Bank had 
been efficient. The examination of the determinants of 
the performance of the selected projects is also expected 
to offer insights into factors which assisted or hindered 
industrial development in the East African Community.
The projects to be examined are drawn from the 
three categories, large, medium and small scale. The 
successful projects (commercially profitable) are 
discussed first, and those which failed are discussed 
next. This order applies to projects which were located 
in Kenya and Tanzania; Uganda is an exception because 
in the large scale category of projects none succeeded.
In some cases, the examination of the operation of 
projects is not as deep as the author would have wished 
because of insufficient data. Some clients of the Bank
did not comply with the Bank’s requirement that regular 
reports of a project’s performance should he sent to it.
The Performance of Large Scale Projects 
Cofinanced by EADB
The Panafrican Paper Mills
The Panafrican Paper Mills (PPM) project which was 
conceived in the late 1960s, was a large scale project 
designed to produce pulp and paper in Kenya. This 
project which was the first integrated pulp and paper 
plant in the East African Community, was initially 
estimated to cost K Shs. 250 million*'*' By the time 
it came into production, in the 1970s, it had cost 
K Shs. 355 million. This escalation of cost and its 
implication for the commercial performance of the project 
is discussed below later*
The plant was to be located at Webuye, 450 Km.
North West of Nairobi, a place where employment 
opportunities were scarce. The main raw materials were 
trees from the Government forests 145 Km. from the plant. 
It had been estimated that these forests had more than 
adequate trees to satisfy the plant’s demand. The 
designers of the project had, however, a plan of plant­
ing trees near the factory so as to reduce the transport­
ation costs. The theoretical capacity of the plant was 
to be about 48,000 tonnes of paper per annum*
The main investors in the PPM were the Kenyan 
Government, the Orient Paper Mills of India (OPM), 
the International Finance Corporation and the Finance 
Development Company of Kenya. Those investors formed 
a limited liability company to implement and to run the 
Panafrican Paper Mills* The OPM, which had a good 
record in running pulp and paper businesses, was chosen 
to manage the new company. The OPM was actually a 
shareholder in the Panafrican Paper Mills company.
The Bank was one of the minor sources of finance
for the project. Its total contributions to the
revised cost of the project (K Shs. 355 million) was
2K Shs. 13<>92 million or 3.9 per cent*
It seems reasonable to expect that with this low 
level of contribution to the cost of the project, the 
Bank’s influence over the running of the PPM was likely to 
be correspondingly low. The Bank had, however, a 
policy of making loans on condition that it would have 
a say in the management of the business of a loan 
recipient. There is evidence later in this section to 
show that in a number of times the Bank’s advice was 
not heeded*
The performance of the Panafrican Paper Mills was 
initially disappointing. To begin with, production did 
not start in the last quarter of 1973 as had been 
scheduled; the plant actually came into production in 
November, 1974. This delay was the main cause of the
cost overrun mentioned above. Even when production 
started, there were a number of technical problems which 
kept on interrupting production. These problems took 
about a year to eliminate. The result of those 
interruptions was low capacity utilization which, in 
turn, led to high unit costs.
When output increased later, the products of the 
PPM did not have adequate demand because there were 
plenty of rival imported goods. Although the Govern­
ment was the main investor in the PPM, it had not 
protected its company either through tariff or by 
restricting imports of competing products. The Govern­
ment refused to do either of the two things because the 
project had not come into production as had been planned 
and also because when production did start, it was 
sporadic. A major financial consequence of the low 
demand for the products of the PPM was a liquidity 
problem, which took about 16 months to solve. The 
company was also faced with the problem of rising costs 
of production which was partly due to the devaluation 
of the Kenyan shilling in October 1975 and partly due 
to the enormous price increases following the 1973 
Israeli-Arab conflict. The PPM burned oil as a source 
of power (the price of oil had quadrupled since 1973) 
and this item formed about 38.5 per cent of the total 
manufacturing expenses in 1975.
To solve the above problems, the management of 
the PPM took the following steps. First, it passed 
through the Industrial Production Committee (which, 
among other things, assesses industrialists* need for 
protection) and secured a loan on imports of paper. 
Second, it commissioned consultants to study how the 
marketing of the PPM products could be improved. The 
recommendations of the consultants were implemented. 
Third, it applied for price increases for its products 
from the Price Controller. A price rise of between 
10 and 15 per cent was granted in 1977 and the following 
year permission to raise price by 30 per cent was being 
sought.^ Fourth, by the late 1970s, the company's 
scheme to set up a school to produce well-trained 
technicians was now paying dividends. Production was 
so smooth that even the theoretical capacity had now
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been surpassed.
The above remedial measures changed the financial 
fortune of the PPM from being a loss-making business 
(K Shs. 2.99 million loss was incurred in the financial 
year 1975-76) to being a profit-making company. Net 
profit of K Shs. 1.02, 1.9, 2.5 and 1.6 million were 
made in 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 respectively.
As was stated at the beginning of this section, its 
primary goal is to identify the determinants of the 
performance of projects and to evaluate the extent to 
which the Bank influenced those determinants. It seems
reasonable to assume that the crucial factor which
enabled the PPM company to succeed was its experienced
management team* It took the right steps to solve the
company’s problems by going through the right channels
in seeking a ban on imports and in seeking permission
for the price increases. The task of saving the company
was made easier by the fact that the Government was the
principal investor in the project. Although at first
it was reluctant to help, it would have been surprising
if the Government, having invested heavily in a project
7
of very significant potential benefit to the economy, 
had completely refused to give the PPM the assistance 
it needed to succeed*
The commissioning of consultants to advise the PPM 
on an effective marketing strategy was also a correct 
step to take when its products faced a stockpile of 
competing imports. The need for this strategy became, 
however, less important after the banning of imports 
since the company was the sole source of paper products
Q
in the country. Before the banning of imports, the 
company had managed to secure a market for its products 
in the Middle East. This market was later to offset 
some of the loss of sales to Tanzania and other Eastern 
African countries which was caused by the break-up of 
the East African Community in 1977.
The Bank contributed hardly anything to the 
commercial performance other than the provision of a
small amount of finance. The Bank itself at the time 
of implementing that project did not have sufficient 
experience to enable it to combine its main function 
of lending with that of consultant (adviser). With 
now twenty years of experience, the Bank ought now to 
be in a position to combine the two roles in order to 
improve the rate of success of its clients.
The South Nyanza Sugar Company
The South Nyanza Sugar Company was set up by the 
Kenyan Government in conjunction with other investors to 
produce white sugar. The plant to produce this type of 
sugar was to be located in Western Kenya where plantations 
of sugar cane would be developed. One of the major 
attractions of this project was a large number of jobs 
which it would create. It had been estimated that 3000
9
new jobs would be created.
The capacity of the plant to be installed was
60,000 tonnes per annum and it was planned that at a 
later date production would be increased to 90,000 
tonnes per year."**^  The cost of the project was 
estimated at K Shs. 632.4 million in 1977 and the Bank’s 
contribution towards this cost was a loan of K shs. 20 
million^the maximum amount the Bank was permitted to 
lend. . Although it lent the project the maximum 
amount it was allowed, its share of the cost of the
project was only 3.2 per cent. There were seven other
sources of finance for the project. Of the eight
sources of finance for the South Nyanza Sugar project,
the Kenyan Government was the biggest, its contribution
of K Shs* 186.5 million forms 29.5 per cent of the
12total cost of the project*
The management of the South Nyanza Sugar Company 
was given to one of the minor investors in the project, 
the Metha Group of companies. This Group had had long 
experience in the production of sugar in Uganda and in 
Kenya. Its experience in the latter country does, 
however, indicate that its managerial competency was 
questionable* Policy-makers in Kenya ought, therefore, 
to have exercised thorough scrutiny with regard to the 
managerial record of the Metha Group before giving it 
the right to manage the South Nyanza Sugar Company*
The project’s initial performance was unsatisfact­
ory because of a variety of problems it faced. This 
was because there were no adequate supplies of sugar 
canes. The insufficient supply of canes inputs was 
due to the fact that no sufficient land on which sugar 
canes could be grown had been acquired* This reflected 
inefficiency on the part of the Government (the biggest 
shareholder) because it had power to acquire enough 
land.
The second problem is that the project was poorly
13
managed. The Metha Group which was chosen to manage
the South Nyanza Sugar project had, as was mentioned 
above, a tainted record in management* The Group had 
a sugar factory in Kenya, at Muhoroni, which had been 
badly managed. The Bank reported that the management 
of the South Nyanza Sugar Company (SNSC) left a lot to 
be desired in the initial years of operation. It was 
even alleged that the Metha Group’s business transact­
ions were entangled with those of the SNSC, with the 
result that K Shs* 3*5 million of the latter’s company 
could not be accounted for.^ This allegation, if it 
were true, would be surprising considering that right 
from the outset, the Metha Group as a managing agent
had been given attractive financial incentives to
15implement and to run the project.
Other problems which the project encountered were 
these: First, the price of sugar was low, the price
of this product was Government controlled mainly in 
order to protect the consumer* Second, the company 
had inadequate working capital because of delays in 
payments for sugar which had been delivered* The 
delays were due to the inefficiency of the organisation 
which marketed sugar*
Although commercial production started in January, 
1980, full development of the sugar cane estates was 
expected to occur at the end of the following year*
The Bank reported that the management of the South 
Nyanza Sugar project was confident of producing the
60,000 tonnes per year which the plant was capable of
in the near future. The management based its optimism 
on the fact that between January and November, 1980, 
32,191 tonnes had been produced* This output was just 
over 50 per cent of the annual output and yet production 
had taken place for eleven months. This modest capacity 
utilization was mainly due to the insufficient supplies 
of the sugar canes cited earlier. This problem was 
expected to be solved when the sugar canes on the 
estates had reached the desired maturity by December,
1981. The management was also optimistic because the
average yield per hectare was higher than had been
, 16 forecast*
The South Nyanza Sugar project later became a 
commercial success (a profitable business)* One of the 
principal reasons for its success is the high demand for 
the type of sugar it produced. The quality of its white 
sugar was the best produced in the country. Because of 
this attribute, it was reserved for export.
The satisfactory commercial performance of the 
South Nyanza Sugar project was due to the following 
factors. First, sugar canes were available in suffic­
ient quantities to enable the plant to operate at high 
17capacity. Second, the demand for the type of sugar
it produced, as was explained above, was high. Third, 
management of the project improved following the
criticism of the way the business was run.
The Bank’s contribution to the commercial success
of the South Nyanza Sugar project, apart from providing 
the K Shs* 20 million loan, was insignificant* It 
neither played a part in solving the problem of 
inadequate supplies of sugar canes nor did it have 
anything to do with the good quality of sugar the 
project produced. The Bank may, however, have contrib­
uted to the improvement of management through its 
criticisms of the way the project was run. But it is 
more probable that the management would have paid more 
attention to the criticisms from the Government than 
those from the Bank. Therefore, the fear of the 
former more than of the latter may have led to the 
improvement in management. The Metha Group had reasons 
other than losing the financial benefits associated with 
efficient management of the South Nyanza Sugar company. 
They had other business interests in Kenya which could 
be adversely affected by a bad record in management*
The Nan.yuki (Mount Kenya) Textiles Limited
The Nanyuki Textile Mills, later renamed Mount 
Kenya Textiles, illustrate some of the major problems 
which projects that were not commercially successful 
faced. This project falls in the categories of import- 
substituting industries. It was expected to produce 
textiles such as Khangas, Vitenge and drills for 
industrial uniforms* The first two of these products
were already being produced in Tanzania. There was,
however, still room for the output of textile products
18in the East African Community.
The project was to be located in northern Kenya.
Its main input was the locally grown cotton. The
estimated cost of the project in 1975 was K Shs. 102.75
19million and the Bank’s loan was K Shs. 20 million.
This amount of loan meant that the Bank’s share in the 
cost of the project was 19.5 per cent. The Kenyan 
Government was interested in the Nanyuki Textile Mills 
mainly because it was expected to create 750 jobs in 
the northern part of the country where employment 
opportunities were scarce. Since the major input for 
the project was local cotton, it was expected that some 
foreign exchange would be saved.
The project was such a commercial failure that it 
had to go into the hands of a receiver. Two main 
factors explain its failure. The first is inefficient 
management. This was characterised by the lack of 
planning for the company’s activities. The second was 
a fall in demand for the company’s products due to the 
depression of the Kenyan economy in the late 1970s. 
However, even during the period when the economy was 
buoyant (in 1976-77 when the prices of coffee and tea 
on the world market were high) the company had not 
produced enough to exploit the existing high demand. 
Corrective measures taken were to appoint a new
manager and to provide more finance to the company so 
that it could be rehabilitated. Of the K Shs. 164 
million which was required to enable the plant to 
operate smoothly, the Government contributed K Shs. 70 
million, or 42.7 per cent, the Industrial Development 
Bank (a Government set-up institution to assist
20industrial development) provided K Shs. 10 million.
Both of these contributions were in the form of equity. 
Therefore, the Government was directly and indirectly 
involved in the attempt to make the Nanyuki Textiles 
a viable project.
The company ceased to be under receivership in 
1979. However, it was not until towards the end of 
1980 that approximately 80 per cent of the plant had 
been rehabilitated. Production in that year was 1.6 
million metres of cloth. This was only 16 per cent 
of what the plant had originally been expected to produce. 
It was anticipated that once the plant had been fully 
rehabilitated in March, 1981, its output would be 
3 million metres per year. But even if this target 
had been reached, this would have been only 30 per cent 
of the output which was given at the time of seeking a 
loan from the Bank in 1975.
The above discrepancy between what had been planned 
and what took place was explained by the inefficiency of 
management. Another part of the explanation could well 
be unrealistic estimation of the output of the plant.
It is reported that if the factory were to operate on
two-shift basis, 3 million metres per annum would be 
21producedo And an additional shift would raise 
production by 1.5 million metres. It is also reported 
that the spinning section had second-hand machinery, 
some of which had been scrapped. In order to operate 
at say, 90 per cent capacity, six shifts had to be 
worked. This is, of course, unrealistic since most 
factories operating at very high capacity are on three- 
shift basis.
A noteworthy point is that while there was an 
inadequate spinning capacity, the weaving capacity was 
enough for the output of 13 million metres per annum.
This lack of synchronisation was attributed to a poor 
procurement system by the former management. This 
suggests lack of expertise in the running of an 
integrated textile mill. The lack of know-how in 
setting up this type of project is further demonstrated 
by the factt that the section dealing with finishing was 
too small to cope with the large installed weaving 
capacity.
A question which needs to be answered is the degree 
to which the Bank may be held responsible for the failure 
of the Nanyuki Textiles. To a very large extent the 
Bank may not be blamed for the commercial failure of 
this project. To begin with, it was not responsible 
for the appointment of the management team. Second, it 
could not influence one way or the other the state of the
Kenyan economy. As was explained above, when the
economy was in depression, the demand for the Nanyuki* s
products fell. Third, the manager of the regional
office of the Bank (EADB) in Kenya wrote to the managers
of the Nanyuki Textiles asking them to inform him how
22the company was faring. The management of the company 
seemed to be resigned to failure. Otherwise, they 
could have sought the advice of the Bank, or better 
still, they could have commissioned experts in integrated 
textile industry to study the problems of the Nanyuki 
Mills and to suggest solutions. It will be recalled 
that this is what the Panafrican Paper Mills1 manage­
ment did when their company was in problems.
The Bank can not, however, be totally exonerated.
It had on its staff many engineers who could have 
spotted some of the technical problems the company faced. 
Secondly, there is evidence on its files that it was
aware that the textile was .... "the sick industry of 
23East Africa". In the first instance, it should not 
have given the maximum amount (K Shs. 20 million) it 
was allowed to lend to a project in an industry it knew 
to be sick. In future, the Bank ought to study care­
fully the industries in which projects submitted to it 
for loans belong. This may help it in categorising 
a project as being a low, medium or high risk.
Commercial prudence would dictate that high risk projects 
(and these include the textile project such as the 
Nanyuki project) should not be financed by the Bank.
The Rift Valley Textiles Limited
The Hift Valley Textile Mill is another integrated 
textile mill in whose financing the Bank participated. 
The project was estimated to cost K Shs. 235 million and 
the Bank’s contribution towards this cost was a loan of 
K Shs. 3 million, or about 1.3 per cent of the total 
cost.^ Rivatex (which is the short name for this 
project) was expected to produce plain^dyed5and printed 
cotton fabrics. Its annual output was supposed to be
12.2 million square metres.
The project was to be located in Western Kenya, at 
Elderet. The Government was interested in this project 
primarily for two reasons. The first is that it was 
expected to create 900 new jobs in an area which had a 
low level of employment. Secondly, the project would 
use local cotton which meant that no foreign exchange 
would have to be found for purchasing the major input.
Rivatex started commercial production in 1977 and 
immediately ran into problems. It produced at such low 
capacity that its unit costs were high. This was due 
to the fact that the demand for the company’s products 
was low, particularly during the period when the Kenyan 
economy was in depression. There were stocks of unsold 
cloth. This meant that it would have been senseless to 
operate at high capacity level after overcoming the 
problems faced at the early stages of production.
The company was also faced with a problem of inefficiency
of the management*, As was argued in the case of the
Nanyuki Textile Mills, the inefficient management
explanation was a broad one which included insufficient
knowledge of how an integrated textile mill could be
successfully run. This argument is also valid for the
Rift Valley Textiles project.
The result of the problems Rivatex faced are
reflected by the poor commercial performance of the
company. It made losses in 1977, 1978 and 1979. The
25
cumulative total in the last year was K Shs. 110,380.
The Bank had no hope that Rivatex would overcome its
problems in the foreseeable future. The company had
failed to repay both the capital and interest which
were due in June 1979 and December 1978 respectively.
An important question which needs to be answered
is why the Bank was involved in two similar projects
which were in an industry that had been described as
the "sick industry of Bast Africa". The Bank had
considered both projects to be viable. It may be
excused for this assessment which turned out to be wrong
because of the confusion regarding data and information
on the demand for textiles in the East African Commun- 
26ity. Moreover, both the Bank and the sponsors of the 
project could not accurately forecast future changes in 
the Kenyan economy which adversely affected the company. 
In the future, the Bank would have, however, to bear in
mind the cyclic nature of the textile industry when it 
is approached for a loan by a potential client from 
that subsector.
The Aluminium Africa Limited
The Aluminium Africa project is selected as a case 
study because of the light it sheds on some of the 
determinants of the commercial success of projects in 
Tanzania. The Aluminium Africa company had been 
engaged in the production of a variety of products for 
a long time before it sought a loan from the Bank.
The A1 Af (as the company will be abbreviated from now 
onwards) was established in Tanzania in I960 by the
27Chandaria family business group mentioned in chapter 4c
This company had a foundry, hot and cold rolling mills
and a finishing facility for aluminium sheets. It was
one of those industries which were set up to meet the
East African Common Market’s demand.
The A1 Af needed to expand its scale of operation.
It required T Shs. 69c 2 million for the expansion.
The Bank gave the company a loan of T Shs. 8 million to
28meet part of the expansion costs. The company did
not have difficulties in raising the remaining finance
because its commercial performance record had been good.
29It had made a profit in each year from 1965 to 1972.
The main inputs of this company, unlike the four
companies discussed in the case of Kenya, were imported. 
One would be right to expect that in a period of scarce 
foreign exchange this company would be adversely affected. 
However, one would also have been correct to assume that 
since the company had no rival in the country and since 
it was manufacturing essential products for the operation 
of some key industries, that the company would have been 
put on the priority list for the allocation of foreign 
exchange. Therefore, no major disruption of its 
activities would have occurred.
The company was added, in 1973, to the list of 
industries considered to be "major means of production" 
in the sense of the Arusha Declaration of 1967. The 
Al Af became partly a Public Corporation and partly 
remained in the hands of its original owners. The 
Treasury held 60 per cent of the share capital of the 
company and the remaining shares were held by a private 
investment company called the Mabati, which was in turn 
owned by the Chandarias. The original owners continued 
to manage the company. This seems to have been a 
correct decision since the company had been efficiently 
managed as is reflected by its persistent profitable 
performance.
The company continued to perform satisfactorily. 
Between 1973 and 1976, profit was made in each year; 
in the last one, net profit after tax was T Shs. 21.97 
million.^ The company attributed this good performance
to aggressive marketing tactics and to the diversifi­
cation of the existing production lines which the 
expansion had made possible. There were several other 
explanations for the company’s success.
First, as far back as 1969, the East African Common 
Market’s governments had agreed to maintain a high
31common external tariff on the products of the A1 Af.
This protection was still in operation in the 1970s.
Second, the company was handed to a professional group
of managers called the Comcraft Services of London.
Third, there was a reduction in import duty paid on
inputs, the duty dropped from 35 per cent ad valoreum
32to 10 per cent. Finally, the company was allowed to
33increase the price of its products by 30 per cent.
The importance of this big price rise is demonstrated
by the fact that production in 1980 was 37,205 tonnes
or 78 per cent of what it had been the previous year,
and yet profit was T Shs. 56.94 million in 1980 compared
34. ~to T Shs. 42.8 million in 1979* The Bank had no
influence over the above determinants of the profitable 
performance of the company.
The General Tyre of East Africa Limited
The operation of the General Tyre Company offers 
farther insight into the determinants of commercial 
success of projects., The choice of this company for 
examination is based on two considerations. The first 
is that the General Tyre, being one of those "East 
African Industries" that the Kampala Agreement (seen in 
Chapter 4) dealt with, deserves attention in order to 
learn something about rationalisation of industrial 
production in the East African Community. The second 
consideration is that the performance of this company 
was one of the best of the projects the Bank cofinanced, 
and therefore throws light on the factors which led to 
that success.
The General Tyre Company was formed in Tanzania
in order to produce tyres, tubes and accessories for
vehicles in Eastern Africa. It was envisaged that its
plant which was to be set up in Arusha would satisfy
about 60 per cent of the demand in Kenya, Tanzania and 
35Uganda. There were also plans, at the outset of the 
formation of the company, to export its products to 
Rwanda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Malawi and other Eastern 
Africa areas later in the life of the project.
The project was initiated by the National Develop­
ment Corporation (an institution set up by the Govern­
ment and charged with promoting the economic development
of the country) and a U.S.A. company, the General Tire
and Rubber Company,, The NDC held 74 per cent of the
company’s (GTEA) shares and the remainder was held by 
3 6the GT & R. It was estimated that the project would
cost T Shs. 85 million. The Bank’s contribution to
this cost was a loan of T Shs. 8 million, which was given 
37in 1969® And production was expected to start in
1971. Output when the plant was operating three shifts
was supposed to be 145,000 tyres. This level of
production was to be maintained from 1972 to 1975o
The company was managed by the General Tire which had
long experience in the production of tyres worldwide.
The above output fell far below demand. Motor
car tyre consumption in the Bast African Community in
1970, 1971 and 1972 was 421,000, 491,000 and 458,000
3 8units for the three years respectively. In 1971, the 
three EAC countries’ shares of the total consumption were 
52.5 per cent for Kenya, 29o3 per cent for Uganda, and 
18.1 per cent for Tanzania. By 1972, Kenya’s share
had dropped very slightly to 51.5 per cent, Tanzania’s 
had substantially increased to 33«6 per cent and 
Uganda’s share had drastically fallen to 14®8 per cent. 
Since the consumption of tyres was highest in Kenya, if 
there had been no interference with the market forces in 
order to redress industrial imbalances in the East 
African Community, it is probable that a foreign 
investor would have located a plant where the demand
was greatest. However, since the supply fell far 
short of demand, several plants of the size of the 
Tanzanian one could have operated in the three countries. 
Note that even if the target of 145,000 tyres per annum 
had been met, this would have satisfied only 29.5 per 
cent of the demand in the EAC in 1971, and 31*6 per cent 
in 1972. This was far short of the 60 per cent demand 
which the company had forecast that its production would 
satisfy.
The plant came into production late in 1970, 
which was inside the schedule. It faced no initial 
problems such as those seen above in the case of the 
Panafrican Paper Mills. In 1973, the company decided 
to expand to satisfy the high demand for tyres in the 
East African Community. Production was expected to be 
raised to 236,000 units in 1974 and was to be stepped 
up again to 294,000 units by 1977o The company 
sought and obtained a loan of T Shs. 8 million for the 
expansion which was estimated to cost T Shs. 13o32 
million.^
The expansion was carried oat smoothly and in 
1976 production had gone up to 260,954 units.^ The 
company made a profit in that year as it had in the 
previous years. The Tanzanian market absorbed 68.9 per 
cent of the 1976 production and the remaining percentage 
was exported. Kenya, despite having set up a tyre plant 
in collaboration with the Pirestone of the U.S.A.,
imported 52,403 tyres from the General Tyres company.^ 
This meant that 6406 per cent of the company’s exports 
went to Kenya. Uganda bought 16,295 units from the 
General Tyre in 1976, which forms 20 per cent of total 
exports. Clearly, Kenya and Uganda were important 
markets for Tanzania since they accounted for 84.6 per 
cent of the total exports. However, it is important 
to stress that while the General Tyre was an East 
African Community oriented firm (95.2 per cent of its 
output was consumed in the three member countries) 
Tanzania was the most important market.
The General Tyre Company was a commercial success 
for three principal reasons. Pirst, as was noted 
above, the demand for tyres exceeded the company’s 
capacity to satisfy that demand. As long as the 
quality of the GTEA tyres was reasonable (and it was) 
and as long as their prices were competitive (which they 
were because of tariffs on imports of rival products), 
whatever quantity put on the market would be sold.
Second, and more important, the company’s activities 
were in the hands of the General Tire which had had 
long experience in tyre production in many parts of the 
world. The importance of efficient management as one 
of the crucial determinants of the success of a company, 
was stressed in Chapter 7. A good management team 
will do all it can to exploit the existing demand.
The third factor which facilitated the commercial success
of the company was the arrangement between this company 
and the General Tire of U.S.A. to give raw material 
credit facility to the Arusha plant. This meant that 
the danger of the plant coming to a standstill because 
of lack of inputs was eliminated.
The General Tyre Company is a good example of how 
in a mixed but predominantly socialist economy, a public 
enterprise may harness the expertise of private foreign 
company to produce a good which is needed. Given the 
high demand for many consumer goods in Tanzania and 
given the failure by many producers to exploit that 
demand, the G.T.E.A. is a source of important lessons.
The Lake Katwe Salt Company
The Lake Katwe Salt Company is one of the three 
large scale projects which the Bank cofinanced in 
Uganda. Like the other two projects, it was a 
commercial failure. The examination of the nature and 
the reasons for the failure of this project provide 
lessons to potential investors in a similar line of 
business.
The project was designed to produce salt in the 
Western part of Uganda using mainly salty water of the 
Lake Katwe. The Ugandan Government was interested in 
this project for three principal reasons. Pirst, it 
was expected to contribute to the expansion of
industrial production to which the Government had, rather
belatedly, come to attach much importance. Second,
the project was not only expected to save the country
foreign exchange through a reduction of imports of
salt, but it was also supposed to earn the country
foreign exchange through exporting the by-products such
as potassium chloride, which was needed for increasing
43sugar cane yield . Third, the project was supposed
44to create jobs, estimated at 210.
The cost of this project was put at U Shs. 184.14
million in 1975 and the Bank contributed U Shs. 20 
45million. The capacity of the plant, when fully
operational, was 50,000 tons per year. This would have
been more than adequate for domestic demand because the
average annual consumption of salt in Uganda was about
46 __28,400 tonnes per annum. The surplus quantity could 
have been exported to Zaire, near whose border the 
project was located, or to Rwanda and Burundi, which 
are also close.
The project has been a failure for three broad 
reasons, political, technical and financial. The 
political hostility towards European "capitalists” 
during the Amin Government made it difficult for a West 
German firm to discharge its duties as the main 
contractor of the project. The progress which had been 
made by 1979 was to some extent wasted when the Germans 
working on the project had to flee the country due to
a civil war. By the time they returned, eight months 
later, some machine parts needed repairing. Curiously, 
a short time after returning, the contractors wanted to 
conduct test-runs, a thing which a firm of consultants 
hired by the Government on behalf of the Lake Katwe
A  *1
Company objected to. The ground for objection was 
that the main process line was not ready. The testing 
took place and proved the consultants right because 
serious problems were exposed.
The Government ignored these findings and pressed 
for the plant to be commissioned in June, 1980. With 
this phase over, it seems that the main contractor 
assumed his obligations to be over and the German staff 
had left by the end of the year. But the plant was not 
operating. The desire for the contractor to pull out 
may be explained by the difficulties the foreign staff 
had experienced in Uganda and by the fact that the 
project had exceeded the three to four years period 
which is how long its implementation had been expected 
to last. The Government’s pressure to have the project 
commissioned hurriedly is hard to understand. It may 
be that the Government thought that it could save 
itself further financial assistance to the project by 
bringing it into production as soon as possible. The 
opposite was to happen.
Between June and December 1980, when the plant was 
idle, machine parts were spoilt. The estimates of the 
cost of the project at the latter date was U Shs. 300,
and more funds were required to repair the spoilt parts
and to solve other problems0 The underestimation of
costs, as Little and Mirrlees (1974) point out, is a
48common problem in the developing countries. This 
is likely to be particularly so in economies such as 
the Ugandan one where undertaking most forms of economic 
activities involved a lot of uncertainties«
Some of the uncertainties are illustrated by 
specific problems the Lake Katwe Salt project facedo 
Several vehicles of the company were "grabbed” by the 
Ugandan Government armed forces. There were frequent 
power failures during the test runs. There is no 
reason to believe that this power failure would not 
have disrupted the running of the project. There was 
another type of uncertainty which could not have been 
foreseen. This was the development of algae in the 
water, which the plant was going to use. The water 
treating plant that had been installed had no facility 
to remove the algae.
The project faced two other major problems, both 
of which were of technical nature. First, there were 
major faults in the crystallising and separating systems. 
Because of these faults, the final product contained 
impurities. There was a divided opinion about the 
cause of those faults. Both the managers of the project 
and the Bank believed that the fault was a technical one. 
Those who installed the plant, on the other hand, argued
that the lack of skilled technicians was to blame®
The author is inclined to side with the experts who set 
up the plant, for the following reasons. It is common 
in the less developed world for projects not to operate 
smoothly soon after commissioning because even the well- 
trained staff take time to become used to the machines. 
It will be recalled that in the case of the Panafrican 
Paper Mills, (which was a great commercial success) it 
took a year for the machines to run smoothly.
The second technical problem was corrosion in 
some heat exchangers and pumps in salty water. The 
solution was to eliminate the gases which caused the 
corrosion. No solution had been found for this 
problem, because the cause was still unknown. These 
problems should have been anticipated by the expert 
contractors if they were not unique to the Lake Katwe 
Salt project. If they could not be anticipated, they 
should have been solved fast enough before they had a 
devastating effect on the rest of the machines.
Once again a question which must be now answered 
is whether or not the Bank could have helped this 
project to succeed. The answer seems to be that it 
could not have greatly helped. To begin with, although 
the Bank had trained engineers, none of them had 
practical experience in salt production. Second, the 
Bank did not go to inspect the progress of project 
implementation to ensure that the job was being done
properly. Third, both the political unrest and the 
difficult economic climate in Uganda which greatly 
contributed to the delay in the implementation of the 
Lake Katwe Salt project, were beyond the power of the 
Bank to influence. The Bank is most likely to continue 
to be powerless over the third factor. Therefore, the 
extent to which it can contribute to the economic growth 
of its member countries will depend on whether or not 
the conditions conducive to the success of projects are 
present in the economy where the project is located.
The Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited
The study of the operation of the Mtibwa Sugar 
Estate company shows how the Tanzanian Government’s 
assistance, in conjunction with a capable firm of 
international managing agents, and pressure of demand, 
transformed this company from being a "sick" project 
into being a promising business venture. But this took 
about 8 years to happen.
The Mtibwa Sugar Estate (from now onwards to be 
referred to as the M. S.E. ) was set up by Greek settlers 
in Tanzania in 1961, and was located 65 miles from 
MorogOro, on the Morogoro - Korogwe road. This is not 
far from Dar-es-Salaam. The factory at the Estate had 
been neglected. In anticipation of a fast growth of 
demand for sugar in Tanzania, the Madhvani Group,
(which already had a huge sugar estate in Uganda),
49bought the M.S.E. in 1966* The new owner intended
to rehabilitate the plant so as to raise the production
5 0of sugar from 7000 to 45,000 tons per annum,. If this
target had been met, in 1970 the M*S.E. would have
satisfied 44o8 per cent of the national consumption of 
51sugar* Considering that there were two other sugar
estates in Tanzania, the M.S.E. would have made a major
contribution with that 6i fold expansion in output*
This scale of expansion also required a large
investment, T Shs* 69 million, and the Bank*s share in
this cost was a loan of T Shs. 10 million given in 
521969o Even before the expansion was completed, the 
National Agricultural and Food, a parastatal, was 
approached by the Madhvani Group and asked to become an 
equal partner* It agreed in 1970* This was most 
probably a calculated move on the part of the Madhvani 
Group which was designed to facilitate accessibility to 
various forms of Government assistance that would make 
the project commercially profitable*
The sugar canes which the plant had used had come 
from the estate itself and from the outgrowers, the two 
sources had contributed 60 to 70 and 30 to 40 per cent 
respectively of the canes required* Because of the 
inadequate rainfall, it was considered necessary to 
irrigate the estate if the expanded production was to 
be achieved. The owners of the M.S.E. were prepared
to incur the expense of establishing irrigation 
facilities on condition that the Government waived off
excise duty which was said to constitute 30-40 per cent
53of the company’s total operating expenses,. The
irrigation facilities were not installed in the early 
and mid 1970s because the tax was not waived.
In the late 1970s irrigation was introduced. As
54a result, output rose from 7 to 15«5 tons. It will 
be recalled, however, that way back in 1969 it had been 
estimated that after modernising the plant, 45,000 tons 
would be produced in each year. In 1980, output was 
up again to 25,119 tons, which was still only 55<>8 per 
cent of the original production target. However, this 
was a remarkable achievement since the company had 
never in its history produced that much sugar.
The other factors which had led to such an increase 
in output were the reconditioning of the machinery and 
the improvisation to manufacture spare parts when they 
could not be imported because of the scarcity of the 
foreign exchange. It was also reported that the 
factory engineers and technicians were committed to the
c c
success of the factory. This was largely attribut­
able to the introduction of an efficient firm of inter­
national management services.
The pressure of demand for sugar, as this quotation 
shows, meant that the potential for the commercial 
success of the M.S.E. was bright (providing the costs of 
operating were kept low). "Since local demand is higher
than locally available sugar, there are no selling 
56problems’'.
The Government was directly involved in negotiations 
which led to a loan that made the irrigation possible. 
Therefore, the Madhvani Group's calculation paid off.
It is important to recall that the Kenyan Government 
itself tried to help the South Nyanza Sugar Company and 
that that help enabled the company to succeed. The 
Mtibwa Sugar Estate seemed to be on the road to success 
but it had taken too long. In this connection, the 
author learned from the Director of the Bank's operat­
ions that, on the whole, projects with problems in 
Kenya tended to take a shorter time to find solutions 
than projects in Tanzania. This, coupled with the 
fact that Kenya had a higher rate of success of projects 
than either Tanzania or Uganda, made a nonsense of the 
balanced industrial development objective.
The Bank did not contribute anything to the improve­
ment of the M. S.E. fs performance. The Bank may, 
however, be playing a useful role in the future if it 
advised its clients to set up contingent funds, which 
could be in a form of loans, in case the need for 
services of managing agents might be required.
The Arusha Pharmaceuticals limited
The Arusha Pharmaceuticals Company is one of the 
projects cofinanced by the East African Development Bank 
which was a commercial failure. The study of the 
operation of this project offers insightsinto the 
negative effects of the scarcity of foreign exchange, the 
inconsistency between the stated government policy of 
promoting domestic industries and what actually took 
place.
The National Development Corporation (NDC) initiated
the idea of substituting many of the human and veterinary
drugs. The Arusha Pharmaceuticals was expected to
produce about 40 different drugs. The NDC invited a
Finnish public enterprise pharmaceutical company to set
up and manage the production of that assortment of 
57drugs. The plant was to be located in Arusha, and it 
was assumed that when it began to operate (one shift) it
CO
would produce drugs worth T Shs. 115.7 million.
Production was scheduled to start in January, 1979.
The raw materials for the project would all be
imported. It was estimated that the value of the raw
material to be imported in 1979 and 1980 would be
59T Shs. 12.9 and 18.3 million respectively. The
estimate for the entire cost of the project in 1976 was
put at T Shs. 63.7 million and the Bank lent the Arusha
60Pharmaceuticals T Shs. 16 million. The economic
benefits of this project were the expected creation of 
262 new jobs and an annual saving of T Shs. 18.6 million 
of foreign exchange through a reduction in the import 
bill of foreign drugs. The Government was interested 
in the project and this is shown by the fact that it 
guaranteed the loan the APL obtained from the Bank.
Production did not start in January 1979 as had been 
expected, instead it started in June 1980. This delay 
is largely to be explained by the fact that neither the 
NDC nor the Finnish company had had experience in 
implementing a pharmaceutical project in the conditions 
of Tanzania. At the end of 1980, drugs worth T Shs.
8.2 million had been produced. This was only 7.1 per 
cent of the anticipated production.
This poor performance was due to the following 
factors. First, the project did not have adequate 
raw materials because of the scarcity of foreign 
exchange. For example, in 1980, the management of 
this project applied for T Shs. 8.5 million to the Bank 
of Tanzania and it was allocated only T Shs. 1.5 million. 
Note that the amount applied for was 46.4 per cent of 
the budget for imports of the raw material seen above.
The project was allocated even less amount in 1981.
An application for T Shs. 13 million was lodged with 
the Bank of Tanzania, but only T Shs. 1 million was 
approved. While it is understandable that the country 
was faced with a severe foreign exchange problem, the
Government could have tried to help this important 
industry to obtain the necessary foreign exchange from 
other sources. For instance, with the Government's 
guarantee, a loan could have been obtained from capital 
markets in the world. Given the importance of healthy 
people to the proper functioning of the economy and 
given the priority the Government attached to the 
structural transformation of the economy through 
industrialisation, arrangements should have been made 
by the Government to secure the T Shs. 8.5 and T Shs.
13 million the company required.
The second major problem for the Arusha Pharma-
62ceuticals was the inefficiency of the management.
An imaginative management team could have done the 
following to secure the foreign exchange required for 
purchasing imports of the raw materials. It could have 
arranged to obtain credit from the Finnish pharmaceutical 
company. It will be recalled that the management of 
the General Tyre had made such an arrangement and the 
foreign exchange scarcity in the country had had no 
adverse effects on its operations. It could also have 
tried persistently to remind the Government that all 
should be done to secure the necessary foreign exchange 
needed for importing raw materials. Furthermore, it 
could have tried to concentrate on the production for 
export in order to earn foreign exchange. If the 
company had shown that it was capable of earning foreign 
exchange, most probably the Government would have placed
it high on the list of companies to he allocated 
substantial amounts of foreign exchange. Finally, 
though not exhaustively, an imaginative management group 
could also have tried to obtain supplementary loans 
from both the East African Development Bank and the 
Tanzanian Investment Bank. Both of these institutions 
often gave loans in foreign exchange. The interview 
the author had with a senior member of the TIB, in 
1982, revealed that a substantial amount of foreign 
exchange had very often been available for a well- 
formulated and efficiently managed project.
The third problem of the APL was high unit costs.
As was seen above, the plant produced at about 7*1 per
cent of the rated capacity. Because of the high unit
costs, a 30 per cent tariff protection which the APL’s
products enjoyed was inadequate. The National
Pharmaceutical Company and the Christian Missionary
Society, which were in charge of importing drugs
required by Tanzania, had the power to regulate the
amount of imports in a manner that protected the local 
6industry (there were four more drug producing companies 
but their output was very small). The two organisations 
did not restrict imports with a view to protecting the 
Arusha Pharmaceuticals. The scarcity of the foreign 
exchange ensured that limited quantities of drugs were 
imported.
A further problem the APL faced is that its
products were considered to be of inferior quality 
to the imported rivals. The usually high quality of 
some imported goods tends to make consumers willing to 
pay more for those products than the local low quality 
similar products. This makes moderate tariff protect­
ion ineffective.
The problems of the Arusha Pharmaceuticals could 
probably have been eased if the Bank had had a larger 
part of foreign funds, and if it had a policy of 
providing working capital to its clients who badly 
needed it. As was seen in Chapter 6, the Bank had 
from 1975 onwards found it hard to obtain substantial 
funds to lend. This was even more so after the break­
up of the East African Community in 1977. The Bank 
introduced a policy of lending to its clients working 
capital for purchasing raw materials in the 1980s.
This is a step in the right direction. The Bank 
could also have helped the company if it had brought 
some subtle pressure to bear on the Tanzanian Government 
so that it could allocate more foreign exchange required 
for the inputs. This needed, however, to be preceded 
by appointing an efficient team of managers.
The Performance of Medium Scale Project
Cofinanced by EADB
The EMCO Steelworks (K) Limited
The EMCO Steelworks is one of the many projects 
cofinanced by the East African Development Bank which 
was a commercial failure in the early and mid 1970s.
By 1979 and 1980, the company was making profit largely 
because it had implemented remedial measures which 
consultants had recommended. The operation of this 
project is important because of a variety of lessons it 
gives on the determinants of commercial success and 
failure of a project.
The initiators of the EMCO project, the Madhvani
Group, intended to set up a plant to produce iron and
steel products such as iron bars, angles and billets.
The project was estimated to cost K Shs. 22.1 million
and towards this cost the Bank gave a loan of K Shs. 7.51
million in 1971. The products of this project were
mainly to be consumed by the construction industry.
It was estimated that 75 per cent of its output would
65be sold to that industry.
The EMCO, like the Steel Corporation of East Africa 
which was based in Uganda and was also owned by the 
Madhvani Group, intended to use scrap iron from Kenya 
and some ingots from Uganda. The source of the latter 
input was the Steel Corporation. The estimated
66capacity of the EMCO was 24,000 tons per annum,, It
was expected that all the output of the EMCO would be
readily consumed and that there would still be room for
imports. It was estimated that by 1973 the production
of iron and steel products would be 114,000 tons and
67
consumption was put at 204,000 tons.
The demand for iron and steel products in the
East African Community was greatest in Kenya and
Uganda’s demand was slightly greater than Tanzania’s.
For instance, in 1969 Kenya consumed 77,900 tons,
Uganda used 43,700 tons and Tanzania consumed 41,600 
68tonso Investors in the iron and steel industry 
expected Kenya to continue to consume more than either 
of the two countries. This is one of the most probable 
reasons why several iron and steel plants were set up 
in Kenya in the early 1970s0
The EMCO plant came into production in 1972 as 
had been expected. However, it did not produce anywhere 
near the planned level of output. In that year, about 
8223 tons were produced. This was about one third of 
what should have been produced. The explanations 
offered for producing below expectations are these.
The first is the inadequate supply of inputs. It will 
be recalled that the principal sources of the project’s 
inputs were Kenya and Uganda. The EMCO did not obtain 
as much scrap iron from Kenya as had been anticipated. 
This is partly because other iron and steel plants which
also used scrap iron had been set up in the country.
The supplies from Uganda were also cut off when Asians 
were expelled from the country in 1972. Madhvani was 
one of those who left the country and as a result his 
Steel Corporation, which was supposed to give ingots 
to the EMCO, ceased to operate. The EMCO tried to 
obtain inputs from Eastern Europe, but they were very 
expensive.
The consequence of the inadequate supply of inputs
6 9was that unit costs were high. This problem was
compounded by utilizing expensive inputs from Eastern
Europe. The low level of production mentioned above
was partly caused by frequent breakdown of machines.
A further explanation for the low volume of production
is the high rate of rejection. This was a problem
70which could be solved by skilled technicians.
A question which needs to be answered is whether 
or not the inadequate supply of inputs could have been 
forecast. The answer seems to be affirmative. It 
ought to have been known to the Madhvani Group that by 
setting up two more plants in Kenya, their original plant 
in Uganda which had used scrap iron from Kenya, and the 
two new arrivals, would be competing for a limited stock 
of scrap. However, the political events which 
culminated in the expulsion of Asians from Uganda and 
which resulted in the cut of supplies of inputs to EMCO 
could not be forecast.
As a step towards solving the problems of EMCO, the
management of this company took a right decision in
commissioning a firm of consultants, Mukand Iron and
Steelworks Limited of India, to study and recommend ways
of saving this company further financial losses*
71Losses had been incurred from 1972 to 1976. Some of
the recommendations of the consultants were implemented
and as a result, no major breakdowns occurred and the
rate of rejection was sharply reduced. There is also
evidence that the skills of technicians had subs tant- 
7 2ially improved.
Following the implementation of the remedial
measures, the EMCO company made a profit of K Shs. 2.4
million in 1979 and in the following year, the profit
70
was K Shs. 1.9 million. J This drop in profit was 
attributed by the Bank to a less than expected volume of 
sales. An interesting point about the profitable 
performance of the company in the two years is that the 
volume of sales was around 50 per cent of the rated 
capacity of the plant. If the company could make 
profit by selling about 12,000 tons, then it could have 
made greater profit by operating near full capacity, 
assuming that it had managed to obtain inputs at 
reasonable prices.
The demand for iron and steel products, as the Bank 
noticed, depended on the state of the Kenyan economy. 
Luring an economic recession the construction industry 
was also depressed and as a result the demand for
reinforcing bars was low. Also, a government's 
monetary policy of restricting credit reduced the demand 
for iron and steel products. This came about by 
deferring government and private projects. The 
restriction of credit also had an adverse effect on the 
EMCO because the company was forced to give credit to 
its customers who needed iron and steel products but 
who could not pay cash immediately. The result of 
giving credit to the EMCO's clients was that the company 
had to arrange for overdraft facilities which meant it 
was incurring costs of borrowing at the time when 
interest rates were high.
The iron and steel companies in Kenya were producing 
a limited range of products. Because of this, although 
the demand for a variety of iron and steel products 
exceeded the installed capacities, the market for the 
few products manufactured in the country seem to have 
been saturated. The solution which the Bank proposed 
in 1972 was the diversification of products. By 1980, 
the EMOO was in the preliminary stages of diversifying; 
it intended to produce different sizes of bars, angles, 
T-sections, window sections and flats. Notice, 
however, that it had taken about 8 years to do what the 
Bank had recommended.
The Bank had also expressed concern in 1970 about 
the likelihood of the EMOO running short of scrap iron 
inputs. This kind of critical evaluation of projects,
as the author learned from interview, declined after 
the departure of expatriates such as those from the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). 
The author also learned that the Appraisal Department of 
the Bank was generally weak. This department is of 
great importance to the Bank for the selection of 
economically viable and technically feasible projects.
It should, therefore, have competent and critical 
project evaluation officers.
The Performance of Small Scale Projects
Cofinanced by EADB
The Kibo Paper Industries Limited
The Kibo Paper Industries, as its name suggests, 
was in the business of producing a variety of paper 
products in Tanzania. Like the EMCO company, it 
started as a commercial failure and later became a 
profitable business. The main factors behind the early 
failure of the Kibo Paper Industries were the inefficiency 
of management and technical faults. Once these were put 
right, the company became a commercial success since the 
demand for its products was high. The K.P.I., unlike 
the EMCO, was from 1970 a predominantly public owned 
enterprise; the National Development Corporation owned 
76 per cent of the shares of the company, the National 
Milling Corporation held 14 per cent of the shares and
the remainder were owned by the Workers Development 
Corporation. The company had, however, started as a 
private enterprise in 1965.
The performance of this company in the 1960s was 
so bad that in 1969 it was placed under a receiver.
Since, as was mentioned above, its major problem was 
an inefficient management team, its chances of commercial 
success depended on giving it an efficient team of 
managers. With this solution in mind, in 1971 the NDC 
appointed an international firm of managers, Packages 
Limited of Lahore (Pakistan). This firm had success­
fully managed packaging, printing and paper-making 
businesses in Pakistan. The new management team had by 
1973, solved the technical problems and were steering 
the company on a course of commercial success. In
fact, that year it made profit for the first time in 
74many years.
During the same year, the management wanted to add
two lines of production for multiwall paper sacks and
packaging materials. This diversification of the
products of the K.P.I. was estimated to cost about
T Shs. 14o8 million and the Bank was approached and it
75
gave a loan of T Shs. 4»7 million in 1973. Ehe 
diversification contributed to the satisfactory perform­
ance of the company. For each year between 1974 and 
1976, profit was made and the company, as the quotation
below shows, was efficiently run. ’’The K.P.I. is one
76
of the best managed companies in Tanzania”. This
evaluation was made by the Bank after the company had
approached it for another loan for further expansion in
1976, A loan of T Shs. 8 million was granted to enable
the company to carry out an expansion estimated to cost
77T Shs. 25.06 million,.
After the expansion was completed, the company
continued to perform satisfactorily. Net profits after
tax amounting to T Shs. 10.1 and T Shs. 20.6 million
78were made in 1978 and 1979 respectively. This
satisfactory performance was due to the pressure of
demand for the K.P.I. products and also because the same
efficient team of managers was still running the company.
The demand for a range of products the K.P.I. produced
was 4080 tonnes in 1973 and the annual growth rate of
these products was estimated to be 10 per cent. This
rate of growth meant that 7228 and 7951 tonnes would
have been consumed in 1979 and 1980. The actual
consumption was 8749 and 10882 tonnes respectively for 
79the two years. Because of the increase in the cost
of raw materials, profits in 1980 were lower than those 
made in 1979 although the volume of sales was higher 
in 1980.
The K.P.I. company shows a conflict between promot­
ing industrial development in a less industrialised 
member of the East African Community and the promotion 
of industrial complementarity. It will be recalled 
that the Bank was expected to achieve the two goals.
The dilemma the Bank faced is that at the time the K.P.I.
approached it for a loan (1973), there was already 
another firm, in Kenya, E.A. Package Industry Limited, 
engaged in the production of goods similar to those the 
K.P.I. intended to produce. By giving a loan to the 
K.P.I., the Bank participated in the duplication of 
plants in the Community,which was inconsistent with the 
promotion of industrial interdependence, or industrial 
complementarity. Ideally, what the Bank should have 
done was to bring together the two companies so that 
an agreement on how to rationalise production could be 
worked out. It was seen in chapter 6 that the Bank’s 
efforts to bring together owners of iron and steel 
plants had failed to produce an agreement on rationalis­
ation. This had happened despite the fact that all 
the producers in Kenya were adversely affected by the 
absence of a rationalisation arrangement. It is most 
probable that even if the Bank had ignored its failure 
and brought together the K.P.I. and E.A. Package Limited, 
no agreement would have been reached. The K.P.I., 
unlike the iron and steel companies, was doing very 
well in the national market. There was, therefore, no 
incentive for it to engage in the rationalisation of 
production. At any rate, even in the early 1970s, the 
signs of the break-up of the East African Community 
were present; for this reason, it made more sense to 
concentrate on building national industries. A more 
realistic way in which the Bank would have contributed
towards making the partner states of the East African 
Community complementary in industrial field was to finance 
projects which intended to export part of their output 
to the other partners.
A noteworthy point about the K.P.I. is that though 
most of its inputs were imported, its production did not 
fall even during the severe foreign exchange scarcity 
period of 1979-80. It was allocated foreign exchange 
to import inputs largely because it had proved its 
capacity to meet targets it had set.
The Bank could use the performance of this company 
as a model for other projects. It is important to 
realise that the Bank had not been responsible for the 
determinants of the success of the Kibo Papers. But 
in future, it could influence the performance of a 
project if the managerial factor is of crucial importance. 
It could insist on the project it will finance to be run 
by an efficient team of managers. It will be seen 
ahead in the case of the Ugma project that the Bank had 
actually done that.
The Q.P.Ce Industrial Products
The C.PoC. Industrial Products is the last of the 
commercially profitable projects operating in Kenya 
which will be discussed in this appendix. The examinat­
ion of the operation of this project will illustrate the
extent to which the Kenyan Government went to ensure 
that the project succeeded. The products of this 
company enjoyed a high tariff protection; the inputs 
were highly subsidised and their regular supply was 
guaranteed by the National Milling Board. This 
extensive assistance should remind us of the observation 
by Cooper and Massell that governments in the less 
developed world attach much importance to industrialisat­
ion (see chapter 3 of this thesis). Because of that, 
a high price in terms of national income foregone is 
paid.
The C.PoC. Industrial Products project was designed
to produce starch, glucose syrup, maize oil, maize cake
80and other related products. The main raw material
was yellow maize. The project was sited at Eldoret
in the neighbourhood of which there were grown yellow
maize. The estimates of the cost of this project were
81K Shs. 14.57 million. The sponsors of this project, 
C.P.C. Europe Limited and the.ICDC of Kenya, sought and
82obtained a K Shs. 4 million loan from the Bank in 1973* 
The C.P.C. Europe Limited, which was the majority share­
holder, was to manage the new project in Kenya.
The project took longer than expected to be 
implemented. This was largely due to delays in shipp­
ing the machinery required and also because of the 
shortage of cement. The delay in implementation 
resulted in cost overrun of K Shs. 3 million. Product­
ion started in March 1976. By the end of the year the
plant was not yet on course to an annual production of 
10,485 tonnes, which is what was expected to be produced.
Production in 1977, 1978 and 1979 was 6600, 7192 
and 7704 tonnes respectively. Despite this modest level 
of production, in relation to the rated capacity, the
O.P.O. Industrial Products made profit in each of the 
three years. However, by September 1980 the plant
was operating at full capacity. Around this time, the 
management of the company had plans to expand production 
by installing another plant. There were, however, those 
who thought that the expansion would be an unwise step 
to take because there was already a problem of inadequate 
supply of maize. This input had turned out to be a very 
expensive one. This problem, together with high costs
of energy, contributed to a sharp fall in profits in 
1980 from a peak of 1978.^
A key factor which enabled the C.P.C, company to
become a commercial success is the subsidy it received
for its main input, yellow maize. The management team
had been able to secure authorization to buy at a price
below that prevailing on the maize market. It bought a
bag of maize at K Shs. 59 when the market price was 
86K Shs. 88.50. This was part of the investment agree­
ment. Another important element of that agreement was 
a guarantee that the C.P.C. would be supplied regularly 
with the quantity of maize it required. The regular 
supplies ensured that the plant was not idle for lack of
inputs, hence its ability to reach the rated output.
This arrangement was about to be terminated in 1980 
because with the Kenyan Government having to import 
virtually all the maize required in the country (maize 
is the staple food for most Kenyans), it found it hard 
to import extra quantities for the C.PoC. The Bank’s 
officials were of the opinion that if the subsidy and 
the guarantee of regular supplies were removed, the 
company would cease to be a profitable business.
Another factor which helped the company to succeed
is the high protective tariff duty imposed on the rivals
of its products. The duty on imports of rival products
R7
was 50 per cent. This was actually less than what 
the management of the C.P.C. wanted. They had sought 
a total restriction of imports which would have given 
them a monopoly of the Kenyan market. The fact that 
volume of sales had persistently gone up from 1976 to 
1980 suggests that there was pressure of demand for the 
C.P.C. products. This also contributed to the commercial 
success of the company.
Other factors which enabled the company to perform 
well were. First, the installation of a generator so 
that production would not be disrupted by power supply 
cuts. Second, improvements were made in the engineering 
section. Third, both the spare parts and other inputs 
such as chemicals were stockpiled whenever there were 
signs that import restrictions would be imposed in the
near future. Fourth, a water reservoir was built so 
that production was not hindered by water shortages in 
Eldoret.88
The negotiating skills of the C.P.C. Europe Limited 
deserve to be commented on. The management of this 
company foresaw that supplies of maize would be inadequate 
unless there was a Government guarantee. As. was seen 
above, that guarantee was obtained. The Government 
wanted an industry and the C.P.Co wanted a return on 
its investment. This investment was expected to create 
124 jobs ancL to save the country some foreign exchange 
by producing locally a variety of goods which were 
formerly imported. Since some of the products were 
expected to be exported, some foreign exchange was also 
supposed to be earned. A net foreign exchange contribut­
ion of the project was estimated at K Shs. 40 million
89in the life time of the project. These expected
benefits are the probable reasons why the Government 
subsidized and guaranteed the maize input of the project.
It is easy with the benefit of hindsight to argue 
that the Government ought to have realised that the 
supply of maize would in future be inadequate. It is 
important, however, to realise that in 1973 when the 
agreement between the Government and the C.P.C. was made, 
there was no shortage of maize in the country. The 
Government should, however, have tried harder than it 
did to encourage the production of maize so that there 
would be adequate supplies for peoples1 consumption and
a surplus for the new industry. This would have been
consistent with the objective of raising peoples* income.
In future both national governments and the Bank 
should critically examine the proposed source of inputs. 
It may be helpful for the Bank to request a loan seeker 
to indicate an alternative or alternative sources of 
inputs, should the original one prove to be inadequate. 
The costs which may be incurred in order to obtain 
inputs from alternative sources should be taken into 
consideration and contingent plans should accordingly 
be made. Once again, it is important to point out that 
the Bank did not influence the determinants of the 
success of this project*
The JoKo Industries
The JoKo Industries, a company set up to produce a
90variety of plastic goods, became a commercial failure 
business venture. Yet according to the Bank, it could 
have been a profitable business if it had been effic­
iently managed. This view was based on the fact that 
there was high demand for the type of products it 
produced. The study of the operation of this project 
will show once again how inefficient management can ruin 
a business venture with a potential to become a commerc­
ially profitable project.
The owners of the J.K. Industries obtained a loan
91of K Shs. 7 million from the Bank in 1975* Because
of the great potential which the Bank saw in this 
project, it also paid K Shs. 1 million as a share in the 
equity of the company. The entire cost of the project 
was estimated at K Shs. 18.1 million. Since 8 products 
were to be produced, machines of various capacities were 
to be installed. All the eight items were to be 
produced using imported plastic resins.
Because of depending on imported raw material, there 
was risk of disruption of production whenever there was 
a severe scarcity of foreign exchange unless the manage­
ment was able to convince the Government to place it on 
the list of those industries which would be given 
priority during the rationing of the foreign exchange.
Three of the items the company intended to produce, 
syringes and bobbins and wind-on-spools, could have been 
used by an imaginative team of management to secure 
preferential allocation of foreign exchange. The 
syringes were to be sold mainly to the Ministry of 
Health. Given the importance policy-makers attached to 
health, and also given the high priority industrial 
development was accorded by the Government, it should not 
have been hard to use the production of syringes and 
bobbins and wind-on-spools required by the textile mills as 
bargaining instrument for securing a guarantee of a regular
allocation of foreign exchange. Moreover, it had been 
estimated that at full production, the project would save
the country about K Shs* 3»6 million per annum of
92foreign exchange.
The demand for some of the items the J,K, Industries
intended to produce and the capacity to be installed
were as follows. The consumption of syringes in 1974
was about 950,000 pieces. The capacity to be installed
93was 2,5 million, on a three-shift basis. The annual
demand for bobbins was around 1,2 million units, but
the company intended to set up machines with 6 million
94capacity also on a three-shift basis.
The value of all the goods the company intended to 
produce is shown in Table 7oAl below. Table 7»A1 shows 
that in 1977 there was an enormous gap between what was 
expected to be produced and the actual production. In 
the following year though the gap narrowed, the product­
ion was still only at 28 per cent of the target set.
In 1979, production was 58 per cent of the expected 
output which was a very substantial improvement on the 
previous year's level of production. It is no surprise
that in that year a profit of about K Shs. 1 million 
95was made. But in 1980 the value of output declined 
and as a result a loss of K Shs, 1,34 million was 
incurred, ^
Many reasons have been given why the J,K, Industries 
failed commercially. First, and most important, the
company was badly managed. The Bank reported that there 
was no proper planning for the activities of the company
and that production activities were not co-ordinated.
This is an indictment of the Managing Director who 
should have seen to it that a company had a proper 
plan and that its activities were synchronised. Poor 
management manifested itself in the absence of proper 
budgets, inadequate supplies of raw materials and 
spares and low morale of the staff. With these problems, 
it is not surprising that targeted output was not met. 
Power cuts also contributed to low capacity utilization,
TABLE 7oAl: Values of Expected and Actual Output
JoKo Industries
(in K Shs. 000, and in current prices)
Expected
(1)
Actual
(2)
(2) as % 
Of (1)
Deviations
1977 21,056 834 4$ - 20,222
1978 21,273 6056 28$ - 15,217
1979 21,524 12579 58$ - 8,945
1980 21,802 10440
00 - 11,362
1981** 22,109 13473 61% - 8,636
Source: Calculated from East African Development Bank!s
project file: JoKo Industries,' Reports from 
Clients, NRB/PS/l6D/58/I.
In spite of low output, the company could have done 
better than it did were it not that the cost of raw 
materials rose sharply. It is claimed that the company 
could not pass on to the consumer part of the rise in 
price because one of its major customers was the Govern- 
ment. In the same vein, it was argued that the price 
of one of its products, toothbrushes, was controlled by 
the Governments price rise watchdog. The management 
of the JoKoI, should have applied for permission to 
increase price. It was seen that the Panafrican Paper 
Mills was granted such permission. Given the disarray 
the company was in, it is not surprising that no attempt 
was made to seek permission for increasing the price 
of those products which formed the backbone of the 
company’s sales, the tableware.
There was, however, another important exogenous 
factor which contributed to the bad performance of the 
company in 1980. This was the restriction of credit 
facilities which the Government implemented in 1979-80. 
As was seen before, credit restriction had a general 
adverse effect on demand in the economy. This is 
reflected by the fact that JoK.Io turnover in 1980 was 
lower than it had been in 1979o
The Bank tried to help the J.KoI. The manager of
the Bank’s regional office in Kenya recommended that a
team from the Bank should visit the J,LI, and identify 
97its problems. The visit took place, but the
recommendations of the team which included establishing 
systems for running the activities of the company, were 
not implemented. The author is of the opinion that the 
Bank should, right from the start, have insisted on the 
company having a management team which had a record of 
successful management of the type of activities which were 
to be undertaken.
The Casements (Africa) Limited
The Casements Limited company had been producing a 
variety of metal products for the construction, fire­
fighting and fishery industries in Tanzania since 1966,
In the mid-1970s, the management of this company wanted 
to increase the capacities of various plants in order to 
satisfy the rising demand. Since the main raw materials 
were imported, the company could meet the growing demand 
if it had regular supply of foreign exchange. The study 
of the operation of this company will throw light on how 
the scarcity of foreign exchange for purchasing inputs 
can hinder full exploitation of the commercial potential 
of a company. This company, like the J,K, Industries, 
its potential to become a profitable business was high 
because the demand for its products was high. Also, 
like the J,K, Industries, it was the only company of its 
kind in the country. But unlike the J,K, Industries, 
the Casements Limited was managed by an efficient firm
of managing agents, the Comcraft Services of London*
The expansion programme which the owners of the
Casements intended to carry out, involved increasing the
output of steel doors and windows and an introduction of
98a new line to produce aluminium louvre windows. For
the former, the expansion was to be from 500 to 900
tonnes and for the latter, it was estimated that 120,000
99louvres would be produced each year* This programme 
was expected to cost T Shs. 10*14 million and the Bank’s 
contribution was a loan of shs. 6 million*
The demand for the company’s products, as was 
mentioned above, exceeded its production capacity. It 
may be seen from Table 7oA2 that the company produced 
in 1970 only 41 tonnes or about 5o8 per cent of the total 
consumption. In the following year, it more than 
quadrupled its output of 1970, but this was still about 
33.7 per cent of the total consumption in 1971® The 
decline in consumption in 1971 and 1972 was due to the 
Government* s take-over of buildings (an integral part 
of extreme socialist measures designed to put in the 
hands of the public the ownership of important assets) 
as part of the implementation of socialist policies*
The fear of having one’s building nationalised led to 
the suspection of building for a number of people.
However, as the table indicates, consumption in 1973 
was substantially higher than it had been in 1972. By 
1974, it was exactly equal to what it had been before
the nationalisation of buildings, 711 tonnes* During 
that year 410 tonnes were produced* This was about 
82 per cent of the installed capacity.
Demand was estimated to grow at 5 per cent 
annually* At that rate of annual growth, it was
estimated that demand would exceed domestic supply 
from 1975 to 1985. By 1979, demand would be greater 
than the 900 tonnes of output of steel doors and frames 
which was to be the new level of production (seen above ).
TABLE 7oA2: Production and Consumption of Steel Doors
and Windows in Tanzania, 1970-74
(in tonnes)
Year Production Imports Consumption
1970 41 670 711
1971 189 371 560
1972 232 90 322
1973 245 176 421
1974 410 301 711
Source: Calculated from East African Development Bank’s
project file, Basic Data, PS/16B/61/I.
The commercial performance of the Casements company 
was satisfactory apart from 1971 and 1972. In these 
two years, capacity utilization was 8.2 and 37®8 per cent 
respectively. It is no surprise that at such low levels 
of production losses were made. When capacity utiliz­
ation climbed to 82 per cent in 1974 a profit of over
102T Shs, 1 million was made* After the expansion
programme was completed, around 1979, the company’s
profit was up^T Shs. 1*5 m i l l i o n * T h e  statistics
found on the file do not indicate the contribution of
the expansion to the profit made. However, the
quantity of louvres produced in 1979 is shown, 214,000
units, and in the following year output was even higher,
248,918 units*^^ It will be recalled that it had
been estimated that 120,000 would be produced per year.
But by 1980 the target had been raised to 294,000 
105units* This meant that 84®7 per cent of the target
was achieved, which is good considering that the 
Tanzanian economy was in a bad state.
The company experienced a number of problems. The 
most serious, as was stated earlier, was the insufficient 
supply of foreign exchange. The years 1979, 1980 were 
a period of severe shortage of foreign exchange in 
Tanzania since the limited amount the country had was 
spent on arms during the war between this country and 
Uganda. The scarcity of the foreign exchange led to 
inadequate allocations and this, in turn, resulted in a 
fall in production for some of the items traditionally
produced. For instance, the output of door and window 
frames, H/Douglas and Styropor for 1980 was lower than 
it had been in 1979®
The closure of the border between Tanzania and 
Kenya, following the break-up of the East African 
Community, is another factor which adversely affected 
the Casements Africa. Before the closure of the border, 
this company had sold louvres, fire-fighting equipment 
and styropor to Kenya. These products were in the 
late 1970s hardly being exported to Kenya.
Yet another problem which the Casement faced in 
1980 was low sales. This seems to contradict the 
point made above, that there was pressure of demand 
for the company1 s products. There is no inconsistency 
because the Tanzanian economy was depressed in 1980.
Most economic activities, construction inclusive, 
slowed down.
The company surmounted the above problems mainly 
because it was in the hands of a capable firm of 
managing agents. It is interesting to recall that the 
J o K o  Industries, which also depended on the availability 
of foreign exchange like the Casements ,failed. As was
mentioned above, the former was badly managed while the 
latter was well managed. Also it was seen that the 
Arusha Pharmaceuticals which was badly managed had great 
difficulties in obtaining allocations of the foreign 
exchange it required for purchasing raw materials. It
seems reasonable for the government to show reluctance 
to allocate the scarce foreign exchange to a company 
which cannot show ability to run its business efficiently. 
A company such as the Casements which was well managed 
and which had earned the country some foreign exchange, 
would deserve to be a regular receiver of the necessary 
amount required to purchase foreign inputs. The Bank 
should, however, be cautious with projects which depend 
heavily on imported inputs.
The Mafia Coconuts Limited
The Mafia Coconuts company produced coconut related 
products such as coconut oil, copra cake, coil fibre 
and shell flour in Tanzania. Towards the end of the 
1960s, the management of the company decided to develop 
two coconut plantations on the Mafia Island (80 miles 
South-East of Dar-es-Salaam) and to modernize and 
enlarge the existing processing facilities. This 
vertical integration programme was intended to satisfy 
the existing high demand in Tanzania for the above listed 
products. If the development had been successful, it 
could also have satisfied demand in some other parts of 
Eastern Africa. Tanzania has the largest area in East 
Africa which is suited to large scale plantation of
coconut. Yet the Mafia Coconut project was a commercial
failure. The causes of its failure will be examined
below.
The development of the two plantations and the
modernisation of the processing facilities were expected
to cost T Shs. 8 million and the Bank’s contribution to
this cost was a loan of T Shs. 1.9 million, which was
106supposed to finance the processing section. Other
sources of finance were H.J. Stanley and Sons (the 
managers of the Mafia Coconut company) the Tanzanian 
Development Finance Company (in which the Government 
had majority shares), the National Food Corporation (a 
me’mber of the National Development Corporation which, as 
was noted earlier, was set up by the Government to 
facilitate the economic development of the country) and 
Mr. R.A. Appleby. It is noteworthy that the NDC relied 
on a company, H.J. Stanley and Sons, which had had 
experience in coconut production.
Four processing plants were to be set up. The 
plant for extracting coconut oil had a capacity of 
1000 tonnes per year, and the plants, those for process­
ing copra cake, coil fibre and shell flour were to 
produce 666, 1720 and 630 tonnes per year respectively.
It may be seen from Table 7®A3 that in neither of 
the three years did the Mafia company achieve the 
target it had set itself. The output of coconut oil 
and copra cake, which were the backbone of the company’s
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activities, increased in each of the three years. By
1071979, the production of coconut oil was 349 tonnes
which was lower than the previous year’s output of
418 tonnes (Table 7*A3). Copra cake output in 1979,
at 193 tonnes, was also lower than the production of 
108236 tonnes in the preceding year. Considering 
that these two activities were supposed to be the 
mainstay of the company, the deterioration in output 
was bound to have an adverse effect on its commercial 
performance.
This is indeed what happened. In 1979 a loss of
109T Shs. 1.2 million was made. And because of capacity
underutilization, (seen in Table 7<>A3) unit costs were 
high and as a result the company had made a loss for 
most of the time between 1971 and 1979. The accumulated 
losses stood at T Shs. 1.48 million by 1978.
The capacity underutilization had been mainly due 
to low yield of the coconuts. In order to raise the 
yield, fertilizers were needed. However, the cost of 
fertilizers was too high to be afforded by the company 
which had not been able to make profits to be ploughed 
back.
The problem of inadequate production was also 
linked to weak management of the Mafia Coconut company. 
The Bank had expressed lack of confidence in the manage­
ment of this company in 1975. However, it had no 
authority to change a team of managers in a given
company. At any rate, "because its loan formed a small 
fraction of the total finance the company had used, its 
authority over the company was correspondingly small.
The National Development Corporation, together with the 
National Agriculture and Pood Corporation, could, however, 
have removed the management of the Mafia Coconut company. 
It will be recalled that the two corporations were 
majority shareholders,. New management was not appointed 
until 1980o
Other remedial measures taken were as follows:
First, a loan of T Shs* 10.3 million was obtained from 
Holland in order to redevelop the Mafia Coconut 
plantations* Therefore, in future, fertilizers could 
be afforded* Second, Holland also gave a grant of 
about T Shs* 4 million so that a well-qualified General 
Manager, Chief Engineer and consultants could be hired. 
Third, a coconut seed multiplication unit was to be set up 
so that coconut seedlings with a high yielding potential 
could be produced. Fourth, it was decided that the 
Mafia Coconut could in future supplement its supplies 
by purchasing coconuts from smallholders. The above 
corrective measures were effected between 1980 and 1981. 
When the author last visited Tanzania, in mid 1982, no 
positive results in terms of commercial performance had 
been reported. The Bank was, however, optimistic about 
the performance of the new project, because it considered 
that the right remedial steps had been taken*
The Ugma Steel and Engineering Corporation
The Ugma Steel and Engineering Corporation is the 
last of the selected case study projects which were 
cofinanced by the Bank that will be discussed. This 
project’s performance illustrates two major factors 
which had adverse effects on many projects in Uganda*
The first is the political change which took place in 
Uganda bringing in a new regime that mismanaged the 
economy and neglected industrial development which the 
previous government had given priority. The second 
factor was the absence of indigenous entrepreneurs 
capable of running a company such as the Ugma after its 
Asian owners had been thrown out of the country by the 
Amin Government. The study of this project also shows: 
how the Bank was willing to help a business proposal 
whose potential impact on the economy was promising*
This willingness was to be expected since the Bank’s 
effectiveness as an instrument for fostering industrial 
development depended on such business ventures with a 
potential of becoming commercially profitable*
The Ugma Steel and Engineering Corporation came 
into existence in I960, in Uganda, and started operations 
in 1962* It was created to fulfil the engineering needs 
mainly of the Lugazi Sugar Estates and the owner of the 
company was the Mehta Group whose main line of business 
was the production of sugar in U g a n d a * T h e  Ugma’s
products included pump components, roller shells, 
mill liners and balls, as well as jaggery rolls* The
company intended to undertake expansion and diversifi­
cation programmes in the late 1960s, which were estimated 
to cost U Shs, 12 million. The Bank, after carrying
out an extensive appraisal of that project, approved a
112loan of U Shs* 2 million in 1969* Another financial
institution, the Development Finance Company of Uganda, 
gave the, company a loan of U Shs* 3 million. This 
company took a pari passu charge with the Bank over 
the assets of the Ugma. The implication of this with 
regard to the financial prudence by the Bank is discussed 
later.
The financial performance of the Ugma Corporation
had been persistently bad from 1962 to 1967. losses
had been incurred in each year and by the latter year,
113the cumulative losses were U Shs. 2.2 million.
This bad performance was due to two interrelated factors. 
One was poor management and the other was the lack of 
an effective distribution and marketing system.
Despite the company’s bad financial record, the 
Bank decided to lend it U Shs. 2 million. The Bank’s 
decision was influenced by two broad considerations, the 
significant economic potential of the project and the 
company’s readiness to reorganise itself along lines 
which would make it an efficient business venture.
The economic contributions of the Ugma project were these:
First, it was to supply Uganda with all the metric 
weights it needed; it was also expected to satisfy all 
the demand for machetes,spades, shovels and picks.
Second, it was expected that it would supply some inputs 
(ingots) to the only iron and steel mill in the country. 
Third, it was to export agricultural implements to 
Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, thus earning the country 
foreign exchange. This is something it had done in the 
past. The fourth attractive aspect of the Ugma project 
is that it was to create new jobs. Finally, the Ugma 
had an apprenticeship scheme to train youngsters, 10-15 
per year, so that the company would have an adequate 
supply of skilled workers.
The readiness of the company to reorganise how the 
business was to be run is shown by the following 
measures it took. To begin with, new staff, including 
a technical supervisor, were recruited. Second, a 
person with good professional qualification in business 
management and who had long experience in the iron and 
steel engineering was put in charge of the expansion 
and diversification programmes. Third, a qualified 
cost accountant was one of the members of new staff 
who was expected to establish a cost accounting system 
in a company where there had been none previously.
Fourth, a more experienced person was recruited to 
supervise production. Fifth, two new members, one from 
the Bank and another from the Development Finance Company
of Uganda (DFCU) were appointed to join the four Board
of Directors of the company. Finally, the Chief
Engineer of the most reputable firm which manufactured
sugar mill equipment in India, was made the Ugma’s
consultant. One year after the above measures were
effected, the company’s losses fell from U Shs. 1.2
1 1 4 .million to U Shs. 0.69 million.
It was seen above that the Bank was not the sole 
sponsor of the Ugma project. The Charter of the Bank 
specifies that financial prudence should be exercised. 
This is what the Bank was doing by committing itself to 
only 16.7 per cent of the total cost of the project.
It was learned from the Director of Operations that the 
Bank always attached heavy weight on avoiding the risk 
of putting too much money in one project.
The Bank also tried to ensure the commercial profit­
ability of the Ugma Company by making loan approval 
conditional on several factors. First, the General 
Manager of the company could only be changed with the 
consent of the Bank and the DFCU. The Bank had 
confidence in the existing General Manager. Second, 
and related to the first point, a managing agent could 
be employed after the approval of the Bank had been 
given. Third, monthly reports of the performance of 
the company had to be sent to the Bank. The study of 
these reports would indicate if the company was making 
satisfactory progress. If it was not, then remedial
measures would be recommended before a long lapse of 
time had made the problem more grave. Fourth, the 
company was not supposed to borrow from anywhere without 
prior consent of the Bank. Finally, the Bank was 
entitled to call for opinion of independent consultants 
if the company was in problems and if there were grounds 
to doubt the opinion of the consultants the company had 
chosen.
The above great efforts the Bank made to ensure
the success of the Ugma were not confined to that
project alone. Many other projects which the Bank
financed in its early years of operation were expected
to be well-managed and were also supposed to comply with
conditions similar to those indicated above. The Bank,
as was learned from one of its senior members, became
less stringent particularly after the expatriates from
115the UNIDO and academic institutions had left.
The Ugma Company was a commercial failure 
principally because its Asian owners were expelled from 
Uganda by Amin. Apart from one indigenous Ugandan who 
was a Sales Manager, the rest of the managerial staff 
were Asians. Their departure led to the closure of 
all activities. Unlike most other properties of the 
departed Asians, the Ugma assets were not relocated, 
partly because both the Bank and the DFCU had priority 
over the assets of the company. The other part of the 
explanation is that to run profitably, the activities
of the Ugma required skilled people who were not in a 
hurry to make profits overnight. People with relevant 
skills, managerial and technical know-how, were few in 
Uganda. And those with patience to lay foundations for 
future profits were, and still are, very scarce indeed.
This may be explained mainly by two factors. One 
is that some people correctly argue that if the purpose 
of doing business is to make profit, why not try to 
achieve that objective more easily by importing commodit­
ies which are in high demand. This takes a shorter time 
than building up a factory. The second line of argument 
is that given the political instability in the country, 
why should one set up a factory which could either go up 
in flames at the time of political changes or which 
could be misappropriated. A combination of these 
interrelated ways of reasoning is probably the main 
reason why some foreign exchange lines of credit extended
to Uganda by the World Bank, the EEC, the USAID, have not 
116been utilized. Unless the political situation
improves and unless greater incentives are given to 
prospective industrialists, the Bank may find itself 
with diminishing Ugandan clients in the future. The 
consequence of this is that the structural transformation 
of the Ugandan economy which the Bank is supposed to 
bring about, will not take place on the desirable scale. 
Unfortunately, the Bank is incapable of creating both 
the political and economic climates conducive to the 
success of projects it will finance in the future.
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